National Labor Relations Board v. Fairmont General Hospital, Inc. , 261 F. App'x 534 ( 2008 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-2301
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    FAIRMONT GENERAL HOSPITAL, INCORPORATED,
    Respondent.
    On Application for Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor
    Relations Board. (6-CA-35297)
    Argued:   December 4, 2007                 Decided:   January 24, 2008
    Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit
    Judges.
    Petition for enforcement of order granted by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    ARGUED: Martin J. Saunders, JACKSON & LEWIS, L.L.P., Pittsburgh,
    Pennsylvania, for Respondent.   Kellie J. Isbell, NATIONAL LABOR
    RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.     ON BRIEF:
    Ronald Meisburg, General Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy
    General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel,
    Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Fred B.
    Jacob, Supervisory Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)
    petitions for enforcement of its order entered against Fairmont
    General Hospital (Fairmont General or the hospital) in an unfair
    labor practice case. In this court Fairmont General challenges the
    Board’s unit clarification decision that included two newly created
    occupational medicine assistant (OMA) positions in the bargaining
    unit for non-professional employees of the hospital.      Fairmont
    General argues that (1) the union’s petition for unit clarification
    should not have been entertained because the OMA positions had been
    historically excluded from the bargaining unit; and (2) even if the
    petition was properly considered, the Board applied the incorrect
    analysis and reached a result that the evidence does not support.
    We conclude that the petition was properly entertained, that the
    Board applied the correct analysis in deciding the petition, and
    that the Board’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
    Accordingly, we grant the Board’s petition for enforcement.
    I.
    A.
    Fairmont General is an acute care community hospital
    located in Fairmont, West Virginia.   Two-thirds of the hospital’s
    seven hundred employees are unionized. Technical employees such as
    nurses are represented by District 1199 of the Service Employees’
    2
    International Union (SEIU), while “nonprofessional employees” are
    represented by the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union
    Council,     Local   550,    United       Food   and     Commercial    Workers
    International Union (the Union).           J.A. 308.      The Union contract
    covers:
    All the part-time and full-time nonprofessional
    employees in the following Hospital departments:
    Nutrition Services, Engineering, Laundry, Guest Services,
    X-Ray, Clinical Laboratory, Medical Records, Central
    Supply, and Patient Services. There is excepted from the
    above departments all clerical and administrative
    employees, other than ward secretaries, and all clerical
    employees (except in the Medical Records department); all
    department heads and their assistants; student employees;
    and supervisors.
    The term, “nonprofessional employees,” is intended
    to exclude those whose occupations require a course of
    study or an extensive technical training course or
    apprenticeship,   such   as   laboratory   technicians,
    registered or licensed practical nurses, or dietitians.
    J.A. 308.
    The Union represents approximately 180 Fairmont General
    employees.        Bargaining   unit       positions      include    laboratory
    secretaries, certified nurse’s aides, operating room technicians,
    and emergency room medical assistants.                Many covered employees
    perform    both   clerical   tasks    (such      as    answering   phones   and
    scheduling appointments) and clinical duties (such as blood sugar
    testing, drug screening, and assisting with physicals). Bargaining
    unit positions do not require extensive training, although some
    require limited certifications.
    3
    B.
    In 1991 Fairmont General started providing occupational
    medicine services.     The occupational medicine program (OM) was
    originally located in the main hospital facility and staffed by
    medical technologists.   OM grew as employers began requesting more
    health services for their employees.        In 1998 Fairmont General
    responded to OM’s growth by employing a licensed practical nurse
    (LPN), Cindy Ralphsnyder, and a laboratory secretary, Janice Divin,
    to work in OM.    The lab secretary was represented by the Union,
    while the LPN and the medical technologists were represented by
    SEIU.
    In 1999 Brian Pulice was engaged as an independent
    contractor to direct and market OM’s services, and the program
    “grew astronomically.”    J.A. 101.      In response to the program’s
    growth, Ralphsnyder and Diven moved in 2000 to an offsite location
    five miles from the main hospital facility.     When Ralphsnyder left
    OM two years later, Fairmont General did not hire another LPN to
    take her place.   Instead, the hospital created the new position of
    occupational medicine services coordinator (OMSC), which Diven, the
    former lab secretary, filled.          OMSC duties included drug and
    alcohol   testing,   conducting   physicals,   drawing   blood,   audio
    testing, pulmonary function testing, performing injections, and
    otherwise assisting physicians.        In addition, the OMSC position
    required Diven to take on responsibility for coordinating some of
    4
    OM’s programs.   The vacant lab secretary position was filled by
    Brenda Schell. The Union continued to represent the lab secretary,
    but did not represent Diven in her new position as OMSC.
    Between 2002 and 2005 OM’s services continued to expand.
    In response the OM lab secretary position evolved to encompass
    substantially more tasks than its original clerical duties. By the
    end of 2004 Schell spent approximately seventy-five percent of her
    time doing various clinical activities and twenty-five percent of
    her time on clerical tasks.   By 2005, in addition to her clerical
    tasks, Schell’s duties included breath alcohol testing, various
    types of on- and off-site drug testing and paperwork, multiphasic
    computer entry, setting up medical equipment, vision screening,
    urinalysis dips, assisting with blood drawing, taking vital signs,
    and conducting physicals.
    In 2004 Pulice, OM’s director, was replaced by Pam Payne
    under the new title of occupational medicine director.   Payne took
    over many of the clerical and billing duties formerly performed by
    the lab secretary. Payne also reviewed the OM job descriptions and
    decided that they should be changed.     Accordingly, in 2005 Payne
    eliminated the lab secretary position and posted the newly created
    positions of occupational medicine assistant (OMA) I and II.   (The
    only difference between the two positions is that the OMA II is
    full-time and the OMA I is part-time.)
    5
    Schell received the OMA II position, and Roseann Orwig
    received the OMA I position.           Like Schell, Orwig’s previous title
    was lab secretary. The OMA job descriptions required applicants to
    have a high school diploma, current CPR certification, and basic
    computer and typing skills.                 The positions also list several
    preferred clinical certifications, some of which had previously
    been   obtained    by   Schell       and    Orwig    for    their    lab    secretary
    positions.     The OMA clinical duties were substantially the same as
    Schell’s previous duties as lab secretary, except that audio and
    phlebotomy testing were added.              Schell’s OMA clerical duties also
    were substantially the same as her previous duties, and there was
    no change in her work days, hours, or supervision.                         As an OMA,
    Schell continued to spend twenty-five percent of her time on
    clerical tasks and seventy-five percent of her time on clinical
    tasks.
    At the same time the OMA positions were created, the OMSC
    title was changed to occupational medical coordinator (OMC), and
    Diven remained in this position.                 While the OMC tasks remained
    substantially the same as the OMSC tasks, the OMC had “quasi-
    supervisory     duties”       such     as       taking     over     the     director’s
    responsibilities in Payne’s absence.                J.A. 220.     Fairmont General
    listed   the    OMAs    and    OMC     as       non-union    in     their    position
    descriptions.     Thus, Diven remained in a non-union position, while
    6
    Schell and Orwig ceased being represented by the Union as the
    result of the title change.
    C.
    In August 2005 the Union filed a petition for unit
    clarification   with   the   NLRB   seeking   to   include   the    new    OMA
    positions in the bargaining unit. After a hearing and briefing the
    Regional Director issued his decision. As a preliminary matter, he
    concluded that the unit clarification procedure was appropriate
    under Board precedent because there were ambiguities concerning the
    bargaining unit placement of individuals coming within the newly
    created OMA job title.
    The   Regional     Director    then      considered      the    unit
    clarification petition. After reviewing the evidence, the Regional
    Director found that the OM lab secretary was historically included
    in the bargaining unit, despite the position’s increase in clinical
    duties over time; Schell’s duties as OMA were similar to her
    previous duties as lab secretary; and the OMA functions were
    similar to those performed by other bargaining unit positions.
    Based on these factual findings and Board precedent, the Regional
    Director concluded that the OMAs should remain in the bargaining
    unit because they “perform[ed] work which had historically been
    performed by unit positions.” J.A. 425. Fairmont General appealed
    to the NLRB, and a divided panel relied on the Regional Director’s
    findings and denied the request for review.
    7
    To obtain judicial review of the decision, Fairmont
    General refused to recognize or bargain with the Union as the
    representative of the OMAs.          The Union then filed an unfair labor
    practice charge alleging the hospital’s refusal to bargain in
    violation of the National Labor Relations Act.                   The Board granted
    summary judgment to the Union and ordered Fairmont General to
    bargain with the Union as the representative of employees in the
    OMA position.         The Board now petitions for enforcement of its
    order.
    II.
    Fairmont General raises two arguments in opposition to
    enforcement.          First,    it   contends      that    the    Board    erred   in
    considering     the    unit     clarification      petition      because    the    OMA
    position had been historically excluded from the bargaining unit.
    Second, the hospital argues in the alternative that the Board
    applied the wrong legal standard when considering the petition and
    (under any legal standard) reached the wrong conclusion.
    In reviewing a decision of the Board, we must first
    ensure   that    it     is     employing       “reasoned   decision-making”        by
    consistently applying its own legal standards.                   Baltimore Sun Co.
    v. NLRB, 
    257 F.3d 419
    , 428 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Allentown Mack
    Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    522 U.S. 359
    , 376 (1998)).                     We then
    8
    determine whether the Board decision is supported by substantial
    evidence.    
    Id.
     (citing 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e)).
    III.
    Fairmont General first contends that the Board improperly
    allowed the Union to pursue the unit clarification procedure rather
    than restricting the Union’s remedy to a petition for election.
    The Board has authority to define “the unit appropriate for the
    purposes of collective bargaining.”           
    29 U.S.C. § 159
    (b).          During
    the term of an existing union contract, a unit clarification
    proceeding is appropriate for resolving ambiguities concerning the
    bargaining unit placement of individuals who come within newly
    created job classifications.          NLRB v. Magna Corp., 
    734 F.2d 1057
    ,
    1061 (5th Cir. 1984); Union Elec. Co., 
    217 N.L.R.B. 666
    , 667
    (1975).     It is not appropriate for the Board to consider a unit
    clarification      petition,   however,      when    the    position    has   been
    historically excluded from the bargaining unit.                  Magna Corp., 
    734 F.2d at 1060
    ; see also NLRB v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 
    769 F.2d 276
    , 279-80 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining rationale for rule).
    Fairmont   General   argues      that    the    unit    clarification
    procedure    was   improper    here    because      the    OMA    positions   were
    successors to the OMSC position, which was historically excluded
    from the bargaining unit.        In support of its position,             Fairmont
    General refers to a different proceeding, where the Regional
    9
    Director concluded that another position, the OMC position, was the
    successor to the OMSC position and thus was not subject to a unit
    clarification petition.          We do not find this argument persuasive.
    In the case before us, the Regional Director concluded
    that   the    OMA    positions       were   not     the    successors       to    the    OMSC
    position.      The record supports this conclusion.                  The parties agree
    that the OMA positions were new titles created in 2005.                                   The
    written OMA job descriptions differ from those for the OMSC and the
    OMC positions because the latter two positions both involve “quasi-
    supervisory duties” that are absent in the OMA positions.                                J.A.
    220.   The quasi-supervisory duties include coordinating day-to-day
    operations when the director is absent.                     Furthermore, the use of
    the    word    “coordinator”         in    the    OMC     job    title     and   the     word
    “assistant”      in     the     OMA       title     indicates       a      difference      in
    responsibility        between    the      positions.            Finally,    as   discussed
    further in the next part, the evidence indicates that the OMA
    position      succeeded   the     OM      lab     secretary      position,       which    was
    historically        included    in    the    bargaining         unit.       Thus,   it    was
    reasonable for the Regional Director to conclude that the OMA
    positions were not successors to the OMSC position and therefore
    had not been historically excluded from the bargaining unit, making
    a unit clarification proceeding appropriate.                      See Magna Corp., 
    734 F.2d at 1061
    ; Union Elec. Co., 
    217 N.L.R.B. 666
    .                                 Since the
    10
    Regional Director did not err in using the unit clarification
    procedure, we now turn to the substance of the Board’s order.
    IV.
    In addressing a unit clarification petition for a newly
    created job title, the NLRB conducts a two-step analysis.                      The
    Board first considers whether “a new classification is performing
    the same basic functions as a unit classification historically had
    performed.”        Premcor,    Inc.,    
    333 N.L.R.B. 1365
    ,   1366   (2001);
    Developmental Disabilities Inst., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B 1166, 1168
    (2001).     If so, the new classification is properly understood as
    “remaining in the unit,” thus resolving the unit clarification
    petition.         Premcor,    Inc.,    333    N.L.R.B.   at   1366;   see     also
    Developmental Disabilities Inst., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B at 1168.
    If the new classification does not remain in the unit
    under the Premcor standard, however, the Board considers whether
    the new position should be added to the bargaining unit through
    accretion.        In conducting this analysis, the Board considers
    whether the employees have “an insufficient group identity to
    function     as    a   separate   unit”       and   whether   they    share    an
    “overwhelming community of interest” with the existing bargaining
    unit.   Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    296 F.3d 292
    , 297 (4th
    Cir. 2002) (quoting Baltimore Sun Co., 
    257 F.3d at 427
    ).              The Board
    11
    looks    to   several        factors    in     determining    whether    there    is    a
    community of interest.           Id. at 298 (listing factors).
    In the case before us the Board held that the OMAs
    remained in the bargaining unit under Premcor.                     Fairmont General
    argues   that    the    Board     erred      in   applying    Premcor    because,      it
    contends, the OMAs do not perform the same basic functions as those
    performed by the OM lab secretary.                   After a thorough review of the
    record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
    decision.
    Schell originally joined OM as a lab secretary in 2002;
    at that time she indisputably fell within the bargaining unit.
    Although Fairmont General was aware that Schell’s duties changed
    over time to include an increasing amount of clinical work, it
    never contested the OM lab secretary’s bargaining unit status.                         In
    2005, when Schell’s title changed from OM lab secretary to OMA, she
    testified that her duties remained essentially the same as they had
    been in her previous position.                  She stated that, as an OMA, she
    continued to do such tasks as making order entries, taking vital
    signs, conducting breath alcohol and drug testing, and performing
    various clerical duties.             Schell was able to identify only a minor
    difference between the positions (the addition of phlebotomy and
    audio testing in the OMA position), and she reported that the
    percentages     of     her    time     spent    on    clinical   and   clerical   work
    remained the same after her title change.                        In fact, Kimberly
    12
    Cheuvront, Fairmont General’s assistant vice president of business
    and development, testified that the OMA position was created for
    the sole purpose of better reflecting the actual work performed by
    Schell.   Cheuvront also testified that Schell retained the same
    work hours, supervision, and job site after the title changes.
    Fairmont General argues that the Board should not have
    compared Schell’s duties directly before and after the title change
    to determine whether both positions performed the same basic
    functions.   Instead, it argues, the Board should have compared the
    tasks originally performed by the OM lab secretary in 1998 with the
    OMA job description adopted in 2005.    This argument misreads the
    Board’s “same basic functions” analysis, however. In applying this
    standard to clarify the unit placement of a new classification, the
    Board has consistently compared the position duties in the time
    closely preceding a title change with those assumed immediately
    after the title change.   See, e.g., Premcor, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. at
    1365-66; Developmental Disabilities, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. at 1166-68.
    The Board appropriately applied the same analysis in this case.
    The Board’s conclusion finds further support in the
    existing unit description in the Union contract. See Developmental
    Disabilities, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. at 1168 (Hurtgen, concurring). As
    defined by the contract, and in contrast to the technical positions
    represented by SEIU, the OMA and other unit positions do not
    “require a course of study or an extensive technical training
    13
    course or apprenticeship.”            J.A. 308.       Instead, the OMA positions
    simply require a high school diploma, CPR certification, and basic
    typing    and       computer    skills.          Furthermore,    despite    Fairmont
    General’s argument that the Union does not represent positions that
    perform    clinical        work,   OMAs     perform    similar    tasks     as   other
    bargaining unit positions.            For example, like OMAs, nurse’s aides
    take blood pressures, document patient information, take vital
    signs, and perform blood sugar, breath alcohol, and drug testing.
    Several bargaining unit positions are, also like OMAs, responsible
    for stocking and ordering supplies, preparing patient records and
    examination rooms, and answering phones.
    We recognize that the employer contested the Union’s
    evidence by presenting some testimony that OMA duties were more
    similar to the OMC duties than to the OM lab secretary duties.
    There is no basis, however, for us to conclude that the Regional
    Director erred in his credibility determinations or in weighing the
    evidence.       In sum, because there is substantial evidence in the
    record    to    establish      that   the   employees      in   the   OMA   positions
    performed “the same basic functions as [the OM lab secretary]
    historically had performed,” Premcor, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. at 1366,
    the Board did not err in its ultimate decision to include the OMA
    positions      in    the   bargaining     unit.       An   accretion    analysis   is
    therefore unnecessary in light of our holding that Premcor and the
    record support the Board’s decision.
    14
    V.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s petition for
    enforcement of its order is granted.
    PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT
    OF ORDER GRANTED
    15