In Re: Lisanti Foods , 241 F. App'x 1 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-2-2007
    In Re: Lisanti Foods
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-3912
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    Recommended Citation
    "In Re: Lisanti Foods " (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 634.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/634
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-3912
    IN RE: LISANTI FOODS INC.;
    LISANTI FOODS OF TEXAS, INC.;
    LISANTI FOODS OF ARIZONA, INC.
    JOSEPH M. LISANTI, JR.; ROSEMARIE LISANTI; LISANTI REALTY OF
    ARIZONA, INC.; LISANTI REALTY CORP; LISANTI ENTERPRISES, LLC; TEXAS
    TRUCKING CORP.; JL TRUCKING, LLC; NEW JERSEY TRUCKING CORP.;
    ARIZONA FREIGHT HAULERS, INC.,
    Appellants.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (04-cv-03868)
    District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
    Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 28, 2007
    Before: BARRY, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: August 2, 2007)
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
    In this bankruptcy appeal, appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in
    “substantively consolidating” three debtors in confirming a bankruptcy plan. Applying
    the standard laid out in In re: Morfesis, 
    270 B.R. 28
    (Bankr. D.N.J. 2001), the Bankruptcy
    Court concluded that the debtors could be consolidated on account of their “substantial
    identity.” The District Court affirmed. After we decided In re: Owens Corning, 
    419 F.3d 195
    (3d Cir. 2005), articulating our standard for substantive consolidation, the District
    Court reconsidered the issue, and concluded that consolidation was still appropriate. We
    will affirm.
    I.
    Substantive consolidation is a “construct of federal common law” that “‘treats
    separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor with all the cumulative
    assets and liabilities.’” Owens 
    Corning, 419 F.3d at 205
    (quoting Genesis Health
    Ventures, Inc. v. Stapleton (In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.), 
    402 F.3d 416
    , 423 (3d
    Cir. 2005)). In this case, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed a liquidation plan proposing to
    substantively consolidate three debtors (former wholesale distributors of Italian specialty
    -2-
    food products) into a single entity for subsequent distribution to creditors. (A-108) In
    approving consolidation, the Court considered, inter alia, “whether there is a substantial
    identity between the entities to be consolidated.” (A-604)1
    In making its determination, the Court heard testimony from two witnesses, which,
    in the Court’s view, established substantial identity among the debtors. Specifically,
    these witnesses testified that “all three debtors have the same officers, same directors and
    shareholders. They conducted the same general business operations under very similar
    names. . . . [I]ntercompany dealings were done without the usual corporate formalities. . .
    . [Moreover,] the debtors did not charge each other for all services which they rendered to
    one another” (A-604) and they were “moving profits between and among the debtors.”
    (A-605) The witnesses also testified that “for the purposes of . . . secured lending, the
    debtors were viewed as a single entity,” and that “the unsecured creditors likewise viewed
    the debtors as a single entity when extending credit terms.” (A-605-06) Relying on this
    testimony, the Bankruptcy Court held that, “through the witnesses, the proponents have
    established that both debtors and creditors viewed the debtors as a single enterprise.” (A-
    606 (emphasis added))
    II.
    In this appeal, appellants challenge whether the Bankruptcy Court’s findings are
    1
    The Court also considered whether consolidation would benefit or harm
    creditors, concluding that the benefits of consolidation would heavily outweigh any harm
    to a creditor.
    -3-
    sufficient to support substantive consolidation under the standard articulated in In re:
    Owens Corning, 
    419 F.3d 195
    (3d Cir. 2005), a decision we announced after the
    Bankruptcy Court rendered its decision. Under Owens Corning, a proponent of
    substantive consolidation must demonstrate one of two rationales for its application:
    “that (i) prepetition [the entities for whom substantive consolidation is sought]
    disregarded separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity
    borders and treated them as one legal entity, or (ii) postpetition their assets and liabilities
    are so scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all 
    creditors.” 419 F.3d at 211
    .
    The application of Owens Corning was directly at issue before the District Court,
    which, in a thorough and carefully reasoned opinion, concluded that “the evidence
    presented in the bankruptcy hearings . . . provides ample support for granting substantive
    consolidation under the first prong (creditor reliance on pre-petition disregard of
    separateness) of the newly articulated Owens Corning standard.” (SA20-21) We fully
    agree with this conclusion. The findings of the Bankruptcy Court, which may only be
    disturbed if clearly erroneous, In re: Am. Pad & Paper Co., 
    478 F.3d 546
    , 551 (3d Cir.
    2007), comfortably support a conclusion that the “creditors relied on the breakdown of
    entity borders and treated them as one legal entity,” Owens 
    Corning, 419 F.3d at 211
    . As
    the District Court recognized, “[a]lthough the Bankruptcy Court used creditors’ reliance
    on Debtor unity as evidence of ‘substantial identity,’ it also speaks directly to, and
    -4-
    satisfies, the first prong of the Owens Corning test.” (SA21)
    Therefore, and for substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s
    opinion, we will affirm.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-3912

Citation Numbers: 241 F. App'x 1

Filed Date: 8/2/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023