DirecTV, Inc. v. Young , 195 F. App'x 212 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                      August 8, 2006
    _______________________                Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-61023
    Summary Calendar
    _______________________
    DIRECTV, INC.
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CHARLES YOUNG, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    No. 4:04-CV-118
    ________________________________________________________________
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This    appeal    arises   from   Appellee    DirecTV,      Inc.’s
    (“DirecTV”) lawsuit against Appellant Charles Young, Jr. (“Young”)
    for his piracy of DirecTV’s satellite communications.                 Due to
    Young’s complete failure to defend the lawsuit, the district court
    entered a default judgment against Young.         DirecTV, Inc. v. Young,
    No. 4:04CV118 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 1, 2005).           Young argues that the
    district court abused its discretion by not granting him relief
    under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).     Young also contends that the district
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    court erred in striking his untimely answer.         Because the district
    court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    DirecTV filed a complaint against Young on June 29, 2004.
    On August 23, 2004, more than a month after Young’s answer was due,
    Young’s first counsel in the case filed a motion to withdraw,
    citing Young’s pattern of “refrain[ing] from cooperation with
    counsel’s efforts to represent him in this matter” and “refusal to
    answer calls from or come sign anything with or for counsel.”
    In light of the withdrawal of Young’s counsel, DirecTV
    made repeated efforts to communicate with Young in an effort to get
    him to engage in settlement discussions or defend the lawsuit.            In
    a February 4, 2005 letter, DirecTV’s counsel reminded Young that,
    as of September 27, 2004, his attorney had withdrawn and his answer
    was overdue.   DirecTV also extended Young’s deadline to file an
    answer to February 21, 2005.
    In a follow-up letter dated March 30, 2005, DirecTV
    repeated its willingness to settle the matter and, once again,
    reminded Young that he had failed to submit an answer.              DirecTV
    again gave Young more time in which to file an answer, setting a
    new deadline of April 15, 2005.          However, the letter made clear
    that, if Young failed to file an answer, DirecTV would “initiate
    default judgment proceedings” and “[t]he Court could enter a
    default judgment   against    you   in    the   amount   of   $350,000   plus
    2
    attorney’s fees.”    Young, No. 4:04CV118, slip op. at 5.
    In an April 15, 2005 phone call, DirecTV’s counsel once
    again agreed to postpone default judgment proceedings and send
    Young another copy of the complaint.    In an April 27, 2005 followup
    letter, DirecTV’s counsel wrote, “This case has been pending since
    June 29, 2004, and you were served with a copy of the Complaint on
    July 14, 2004.   Your answer is extremely overdue!    If you have not
    filed an answer by Monday, May 9, 2005, we will proceed with
    default.”   Id. at 6.   Young did not file an answer by May 9; thus,
    DirecTV filed an application for entry of default the next day.   On
    May 13, 2005, the district court clerk entered default against
    Young.   On June 1, 2005, DirecTV moved for default judgment,
    seeking $350,000 in statutory damages plus attorney’s fees.       In
    response, on June 6, 2005 — eleven months after he had been served
    with the complaint — Young filed an answer.       On June 24, 2005,
    DirecTV filed a motion to strike Young’s untimely response.
    On August 2, 2005, having received no response from Young
    on the motion for default judgment or motion to strike answer, the
    district court granted DirecTV’s motion to strike, and ordered and
    entered a default judgment, awarding DirecTV $350,000 in statutory
    damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)
    motion for an abuse of discretion.     Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi,
    3
    
    635 F.2d 396
    , 402 (5th Cir. 1981).        Under Rule 60(b)(1), a district
    court may grant relief from a judgment for “mistake, inadvertence,
    surprise, or excusable neglect” on a motion made within one year of
    the judgment.     FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).       In determining whether
    sufficient grounds exist for setting aside a judgment, district
    courts are to consider:      (1) the culpability of the defendant’s
    conduct; (2) the extent of prejudice to the plaintiff; and (3) the
    merits of the defendant’s asserted defense.           Rogers v. Hartford
    Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
    167 F.3d 933
    , 938 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Additional factors may be considered by the court as well, and “the
    decision of whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) falls
    within [the court’s] sound discretion.” 
    Id. at 939
    .           Finally, “[a]
    finding of willful default ends the inquiry, for ‘when the court
    finds an intentional failure of responsive pleadings there need be
    no further finding.’”    Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 
    227 F.3d 290
    , 292 (5th
    Cir. 2000) (quoting Dierschke v. O'Cheskey (In re Dierschke), 
    975 F.2d 181
    , 184 (5th Cir.1992)).
    Young    argues   that    the    district   court    abused   its
    discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment.
    The district court denied Young’s motion because of his willful
    conduct, namely his complete failure to act after having been
    specifically informed by DirecTV that it would seek a default
    judgment if he did not file an answer by May 9, 2005.            Young, No.
    4:04CV118, slip op. at 7, 8.       Young contends that his conduct was
    not willful.    Rather, he contends that his failure to respond was
    4
    due to his counsel’s unilateral decision to withdraw and his
    ignorance of the processes of the court.
    We note at the outset that the district court engaged in
    a    detailed   examination   of    the       lengthy    correspondence     between
    DirecTV and Young prior to finding that Young’s failure to file an
    answer had been willful. That correspondence, coupled with Young’s
    inaction, is the basis on which the district court refused to set
    aside the default judgment.        Young, No. 4:04CV118, slip op. at 7-8.
    Significantly, the district court recognized that it was irrelevant
    to   its   willfulness   analysis     that       Young   had   not    received   his
    original    counsel’s    notice     of        withdrawal.      Id.     at   4,   6-7.
    Regardless of whether Young learned in September 2004 that his
    counsel had withdrawn, the district court found that Young could
    not argue plausibly that he was without notice of this development
    by March 2005.     Id. at 6.       As noted supra, in a February 4, 2005
    letter to Young, DirecTV stated that Young’s counsel had withdrawn
    as of September 24, 2004.          And a followup letter from DirecTV to
    Young on March 30, 2005 made the same statement.                      The district
    court’s review of the record led it to conclude that “[i]t appears
    from the foregoing that Young’s assertion to the court that he was
    unaware until May 2005 that Mr. Ready had been allowed to withdraw
    as counsel in the fall of last year is not true.”                    Id.
    Additionally, in its analysis, the district court gave
    Young the benefit of the doubt by noting that, prior to DirecTV
    setting the May 9, 2005 deadline, Young’s failure to file an answer
    5
    did not appear to be willful.      Id.    In so concluding, the court
    noted that the record demonstrated that DirecTV sought to engage
    Young   in   settlement   discussions    and   agreed    to   a   series   of
    extensions for Young to file his answer.        Id.     The district court
    decided, however, that DirecTV’s April 27, 2005 letter to Young
    changed the dynamics of the discussions between the parties in a
    significant way.    Id. at 7.   As noted supra, DirecTV made clear in
    its April 27 letter that Young’s answer was “extremely overdue” and
    that if Young did not file an answer by May 9, 2005, the company
    would proceed with default.
    In coming to its decision that Young’s failure to answer
    was willful, the court also noted that, not only had Young failed
    to answer or seek an extension by the May 9 deadline, but also
    failed to make any response to DirecTV’s May 10, 2005 application
    for entry of default.     The district court summed up its finding of
    willfulness as follows:
    Given that he has offered no explanation whatsoever for
    any of these failures, the court cannot conclude that
    they were other than willful. Young had been specifically
    apprised that an answer would be due on or before May 9,
    2005, and that DirecTV would seek a default judgment were
    one not filed, and yet he did nothing. He did not try to
    find an attorney; he did not ask DirecTV or the court for
    more time; and he did not file an answer.
    Id. at 7.
    Young has failed to show how the district court abused
    its discretion; thus, we find no reason to disturb the court’s
    decision to not set aside the default judgment.          Further, because
    6
    we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    concluding that Young’s failure to file an answer was willful, it
    is unnecessary for us to analyze the other Rule 60(b) elements.
    See Dierschke, 975 F.2d at 184 (noting that “when the court finds
    an intentional failure of responsive pleaings there need be no
    other finding”).
    Finally, Young contends that the district court erred by
    granting DirecTV’s motion to strike his untimely answer. The entry
    of the default judgment against Young disposed of all matters
    relating to this case.   The district court noted, “Although Young
    did later obtain counsel and file an answer, he did so only after
    the clerk had already entered default and DirecTV had moved for
    entry of a default judgment . . . .     His default at that point
    could not be cured simply by the filing of an untimely answer.”
    Young, No. 4:04CV118LN, slip op. at 8.       Additionally, the court
    noted that Young had failed to respond in opposition to DirecTV’s
    motion to strike Young’s answer, and thus the motion should be
    granted as unopposed pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(C).     The district
    court’s decision to strike Young’s response pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
    P. 12 was not an abuse of discretion.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-61023

Citation Numbers: 195 F. App'x 212

Judges: DeMOSS, Jones, Per Curiam, Wiener

Filed Date: 8/8/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023