Barnes v. Domitrovich , 184 F. App'x 164 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-7-2006
    Barnes v. Domitrovich
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-3870
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
    Recommended Citation
    "Barnes v. Domitrovich" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 940.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/940
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    DPS-234                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 05-3870
    ________________
    BENNIE E. BARNES,
    Appellant
    v.
    JUDGE STEPHANIE DOMITROVICH; OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH OF
    ERIE COUNTY, PA.; CASEWORKER MELISSA HEPLER; ATTORNEY ALISON M.
    SCARPITTI; COUNSELOR C. HARBUSKY
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00389 )
    District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
    _______________________________________
    Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    May 25, 2006
    Before: FUENTES, VAN ANTWERPEN AND CHAGARES, CIRCUIT JUDGES
    (Filed: June 7, 2006)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    PER CURIAM
    Bennie E. Barnes appeals from the dismissal of his complaint by the District
    Court. Because we determine that his appeal lacks arguable merit, we will dismiss it
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B).
    Barnes is a state prisoner who is serving an eight to twenty-year sentence
    for rape and indecent assault. In 2001, while Barnes was incarcerated, Barnes’ daughter
    was removed from her mother’s home due to a lack of proper parental care and control.
    In 2002, the Erie County Office of Children and Youth filed a petition for involuntary
    termination of Barnes’ parental rights. A hearing on the petition was held on August 6,
    2002. While Barnes received notice of the hearing, Barnes did not attend the hearing, nor
    was counsel present on his behalf. Barnes’ parental rights were terminated. Barnes
    appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, Barnes argued that his
    constitutional rights were violated because he was not given the proper opportunity to
    attend the hearing or be represented by counsel. He further argued that the trial court
    erred in terminating his parental rights. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the
    decision of the trial court in May 2003.
    In December 2003, Barnes filed his complaint in the District Court pursuant
    to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     seeking injunctive relief1 and monetary damages.2 Barnes’ complaint
    asserts claims previously raised on appeal in state court as well as other claims arising out
    of the state court action. The District Court dismissed all of the claims against Judge
    Domitrovich (the judge who terminated Barnes’ parental rights) based upon judicial
    1
    Barnes seeks an injunction prohibiting the Defendants from retaliating against him
    for filing this complaint.
    2
    Barnes subsequently filed two amended complaints.
    2
    immunity. The claims against the remaining Defendants were dismissed based upon the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
    This Court’s review is plenary. See FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of
    Common Pleas, 
    75 F.3d 834
    , 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996)(stating standard of review over order
    granting motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Digiacomo v.
    Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Phila. and Vicinity, 
    420 F.3d 220
    , 222 n.4 (3d Cir.
    2005)(stating standard of review over order granting motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.
    R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-
    court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
    district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
    those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284
    (2005). Rooker-Feldman bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a
    case that is the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment. See
    Marran v. Marran, 
    376 F.3d 143
    , 149 (3d Cir. 2004)(citations omitted). A case is
    functionally equivalent: (1) when the claim was actually litigated before the state court;
    or (2) when the claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication. See 
    id.
    (citing ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 
    366 F.3d 205
    , 210 (3d Cir. 2004). A plaintiff
    cannot litigate one constitutional claim in state court and then raise a related
    constitutional claim in federal court. See Walker v. Horn, 
    385 F.3d 321
    , 329-30 (3d Cir.
    2004)(citation omitted). Additionally, a federal claim is inextricably intertwined with an
    issue adjudicated in state court when the federal court must determine that the state court
    3
    judgment was erroneously entered to grant the requested relief or the federal court must
    take action that would negate the state court’s judgment. See 
    id. at 330
    .
    Here, we conclude that Barnes’ claims were either actually litigated in the
    state courts and/or are so inextricably intertwined with the state court adjudication of his
    parental rights. Therefore, Barnes’ claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.3
    Because Barnes’ appeal is entirely lacking in merit, we will dismiss it under
    § 1915(e)(2)(B). Barnes’ motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
    3
    As previously stated, the District Court dismissed the claims against Judge
    Domitrovich based upon the affirmative defense of judicial immunity. However, a
    district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims barred by Rooker-Feldman.
    See FOCUS, 
    75 F.3d at 840
    . Therefore, the District Court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over Barnes’ claims against Judge Domitrovich as well.
    4