Vurmaz v. Atty Gen USA , 179 F. App'x 862 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-23-2006
    Vurmaz v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-1866
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
    Recommended Citation
    "Vurmaz v. Atty Gen USA" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1059.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1059
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-1866
    IBRAHIM VURMAZ,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
    SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    Respondents
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Board No. A78-324-997)
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    on March 10, 2006
    BEFORE: ROTH, ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
    and RODRIGUEZ*, District Judge
    (Filed:    May 23, 2006 )
    OPINION
    *The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, Senior District Judge for the District of
    New Jersey, sitting by designation.
    ROTH, Circuit Judge:
    Ibrahim Vurmaz petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals (BIA) affirming, without opinion, the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his
    application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (CAT). We will deny the petition.
    Vurmaz, a native and citizen of Turkey, entered the United States on or about June
    24, 2001 by way of Mexico. On June 24, 2001, the former Immigration and
    Naturalization Service issued a Notice to Appear, charging that Vurmaz was subject to
    removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an
    alien present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled after
    inspection. Vurmaz appeared before the IJ on March 26, 2003, conceding removability
    and seeking relief from removal by filing applications for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under CAT.
    Vurmaz filed an affidavit describing his experiences in Turkey which formed the
    basis of his application. According to that affidavit, Vurmaz and his family were
    “harrassed and denied jobs and education” due to his Muslim identity. Vurmaz asserted
    that, in 1990, he joined the Refah (Welfare) Party, a “democratic party based on equality
    and freedom for working class people, with an emphasis of freedom of religious
    expression and practice for Muslims.” Vurmaz explained that he eventually became a
    member of the Fazilet (Goodness) Party when, in 1997, the Welfare Party re-formed into
    2
    the Goodness Party as a “preemptive move... to carry on the beliefs, ideals and platforms
    of the [Welfare Party],” and subsequently, in1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court
    outlawed the Welfare Party.1 Vurmaz stated that as a Party member, he “organized and
    led protests against the government’s (i) closing of the Islamic schools, (ii) forcing girls
    to remove their Hijab... in order to attend school, and (iii) closures of the Imam Hatip
    (Islamic High Schools),” and, in 1999, he was elected to the City Council of Beyce.
    Vurmaz asserted that he “tr[ied] to escape from Turkey” when the “Constitutional Court
    began proceedings to shut down the [Goodness Party].” In particular, Vurmaz claimed
    that he is “personally acquainted with people who have been arrested and/or harassed by
    the [National Intelligence Agency] because of their party membership, and [he] fear[s]
    that if [he] return[s] to Turkey [he] will be arrested too.”
    On March 26, 2003, the IJ denied Vurmaz’s applications for asylum, withholding
    of removal, and CAT protection and ordered that he be returned to Turkey. On February
    17, 2005, the BIA affirmed, without opinion, the IJ’s decision. On March 16, 2005,
    Vurmaz filed this petition for review.
    We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under § 242(a)(1) of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005). Where, as here, the BIA
    affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision. Partyka v.
    1
    In July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the Turkish
    government’s decision to close the Welfare Party, ruling that the closure could reasonably
    be considered to be a pressing social need for the protection of a democratic society.
    3
    Attorney General, 
    417 F.3d 408
    , 411 (3d Cir. 2005).
    We review the IJ’s determination that an applicant failed to establish eligibility for
    asylum by showing “that he/she is a refugee: a person unable or unwilling to return to the
    country of that person's nationality or habitual residence because of past persecution or
    because of a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” under a
    “substantial evidence” standard of review. Gao v. Ashcroft, 
    299 F.3d 266
    , 271-72 (3d
    Cir. 2002). The applicant for asylum has a two-prong burden - he must demonstrate both
    (1) subjective and (2) objective fear of persecution. 
    Id. The applicant
    demonstrates his
    subjective fear by “showing that [he] has a genuine fear” of persecution and demonstrates
    his objective fear with evidence “that a reasonable person in [his] circumstances would
    fear persecution if returned to [his] native country.” 
    Id. (citing Elnager
    v. INS, 
    930 F.2d 784
    , 786 (9th Cir. 1991)). The IJ’s conclusion that an applicant failed to demonstrate both
    a subjective and objective fear of persecution must be affirmed “unless the evidence not
    only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 
    333 F.3d 463
    ,
    471 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 
    242 F.3d 477
    , 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001)).
    Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Vurmaz failed to prove
    that he was persecuted and has a well-founded fear of future persecution if returned to
    Turkey.
    First, Vurmaz failed to proffer evidence establishing that he suffered past
    persecution for religious and/or political opinion in Turkey. He testified that he had never
    4
    been arrested or charged with any crime in Turkey, including for being a member of the
    banned Welfare Party.2 Also he did not testify that he was wholly prohibited from
    practicing his religion and specifically testified that his religious practices did not differ
    from the religious practices by the majority of Muslims in Turkey.
    Second, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Vurmaz does not have
    an objective basis for his fear of future persecution if returned to Turkey. Vurmaz failed
    to proffer evidence that the Turkish government is systematically arresting and/or
    detaining members of the former Goodness Party by reason of their prior membership.
    Furthermore, although Vurmaz testified that the Turkish government prohibits formal
    Islamic education (i.e. the teaching of the Koran), the 2002 Department of State Report
    on International Religious Freedom states that ninety-eight percent of the Turkish
    population is Muslim and state-sponsored Islamic religious instruction in public eight-
    year primary schools is compulsory. In addition, neither Turkey’s constitution, nor its
    laws created pursuant to it, prohibit Vurmaz from wearing a religious head covering or
    otherwise engaging in religious observance in any place other than government-owned
    properties. Thus, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Vurmaz’s fear of
    future persecution based on religion and/or political opinion is without an objective basis
    2
    Vurmaz testified that the outlawed Goodness Party, of which he was last a
    member, was closed in June of 2001. Vurmaz was no longer in Turkey at that time.
    5
    and thus is not well-founded.3
    The IJ’s conclusion that Vurmaz failed to establish past persecution and a well-
    founded fear of persecution if returned to Turkey is supported by substantial evidence.
    Therefore, we will deny Vurmaz’s petition for review.
    3
    Because Vurmaz has not established that he has a “well-founded” fear of
    persecution for asylum purposes, he also has not met the higher standards of eligibility for
    withholding of removal, see Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 
    333 F.3d 463
    , 469 (3d Cir. 2003), or for
    protection under CAT, see Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 
    388 F.3d 85
    , 89 (3d Cir. 2004).
    6