United States v. Vasquez , 195 F. App'x 164 ( 2006 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4138
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    MARTIN LUIS VASQUEZ,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
    Chief District Judge. (1:03-cr-00357-NCT-3)
    Submitted:   July 28, 2006                 Decided:   August 23, 2006
    Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.    Kearns Davis, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Martin Luis Vasquez appeals his resentencing following
    this court’s remand.      See United States v. Vasquez, 142 F. App’x
    676 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).       For the reasons stated below,
    we affirm Vasquez’ 292-month sentence.
    Vasquez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute in excess
    of fifty grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable
    amount of methamphetamine.      The presentence report recommended a
    base level offense of thirty-eight pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003) (Drug Quantity
    Table), adjusted upward two levels for obstruction of justice, for
    a total offense level of forty.       Based on a total offense level of
    forty and a criminal history category of I, the guidelines range
    for imprisonment was 292 to 365 months. The district court adopted
    the findings of the presentence report and sentenced Vasquez to the
    low end of the guidelines range, 292 months’ imprisonment.
    We   vacated    Vasquez’     sentence   and   remanded   for
    resentencing because the district court’s findings regarding drug
    quantity violated United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005). On
    remand, the district court resentenced Vasquez to the same 292-
    month term of imprisonment.      Vasquez appealed, and his attorney
    filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), questioning whether Vasquez’ sentence was reasonable under
    Booker.   Vasquez was informed of the opportunity to file a pro se
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    supplemental brief, but declined to do so.                    The Government did not
    file a responding brief.
    After Booker, a sentencing court is no longer bound by
    the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines.                            See United
    States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546 (4th Cir. 2005).                                 In a
    post-Booker      sentencing,        district       courts       must     calculate    the
    appropriate guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with
    other   relevant      factors   under       the    guidelines       and    
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and impose a sentence.                        United
    States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 455-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006). However, a “district court need not explicitly
    discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.”                         United States v.
    Eura,   
    440 F.3d 625
    ,    632    (4th    Cir.       2006)    (citation      omitted),
    petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. June 20, 2006)
    (No. 05-11659).       A sentence imposed within the properly calculated
    guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.                     Green, 
    436 F.3d at 457
    ; see United States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 341-44 (4th Cir.
    2006)   (discussing      justifications           for    finding       sentence   within
    properly      calculated     advisory       guidelines          range     presumptively
    reasonable).
    Vasquez’    292-month      sentence        is     within    the   properly
    calculated     advisory      guideline      range       and   below     the   forty-year
    statutory maximum set forth in 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B).                               In
    sentencing Vasquez, the district court considered the nature and
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    seriousness of the offense, particularly the significant drug
    quantity     attributed     to    Vasquez.         See    
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a)(1),(2)(A).      Acknowledging that Vasquez did not have any
    extensive criminal history, see § 3553(a)(1), the court stated the
    length of Vasquez’ sentence was meant to be a deterrent, to protect
    the public from future criminal conduct and to protect the public
    from the perjury committed by Vasquez.         § 3553(a)(2)(A),(B),(C).
    The court considered Vasquez’ explanation for his perjury as a
    mitigating factor, but found that nearly two years after trial,
    Vasquez provided no evidence to corroborate his claims that anyone
    was threatened or harmed as a result of his decision to tell the
    truth.     We therefore find the sentence imposed by the district
    court was “selected pursuant to a reasoned process in accordance
    with the law.”    Green, 
    436 F.3d at 457
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm Vasquez’ sentence. As required by
    Anders, we have reviewed the record and have found no meritorious
    issues for appeal.     This court requires that counsel inform his
    client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
    the United States for further review.        If the client requests that
    a petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be
    frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
    withdraw from representation.     Counsel’s motion must state that a
    copy thereof was served on the client.           We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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