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Wayne Baker v. James T Vaughn Correctional Ce , 425 F. App'x 83 ( 2011 )


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  • CLD-141                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4010
___________
WAYNE T. BAKER,
Appellant
v.
JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER;
DONALD GLAGG, Inmate
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 10-0482)
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 17, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES AND SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 19, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Wayne Baker appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s order. Allah v. Seiverling,
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir.
2000). Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm
the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Baker filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against the James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center, where he is imprisoned, and Donald Glagg, his cellmate.
Baker alleged that Glagg attacked and severely injured him, and that the Correctional
Center then provided him with inadequate medical care. As a result, Baker claimed, he
will never again have full mobility in one leg. He sought money damages.
The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B).
The Court concluded that Glagg was not a state actor as required by § 1983, and that the
Correctional Center was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Court
stated, however, that “it appears plausible . . . that Plaintiff may be able to articulate a
claim against alternative Defendants, and therefore, the Court will give Plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his pleading.”
Baker then filed an amended complaint, but despite the District Court’s clear
guidance, he again named as defendants only Glagg and the Correctional Center. The
amended complaint reiterated the allegations from the original complaint, and urged the
District Court not to “complicate this complaint [so that Baker would] have to go to the
1
Baker also filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which the District Court denied on February 2, 2011. Because
Baker did not file a new or amended notice of appeal as to that order as required by Fed.
2
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.” Given Baker’s apparent desire to stand on
his original claims, the District Court dismissed the amended complaint under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for the reasons detailed in its previous order — this time with prejudice.
Baker then appealed.
We agree with the District Court’s determination that Baker’s action fails to state a
claim against either of the defendants. A § 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1)
the conduct complained of must be “committed by a person acting under color of state
law”; and (2) this conduct must “deprive[] a person of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz,
    1 F.3d 176
    , 184 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Glagg, a fellow prisoner, is a
private party. While a private party can qualify as a state actor when there “is a
sufficiently close nexus” between the state and the private party’s conduct,
    id.,
     Baker has
alleged no such connection here. Baker has thus not stated a viable claim against Glagg.
Baker’s claim against the Correctional Center also fails. Under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Correctional Center, a Delaware state prison, is immune from suit in
federal court. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
    506 U.S. 139
    , 144 (1993). While states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity,
see Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
    302 F.3d 161
    , 168 (3d Cir. 2002),
Delaware has not done so, see Green v. Howard R. Young Corr. Inst.,
    229 F.R.D. 99
    , 102
(D. Del. 2005) (Jordan, J.). Moreover, although Congress can abrogate a state’s
R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), we lack jurisdiction to review it. See United States v. McGlory,
    202 F.3d 664
    , 668 (3d Cir. 2000).
3
sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , the
federal law under which Baker proceeds. See Quern v. Jordan,
    440 U.S. 332
    , 345 (1979).
Accordingly, we agree that Baker’s § 1983 claims against the Correctional Center for
monetary damages are barred.
We will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Baker’s
amended complaint. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.2
2
Baker also asked the District Court to issue subpoenas so that he could
obtain various medical records. We will affirm the District Court’s order denying these
requests.
4