Auto Indus. Pension Trust Fund v. Steven Van Tuyl , 672 F. App'x 685 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 23 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES PENSION                   No.    14-17371
    TRUST FUND; et al.,
    D.C. No. 3:13-cv-03703-WHO
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    TRACTOR EQUIPMENT SALES, INC.,
    a California corporation,
    Defendant,
    and
    STEVEN E. VAN TUYL, individually and
    as trustee of the The Van Tuyl 2003 Living
    Trust, as amended; RENA E. VAN TUYL,
    individually and as trustee of the The Van
    Tuyl 2003 Living Trust, as amended,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    William Horsley Orrick III, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 12, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Before: HAWKINS, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund (the “Trust”) appeals the grant of
    summary judgment to Steven and Rena Van Tuyl (the “Van Tuyls”). The Van Tuyls,
    husband and wife, owned a controlling interest in Tractor Equipment Sales (“TES”),
    which had been a participant in the multi-employer Trust prior to TES’s withdrawal
    in 2011. The district court concluded the Trust could not enforce withdrawal liability
    under ERISA1 against three rental properties owned by the Van Tuyls because they
    did not constitute a commonly-controlled “trade or business” under 29 U.S.C. §
    1301(b)(1).
    “Withdrawal liability” is assessed against the withdrawing employer, which
    includes not only the entity obligated to contribute to the pension plan, but also all
    “trades or businesses” that are under “common control” with that entity. See 29
    U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). Congress enacted section 1301(b)(1) “to prevent businesses
    from shirking their ERISA obligations by fractionalizing operations into many
    separate entities.” Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund–Bd. of Trs. of W. Conference v. Allyn
    Transp. Co., 
    832 F.2d 502
    , 507 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see also Bd. of Trs.
    of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund v. Lafrenz, 
    837 F.2d 892
    , 894 (9th
    Cir. 1988) (“The point of section 1301(b)(1) is simply to prevent the controlling group
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    The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
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    of a company from avoiding withdrawal liability by shifting corporate assets into
    other business ventures under its control.”).
    ERISA does not define the term “trade or business,” and we have noted that
    what constitutes a “trade or business” is an “essentially factual inquiry.” 
    Id. at 894
    n.6. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “trade” as “an occupation, especially
    one requiring skilled labor” and “business” as “the occupation, work or trade in which
    a person is engaged.” American Heritage Dictionary College Edition 220, 1284 (2nd
    Ed. 1991). Although § 1301(b)(1) may apply regardless of whether there is a formal
    corporate structure, employees, or some sort of economic relationship with the
    withdrawing employer (such as leasing property or equipment to the withdrawing
    entity), courts have been much more likely to find a “trade or business” under §
    1301(b)(1) if these factors are present. See, e.g, 
    Lafrenz, 837 F.2d at 894-95
    ;
    McDougall v. Pioneer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 
    494 F.3d 571
    , 577-78 (7th Cir. 2007); Cent.
    States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Fulkerson, 
    238 F.3d 891
    , 895 (7th Cir. 2001).
    None of these factors are present here. Additionally, the Van Tuyls have
    devoted little time to the real estate beyond depositing the income and performing
    minimal maintenance as required. As the district court noted, throughout the period
    of TES’s participation in the Trust, “both the San Jose property and the Merced
    property were leased to a single, continuous tenant, while the Tahoe property was
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    either used as the Van Tuyls’ own vacation home or was leased to friends and family.”
    Indeed, it appears the San Jose property was purchased solely for the purpose of
    renting to a particular church group. And all of the properties in question were
    purchased many years (indeed, most by decades) before TES’s withdrawal from the
    Trust.
    The nature of the real estate activity in this case is thus more akin to holding a
    long-term income-producing investment. See 
    Fulkerson, 238 F.3d at 896
    (noting that
    § 1301(b)(1) does not impose automatic personal liability on owners of withdrawing
    entities, and that construing § 1301(b)(1) to reach all income-producing investments
    would eviscerate this limitation); see also Bailey v. United States, 
    360 F.2d 113
    , 116
    (9th Cir. 1966) (where a statute does not define a term or it appears to have varying
    meanings depending on context, it should be construed in light of the purpose of the
    statute); cf. 
    Lafrenz, 837 F.2d at 894
    n.7 (not every passive investment is necessarily
    a trade or business).
    On the particular facts of this case, we affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to the Van Tuyls.
    AFFIRMED.
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