Russo v. Glass Real Estate , 204 F. App'x 157 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    11-8-2006
    Russo v. Glass Real Estate
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-4894
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    Recommended Citation
    "Russo v. Glass Real Estate" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 218.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/218
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4894
    FRANCIS PAUL RUSSO;
    ESTATE OF DEAN ANTHONY RUSSO;
    CITY DINING CORP.
    v.
    GLASS REAL ESTATE COMP.; ESTATE HERB GLASS;
    STEVEN GLASS; HAZZARD COMPANY; PAUL J. FELIXON;
    STEERMAN & FELIXON, PC; BAINBRIDGE LAW CENTER;
    ESQ. ALAN M. BREDT, Esquire; JUDGE JOHN GREEN, Sheriff;
    JOHN WINTER, Esquire, Wachovia SBC; WACHOVIA SBC;
    AL FIORILLI, Wachovia SBC Credit; JOHN GREEN, Sheriff;
    ESQ. JAMES J. ZWOLAK, Esquire;
    CITY OF PHILADELPHIA REVENUE DEPARTMENT;
    GERALD KOSINSKI, Esquire, Undersheriff;
    JOHN GREEN, County of Philadelphia Sheriff;
    SHARON HUMBLE, Esquire; WACHOVIA BANK, Bondholder Trustee;
    JACK M. BERNARD, Esquire; PETER ANTIPAS; SUSANNA ANTIPAS;
    JOHN GREEN, Sheriff, Phila County;
    RCS SEARCHERS, Distribution Title Company; PERRY J. COCCO;
    CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, South District Building Inspector;
    TOM SCIULLI; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Chief Dept. of License & Inspections;
    ALEXANDER; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Police Dept. Patrol Officer
    Francis Paul Russo,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-6577
    (Honorable Petrese B. Tucker)
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 2, 2006
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
    (Filed November 8, 2006)
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    PER CURIAM.
    Francis Russo appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. The
    procedural history of this case and the details of Russo’s claims are well-known to the
    parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinions, and need not be discussed at
    length. Briefly, Russo filed a complaint alleging several claims arising from the Sheriff’s
    sale of two properties he had owned. The District Court granted the motions to dismiss
    filed by several defendants. After the District Court entered an order dismissing the
    remaining claims, Russo filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    On appeal, Russo argues that there were procedural irregularities in the Sheriff’s
    sale of the properties. However, he already raised these arguments in his petition to set
    aside the sale which he filed in state court. The state court denied his petition. We agree
    with the District Court that Russo is not entitled to relief on these claims. Moreover, the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review, directly or
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    indirectly, a state court adjudication. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    , 416 (1923); In re Knapper, 
    407 F.3d 573
    (3d Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has explained that this doctrine applies to
    “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
    judgments rendered before the District Court proceedings commenced and inviting
    District Court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
    Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005). Thus, to the extent that the relief Russo
    requests would require rejection of the state court’s judgments, the District Court lacked
    jurisdiction over those claims.
    Russo also argues on appeal that his due process rights were violated by his prior
    counsel’s ineffective assistance. However, Russo has no right to effective counsel in a
    civil case. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 
    620 F.2d 404
    , 408 (3d Cir. 1980). We
    agree with the District Court that Russo was not entitled to any relief under the
    Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Russo’s due process rights were not violated when a police
    officer and housing inspector allegedly entered the property after it was sold.
    For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will
    affirm the District Court’s judgment. The motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Jack
    Bernard and Peter and Susanna Antipas on April 10, 2006, is denied as moot. The motion
    to dismiss the appeal filed by RCS Searchers is denied as moot.
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