Wattie-Bey v. Attorney General's Office , 424 F. App'x 95 ( 2011 )

BLD-155 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4680
___________
DAVID WATTIE-BEY;
ALICIA WATTIE,
Appellants
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL‟S OFFICE, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
DIVISION FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH SERVICES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02224)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 31, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 21, 2011 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Appellants, David Wattie-Bey and Alicia Wattie, filed a pro se complaint in the
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania shortly after a Pennsylvania state
trial court entered an order authorizing state officials to remove appellants‟ minor child
from their home, and directing placement of the child with the Dauphin County Division
of Children and Youth Services pending further custody proceedings. Appellants assert
in their federal complaint that the Dependency Petition presented in state court was
improper, that it was supported by an inadequate Affidavit, and that it violated their
federal constitutional rights in several respects. Further, they contend that the state
court‟s removal order was improper insofar as it was entered in reliance upon the infirm
Dependency Petition. Appellants sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy the alleged violations of their constitutional rights.
Upon an initial screening of the complaint, a Magistrate Judge recommended
granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing the suit for four reasons:
(1) the complaint violates the “domestic relations doctrine” by asking to “federally
adjudicate what is a pending state domestic relations matter”; (2) abstention under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is warranted while the state court custody
proceedings are pending; (3) the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the named
defendants (the Pennsylvania Attorney General‟s Office and the Dauphin County
Division of Children and Youth Services); and (4) to the extent that appellants might seek
to hold state judicial agency employees personally liable for damages, those employees
would be immune from such liability. The District Court fully adopted the Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Appellants timely filed this appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will summarily affirm
a district court‟s judgment when, as here, the appeal presents “no substantial question.”
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3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
The District Court was correct that Younger abstention principles dictated
dismissal of the complaint, at least with regard to appellants‟ claims for prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief based on alleged violations of their constitutional rights
in the ongoing state court custody proceedings.1 “We exercise plenary review over the
legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met. Once we
determine that the requirements have been met, we review a district court‟s decision to
abstain under Younger abstention principles for abuse of discretion.” Gwynedd
Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
The doctrine of Younger abstention “reflects a strong federal policy against
federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n certain circumstances,
district courts must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where
resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering
1
With regard to dismissal of the complaint under the “domestic relations doctrine,”
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized a domestic relations exception
to federal diversity jurisdiction for cases “„involving the issuance of a divorce,
alimony, or child custody decree.‟” Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC,
545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
704 (1992)). Here, appellants invoke federal question, not diversity, jurisdiction in
seeking relief under § 1983. “[A]s a jurisdictional bar, the domestic relations
exception does not apply to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984); see McLaughlin v.
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with an ongoing state proceeding.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir.
2010) (per curiam). Younger abstention is appropriate when: “(1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal
claims.” Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1199.
These requirements are met here. First, appellants acknowledged in the complaint
that proceedings regarding the welfare and custody of their child remained pending in
state court when they filed suit in federal court. See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670. Second,
“[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
435 (1979); see also Winston v. Children & Youth Services, 948 F.2d 1380, 1399 (3d
Cir. 1991) (Garth, J. dissenting) (observing that “Pennsylvania … clearly has a strong
interest in administering its child welfare procedures and in adjudicating controversies
that arise from that administration”). Third, appellants do not appear unable to raise their
claims and obtain relief in the state proceedings, at least insofar as they seek declaratory
relief and an injunction against future proceedings due to the alleged constitutional
infirmity of the Dependency Petition, the trial court‟s removal order, and the custody
proceedings generally. See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670-71 (explaining that Younger
requires only an opportunity to present federal claims in state court, and the burden rests
with plaintiff to show that state procedural law bars presentation of the claims). Finally,
Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1989). As such, appellants‟ complaint is not
subject to dismissal under the domestic relations exception.
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there is no indication here “of bad faith, harassment or some other extraordinary
circumstance, which might make abstention inappropriate.” Anthony v. Council, 316
F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).
The record, therefore, supports the District Court‟s decision to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over the complaint. However, inasmuch as appellants seek to
recover damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights, we have observed
that “a district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief,
should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages … when such relief is not
available from the ongoing state proceedings.” Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-
45 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As we have explained,
“Younger abstention is only appropriate where the precise claims raised in federal court
are available in the ongoing state proceedings. Where the availability of a claim in state
court is questionable, our abstention jurisprudence weighs in favor of retaining
jurisdiction.” Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 413 (3d Cir.
2005).
Nevertheless, it is clear that appellants‟ damages claims were properly dismissed
rather than stayed because, as the Magistrate Judge explained, the two defendants that
appellants elected to name in this suit are entitled to sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.
Appellants seek to recover for the alleged violations of their constitutional rights
from the Pennsylvania Attorney General‟s Office and the Dauphin County Division of
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Children and Youth Services. “[T]he Eleventh Amendment . . . has been interpreted to
render states -- and, by extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the
state is the real party in interest -- generally immune from suit by private parties in
federal court.” Pa. Fed‟n of Sportsmen‟s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir.
2002). In addition, “States are not „persons‟ within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore,
cannot be among those held liable for violations of the civil rights statute.” Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1996). For the reasons explained by
the Magistrate Judge, appellants‟ claims against the state agencies named as defendants
are precluded under the Eleventh Amendment.2 Consequently, their claims for damages
were properly dismissed rather than stayed.3
For foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment
dismissing appellants‟ complaint.
2
While “[t]he Supreme Court has long held that counties, municipalities, and political
subdivisions of a state are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment,” Febres v.
Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 229 (3d Cir. 2006), the Magistrate Judge
observed that Pennsylvania‟s domestic relations agencies, such as the Dauphin
County Division of Children and Youth Services, are defined by statute as arms of the
state courts and institutions of state government.
3
The Magistrate Judge also concluded that appellants‟ complaint fails against any
individual defendants that might be named because such individual defendants would
be entitled to immunity for official actions undertaken in the state judicial system.
Appellants, however, did not name any individual defendants to this suit.
Consequently, we do not find it appropriate or necessary to address the potential
immunity of unspecified individuals not named as defendants to the suit.
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