United States v. Raygoza-Cedillo , 260 F. App'x 745 ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 2, 2008
    No. 06-41786
    Summary Calendar               Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    PEDRO LUIS RAYGOZA-CEDILLO
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:06-CR-775-ALL
    Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Pedro Luis Raygoza-Cedillo (Raygoza) appeals his conviction and sentence
    for illegal reentry following deportation in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1326
    (a) and
    (b).   Raygoza argues that the district court erred in applying a 16-level
    enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), based on the
    determination that his 1992 Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation
    constitutes a crime of violence. We review the district court’s application of the
    Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Velasco, 
    465 F.3d 633
    , 637 (5th Cir.
    2006).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 06-41786
    Raygoza recognizes that this court has previously held that an offense
    committed under TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a)(1), the statute of his conviction, is
    a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2, but argues that the Supreme Court’s
    recent decision in James v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 1586
    , 1599-1600 (2007),
    overrules this circuit’s precedent. His argument is unpersuasive.
    In United States v. Gomez-Guerra, 
    485 F.3d 301
    , 304 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2007),
    this court noted that the analysis in James expressly does not concern
    enumerated offenses and pertains only to a residual provision in 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (2)(B)(ii), which § 2L1.2 does not contain. Consequently, James is not
    dispositive of this case. Moreover, because this court has repeatedly held that
    an offense under § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of
    § 2L1.2, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement under
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). See Gomez-Guerra, 
    485 F.3d at 304
    ; United States v.
    Garcia-Mendez, 
    420 F.3d 454
    , 456-57 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
    Murillo-Lopez, 
    444 F.3d 337
    , 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Raygoza also maintains the "felony" and "aggravated felony" provisions of
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(1) and (b)(2) are unconstitutional in the light of Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). This argument is foreclosed by
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998), which held 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense.
    United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 
    492 F.3d 624
    , 625 (5th Cir.2007), petition for
    cert. filed, (Aug. 28, 2007) (No. 07-6202).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    2