United States v. Kirk Robinson , 591 F. App'x 173 ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-1384
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KIRK ROBINSON,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 3-13-cr-00093-001
District Judge: The Honorable James M. Munley
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 21, 2015
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 29, 2015)
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
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Kirk Robinson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to (1) conspiring
to use, carry, and brandish a firearm in furtherance of a robbery, (2) robbery, (3)
armed bank robbery, and (4) mail fraud. Upon Robinson’s arrest, he agreed to
cooperate against his co-conspirators. That cooperation resulted in two additional
arrests. For this assistance, the Government and Robinson agreed jointly to
recommend a sentence of 16 years’ incarceration. But the District Court rejected
the parties’ joint recommendation, sentencing Robinson instead to an 18-year term
of incarceration.
Robinson now complains of procedural unreasonableness in reaching that
sentence. In that regard, the District Court must, among other things, consider the
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and otherwise “adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). But so long as “[t]he record as a
whole . . . make[s] clear that the district judge ‘has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority,’” the District Court will have satisfied its obligations under § 3553(a).
United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215–16 (3d Cir. 2010)). In Robinson’s view, the District
Court failed adequately to explain its rationale for rejecting the agreement that the
parties had reached in light of Robinson’s cooperation.
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But the District Court explained precisely why it thought the parties’
recommendation was insufficient: because of the violent nature of Robinson’s
crimes. After the parties’ presentations regarding Robinson’s assistance, the
District Court acknowledged the agreement reached in light of that assistance and
the Government’s attempts “to be fair” with the joint recommendation.
Nevertheless, in the District Court’s view, the “extremely violent” nature of
Robinson’s crimes, including the use of firearms in each robbery and the fact that
some employees had been tied up, warranted a more severe sentence than the
parties had recommended. This acknowledgment and rejection of Robinson’s
argument is all that was required. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568–69 (no procedural
error where the record demonstrates that the sentencing judge listened to and
rejected each argument).
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
3