Moore v. Dodrill , 185 F. App'x 171 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-19-2006
    Moore v. Dodrill
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-5467
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    Recommended Citation
    "Moore v. Dodrill" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 877.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/877
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    BPS-239
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5467
    ___________
    JONATHAN M. MOORE,
    Appellant
    v.
    WARDEN SCOTT DODRILL
    _____________________
    Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-02168)
    District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
    ________________________
    Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    June 2, 2006
    Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Filed June 19, 2006)
    ______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _____________
    PER CURIAM
    Jonathan M. Moore appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of
    habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The District Court denied the petition on the
    merits. Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition, we will
    vacate the District Court’s order and remand the matter so that the District Court can
    dismiss the petition.
    In 1993, Moore pled guilty in the Northern District of Ohio to bank robbery
    and violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c) makes it a crime for any person who
    uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence. The indictment
    charged Moore under both the using and carrying prongs of § 924(c). After Moore
    withdrew his direct appeal, he filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court denied the motion, and the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
    In December 2003, Moore filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
    Middle District of Pennsylvania, attempting to challenge his conviction under § 924(c).1
    Moore contends that he did not use the firearm within the meaning of the statute pursuant
    to Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
    (1995).2 The District Court found that it had
    jurisdiction to consider the petition.3 Subsequently, Moore moved to amend his petition
    1
    At the time the petition was filed, Moore was incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg in
    Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. He has since been transferred to USP-McCreary in Pine Knot,
    Kentucky.
    2
    In Bailey, the Supreme Court stated that a defendant could not be convicted of
    “using” a firearm under § 924(c) unless he actively employs the 
    firearm. 516 U.S. at 143
    .
    Bailey was decided after Moore’s § 2255 motion was adjudicated and is retroactively
    applied to cases on collateral review. See Bousley v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 614
    (1998).
    3
    After deciding that it had jurisdiction to consider the petition, the District Court
    transferred the case to the Northern District of Ohio. However, the Northern District of
    Ohio subsequently transferred the case back to the Middle District.
    2
    to add a claim that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to United States v. Booker,
    
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). The District Court denied Moore’s § 2241 petition on the merits
    and denied his motion to amend the petition. Moore timely filed a notice of appeal.4
    A federal prisoner’s challenge to the legality of his sentence and conviction
    must be raised in a § 2255 motion, except where the remedy under § 2255 would be
    inadequate or ineffective. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d 245
    , 249 (3d
    Cir. 1997); see also Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 
    290 F.3d 536
    , 538 (3d Cir.
    2002)(per curiam)(stating a § 2241 habeas petition cannot be entertained by the court
    unless a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective). A § 2255 motion is
    inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates some limitation in scope
    or procedure which would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full
    adjudication on his wrongful detention claim. See 
    Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538
    (citations
    omitted). Section 2255 is ineffective or inadequate where a petitioner is in the unusual
    position of having no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an
    intervening change in substantive law could negate with retroactive application. See
    Okereke v. United States, 
    307 F.3d 117
    , 120 (3d Cir. 2002).
    Relying on Dorsainvil, Moore argues that § 2255 is inadequate or
    4
    Our review is plenary over the District Court’s legal conclusions and clearly
    erroneous as to its factual findings. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 
    134 F.3d 506
    , 512, (3d
    Cir. 1998). The standard of review over a denial of a motion to amend is abuse of
    discretion. See Lake v. Arnold, 
    232 F.3d 360
    , 373 (3d Cir. 2000)(citations omitted).
    Summary action is warranted when no substantial question is presented by the appeal.
    See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 
    290 F.3d 536
    , 539 (3d Cir. 2002)(per curiam).
    3
    ineffective to consider his Bailey claim. In Dorsainvil, this Court stated that the petitioner
    could bring a Bailey claim under § 2241 because he did not have the opportunity to
    challenge his conviction under § 2255 for a crime that Bailey subsequently negated. See
    
    119 F.3d 245
    . Under the current circumstances however, Moore’s reliance on Dorsainvil
    is misplaced. Bailey did not implicate the “carrying” prong of § 924(c). See United
    States v. Eyer, 
    113 F.3d 470
    , 475-76 (3d Cir. 1997)(noting that Bailey is not implicated
    where petitioner was clearly convicted of carrying a firearm).    As previously noted,
    Moore pled guilty to both “using” and “carrying” a firearm in violation of § 924(c).
    Moore’s Bailey claim does not fall under the Dorsainvil exception because he has not
    shown that there has been an intervening change in substantive law that negated the
    criminal nature for which he pled guilty (i.e., carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
    crime of violence). See Muscarello v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 125
    (1998)(detailing what
    constitutes carrying under § 924(c)). Therefore, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
    consider the § 2241 petition.5
    In conclusion, Moore has failed to show that § 2255 is inadequate or
    ineffective to consider his claims. Thus, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider
    the § 2241 habeas petition. For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s
    5
    Additionally, Moore has not shown that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to
    consider the Booker claim raised in his motion to amend the § 2241 petition. We also
    note that the rule announced in Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
    review. See Lloyd v. United States, 
    407 F.3d 608
    , 615-16 (3d Cir. 2005); Humphress v.
    United States, 
    398 F.3d 855
    , 860 (6th Cir. 2005).
    4
    December 8, 2005 order and remand so that the District Court can enter an order
    dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
    5