Drywall Tapers v. Nastasi & Assoc. , 488 F.3d 88 ( 2007 )


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  • 06-0241-cv
    Drywall Tapers v. Nastasi & Assoc.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    August Term 2006
    Heard: February 5, 2007                               Decided: May 16, 2007)
    Docket Nos. 06-0241-cv(L),06-0242-cv(con),06-1154-cv(con)
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    DRYWALL TAPERS AND POINTERS OF GREATER NEW
    YORK, LOCAL UNION 1974 OF I.U.P.A.T., AFL-CIO,
    Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,
    v.
    NASTASI & ASSOCIATES INC.,
    Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant,
    CARPENTERS LOCAL 52, UNITED BROTHERHOOD
    OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA,
    Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Before: MESKILL, NEWMAN, and SACK, Circuit Judges.
    Appeal from the December 19, 2005, Order of the United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of New York (John Gleeson,
    District Judge), issuing a consent injunction allocating drywall
    finishing work.               In 06-0241, the appeal of the injunction by Nastasi
    & Associates, Inc., the appeal is dismissed; in 06-1154, the appeal by
    Local 52 from denial of intervention, the Order is affirmed on the
    ground that the District Court lacked jurisdiction after the filing of
    a notice of appeal; in 06-0242, the appeal of the injunction by Local
    52, the case is remanded.
    Jeffrey S. Dubin, Huntington, N.Y., for
    Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant Nastasi
    & Associates, Inc.
    John H. Byington III, Meyer, Suozzi, English
    & Klein, P.C., Melville, N.Y., for Proposed
    Intervenor-Appellant Carpenters Local 52.
    Daniel   E.  Clifton,   Lewis,   Clifton   &
    Nikolaidis, New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff-
    Counter-Defendant-Appellee   Local   Union
    1974.
    JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    These three consolidated appeals, one by a New York construction
    contractor and two by a New York labor union local, primarily present
    issues concerning the rights of a consenting party and a non-party to
    appeal.    Both the contractor, Nastasi & Associates Inc. (“Nastasi”),
    and the local, Carpenters Local 52, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
    and Joiners of America (“Local 52”), are attempting to appeal the
    December 19, 2005, Order for an injunction issued by the United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of New York (John Gleeson,
    District     Judge).   The    injunction     requires   several   New    York
    contractors, including Nastasi, to contract drywall finishing work to
    the Appellee, Drywall Tapers and Pointers of Greater New York, Local
    Union 1974 of I.U.P.A.T., AFL-CIO (“Local 1974”). Local 52, which was
    not a party to the proceeding in the District Court, also appeals the
    District Court’s February 13, 2006, denial of its motion to intervene.
    We dismiss Nastasi’s appeal, affirm on Local 52's appeal from the
    denial of intervention, and remand on Local 52's appeal from the
    injunction.
    Background
    Prior    litigation.    This   appeal   is   another   chapter     in   a
    -2-
    jurisdictional dispute among New York City construction unions that
    has been going on for more than 25 years.            At the core of this saga
    was a dispute between two labor unions representing drywall finishing
    workers--Plaintiff-Appellee Local 1974 and Local 530 of the Operative
    Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International Association, AFL-CIO
    (“Local 530”), which is not involved in the current litigation.           Both
    unions are members of the Building & Construction Trades Council of
    Greater New York (“Trades Council”).         More than a century ago, the
    Trades Council and the Building Trades Employers’ Association (an
    organization of construction contractors associations) (“BTEA”), have
    formed more than a century ago the “New York Plan for the Settlement
    of Jurisdictional Disputes” (“New York Plan”). Through the decisions
    of the official organs of the New York Plan (published in the “Green
    Book”), specific types of construction work in New York City were
    assigned to specific unions, and the member employers and unions must
    abide by those work assignments.
    Local   530   has   tried   for    years   to    violate   Local   1974's
    jurisdiction in New York by assuming drywall finishing jobs that
    rightfully belonged to Local 1974.           These attempts have led to a
    series of court decisions generally upholding Local 1974's position.
    See Drywall Tapers and Pointers of Greater New York, Local 1974 v.
    Local 530 of Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons International
    Association, 
    954 F.2d 69
     (2d Cir. 1992); Drywall Tapers and Pointers
    of Greater New York, Local 1974 v. Local 530 of the Operative
    Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International Association, 2002 WL
    -3-
    31641597 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2002); Drywall Tapers and Pointers of
    Greater New York, Local 1974 v. Local 530 of the Operative Plasterers’
    and Cement Masons’ International Association, 
    2005 WL 638006
     (E.D.N.Y.
    Mar. 17, 2005) (ordering the March 17, 2005, injunction, which
    enjoined Local 530 from performing drywall finishing in New York City
    and, in effect, allocated drywall finishing work in New York City to
    Local 1974; this order was subsequently incorporated in the New York
    Plan’s Green Book).
    Pending litigation. A week after the March 17, 2005, decision,
    the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America--an
    organization not previously involved in the litigation--chartered a
    new local union, Local 52, one of the current appellants, to represent
    drywall finishing workers in the State of New York.    Local 52 was not
    affiliated with the Trades Council, and is therefore not bound by the
    New York Plan.     Shortly after Local 52 was chartered, some New York
    contractors who had previously employed Local 530 workers for drywall
    finishing jobs entered into collective bargaining agreements with
    Local 52.1
    1
    Judge Gleeson has more than once expressed his impression that
    Local 52 was created for the sole purpose of taking Local 530’s place
    in the drywall finishing competition with Local 1974, once Local 530
    was finally defeated in court:
    [E]ight days after the [March 17, 2005,] injunction was
    issued, a new drywall finishing local popped up, giving the
    -4-
    Local 1974 filed a complaint with the District Court against four
    construction managers and their respective drywall subcontractors, who
    have employed Local 52 members to do drywall finishing work in four
    Manhattan   construction   sites.     Local   1974’s   complaint   alleged
    violation of the District Court’s March 17, 2005, injunction by
    failing to employ Local 1974 members, and sought enforcement of the
    New York Plan (to which the Defendants were allegedly parties),
    pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Local
    52, not being a party to the New York Plan and thus not bound by the
    2005 injunction, was not named as a defendant in the complaint.
    Local 1974’s suit against the contractors did not reach trial.
    After the District Court denied the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and
    indicated its intent to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the
    Defendants from further violating the March 17, 2005, injunction
    (subject to confirmation that the Defendants are bound by the New York
    Plan), the parties reached an agreement that put an end to the
    litigation (“Settlement Agreement”).      In December 2005, the District
    impression that Local 530 may have been reincarnated. Work
    that was required by the March 17, 2005 injunction to be
    assigned to Local 1974 was promptly assigned to the new
    local instead.
    Drywall Tapers and Pointers of Greater New York, Local 1974 v. Bovis
    Lend Lease Interiors, Inc., No. 05-CV-2746, slip op. At 3-4 (E.D.N.Y.
    Dec. 19, 2005).
    -5-
    Court issued an amended Consent Injunction, (“Consent Injunction”)
    adopting the parties’ Settlement Agreement.         Nastasi, one of the
    drywall contractor-defendants, appeals the Consent Injunction in No.
    06-0241, notwithstanding its agreement to the entry of the Consent
    Injunction, and Local 52 appeals the Consent Injunction in No. 06-
    0242, notwithstanding its not being a party to the proceeding.
    Local 52’s attempted intervention. While Local 1974’s action was
    still pending, Local 52--which is repeatedly mentioned in Local 1974’s
    complaint but, as noted, was not a party to the proceeding (nor to the
    New York Plan)--instituted several proceedings with the National Labor
    Relations Board (“NLRB”), stressing its legitimate role in the New
    York drywall industry and attacking Local 1974 for the remedies it
    sought   in   this   action.   Thus,   Local   52    initiated   several
    representation proceedings with the NLRB, under which majorities of
    workers employed by some of the defendants have elected Local 52 as
    their collective bargaining representative. Local 52 also filed with
    the NLRB a series of formal charges against Local 1974 and the
    defendant-employers who complied with the preliminary injunction,
    alleging unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(b)(4)(A)
    and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.
    On November 4, 2005, while the parties to Local 1974’s action
    were still in negotiations and while Local 52’s proceedings with the
    NLRB were still pending, Local 52 filed a motion with the District
    Court to intervene as of right in Local 1974’s action, pursuant to
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
    -6-
    Local 52’s motion to intervene was scheduled for oral argument on
    January   20,   2006.   In   the    meantime    the   parties   reached   their
    Settlement Agreement, and on December 19, 2005, the District Court
    entered the Consent Injunction.        Local 52 filed its notice of appeal
    from the Consent Injunction on January 13, 2005, before its motion to
    intervene was heard and disposed of.
    The District Court denied Local 52’s motion to intervene for lack
    of jurisdiction because Local 52 had filed a notice of appeal,
    contesting the Consent Injunction.          Local 52 appeals the denial of
    intervention in No. 06-1154.
    Discussion
    I. Nastasi’s Appeal
    Local 1974 challenges Nastasi’s right to appeal the Consent
    Injunction on the ground that Nastasi was a party to the Settlement
    Agreement that was adopted by the District Court in the Consent
    Injunction. The Consent Injunction incorporates the exact language of
    the Settlement Agreement.      The Settlement Agreement further states
    that it “constitutes a final settlement of all claims between Local
    1974 and Defendant [Nastasi] arising from or relating to the Federal
    Action,” and that the parties “have executed this Settlement Agreement
    knowingly, voluntarily and without duress.”
    An appeal from a consent injunction is “generally unavailable”
    since the parties are held to have waived any objection to issues
    included in the injunction. See New York ex rel. Vacco v. Operation
    Rescue National, 
    80 F.3d 64
    , 69 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
    -7-
    International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
    Helpers of America, 
    172 F.3d 217
    , 222 (2d Cir. 1999); Kelly's Trust v.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
    168 F.2d 198
    , 199 (2d Cir. 1948)
    (“[A] consent judgment by its nature precludes an appeal.”).
    Nastasi offers three arguments to avoid this well settled rule.
    First, it contends that its consent to the Settlement Agreement
    resulting in the Consent Injunction was not voluntary.   As its brief
    asserts:
    The Injunction was consensual only in the sense that it was
    clear to all of the defendants that if they did not
    negotiate a consent injunction, the District Court intended
    to enter a more onerous injunction against Nastasi and all
    of the other defendants.
    The argument is entirely without merit.    Most disputes are settled
    because at least one of the parties perceives at least a risk of a
    more disadvantageous outcome if the litigation proceeds.       Nastasi
    makes no claim that its consent to the Settlement Agreement was
    obtained under duress or any other circumstance that might avoid the
    consequences of its voluntary action.
    Second, Nastasi contends that the Settlement Agreement allows for
    an appeal. It relies on Article 2 of the Settlement Agreement to claim
    that it reserved its right to appeal the Consent Injunction:
    Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary,
    neither Party waives its rights under applicable law to seek
    the vacation or modification of the Order.
    Nastasi claims that its appeal seeks to vacate the Consent Injunction,
    as permitted by Article 2. Local 1974 responds that Article 2 refers
    to vacation or modification by the District Court, in case of changing
    -8-
    circumstances.
    On this issue of contract interpretation, Local 1974 is entirely
    correct.     The    traditional   inclusion    of    language     that    permits
    modification of an injunction in the event of changed circumstances
    cannot be transformed into an appellate right to undo the agreement
    that has just been consummated.
    Third, and of arguably more substance, Nastasi relies on one of
    the few exceptions to the rule prohibiting appeal by a party to a
    consent    decree--the    District   Court’s       lack    of   subject    matter
    jurisdiction. See, e.g., Operation Rescue National, 
    80 F.3d at 69
    .
    Nastasi contends that the anti-injunction prohibitions in the Norris-
    LaGuardia Act (“NLA”), 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 101
    , 104, preclude the District
    Court’s jurisdiction.     Local 1974 responds that the NLA limits only a
    district court’s remedial powers, rather than its subject matter
    jurisdiction.
    Local   1974    is   correct.     As     we    have    previously     ruled,
    “Norris-LaGuardia is a limit on remedial authority, not subject matter
    jurisdiction.”     Emery Air Freight Corp. v. International Brotherhood
    of Teamsters, Local 295, 
    185 F.3d 85
    , 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Avco
    Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 
    390 U.S. 577
    , 560-61 (1968)).                See also
    Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 91 v. United Technologies
    Corp., 
    230 F.3d 569
    , 575, 579-82 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing NLA
    limitations on a specific injunction as a matter distinct from the
    district court’s subject matter jurisdiction).
    Although Nastasi cites our decision in In re Petrusch, 667 F.2d
    -9-
    297, 298 (2d Cir. 1981), and several other decisions in which courts
    have referred to the NLA anti-injunction prohibitions as pertaining to
    the district court’s “jurisdiction,” see, e.g., Triangle Construction
    and Maintenance Corp. v. Our Virgin Islands Labor Union, 
    425 F.3d 938
    ,
    942, 947 (11th Cir. 2005); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. National Mediation
    Board, 
    797 F.2d 557
    , 562 (8th Cir. 1986), the Supreme Court has
    recently cautioned that use of the term “jurisdictional,” even in the
    High Court’s own opinions, does not always refer to the technical
    issue of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Eberhart v. United
    States, 
    546 U.S. 12
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 403
    , 406-07 (2005).    Avco and Emery
    Air Freight illustrate that observation. See also Smith's Management
    Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
    No. 357, 
    737 F.2d 788
    , 792 (9th Cir. 1984); National Maritime Union v.
    Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 
    737 F.2d 1395
    , 1398 (5th Cir. 1984).
    Since Nastasi cannot appeal the Order granting the Consent
    Injunction, its appeal must be dismissed.
    II. Local 52’s Appeals
    Local 52 has filed two appeals, one from the Order issuing the
    Consent Injunction and one from the District Court’s denial of its
    motion to intervene.     Because of the relationship between these
    appeals, we discuss them together.
    Local 52 filed its Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene about six
    weeks before the District Court entered the Consent Injunction.   The
    motion was initially calendared for argument on December 16, 2005.
    The Settlement Agreement was finalized on December 14, 2005.       On
    -10-
    December 16, 2005, the District Court approved the consent agreement
    of the then-existing parties and issued the Order for the Consent
    Injunction, which was insignificantly amended three days later.                The
    argument on Local 52's intervention motion was deferred for several
    weeks. After entry of the Consent Injunction, Local 52 filed a notice
    of appeal from the injunction Order.           The District Court then denied
    the intervention motion on the ground that Local 52's notice of appeal
    had divested the Court of jurisdiction.           Local 52 views itself as the
    victim of an appellate “Catch 22”: it promptly filed an appeal from
    the injunction Order so that, if its intervention motion was granted,
    it would not be considered to have appealed beyond the applicable 30-
    day time limit, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), but its notice of
    appeal   deprived     the    District   Court    of   jurisdiction   to   permit
    intervention.
    Local    52    itself   appears    to     have   contributed   to   its   own
    predicament.       Although we make no ruling on whether any delay in
    submitting its motion to intervene will justify denial of that motion,
    it appears that a more expeditious filing of its motion might well
    have alerted the District Court to the need to act on that motion
    before approving the consent agreement.               In any event, Local 52's
    predicament was at least in part precipitated by the action of the
    District Court in adjudicating the litigation-ending motion to enter
    the consent judgment while Local 52's motion for intervention remained
    pending.     We conclude that this was ill advised.          Although there is
    authority for granting a motion to intervene in the Court of Appeals,
    -11-
    see Bates v. Jones, 
    127 F.3d 870
    , 873-74 (9th Cir. 1997); Hurd v.
    Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 
    234 F.2d 942
    , 944 (7th Cir. 1956), it
    will normally be the better practice for a district court to rule on
    a pending motion to intervene before ruling on the merits of pending
    litigation.
    What we can or should do at this point to rectify the situation
    is not entirely clear.     The District Court did not err in denying
    Local 52's intervention motion once the notice of appeal of the
    Court’s injunction Order divested the Court of jurisdiction to affect
    that Order. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 
    459 U.S. 56
    , 58 (1982); Roe v. Town of Highland, 
    909 F.2d 1097
    , 1100 (7th Cir.
    1990); Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 
    743 F.2d 298
    , 299
    (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Katsougrakis, 
    715 F.2d 769
    ,
    776 (2d Cir. 1983); contra Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
    Hospital, 
    612 F.2d 131
    , 134 (3d Cir. 1979) (in banc).   Therefore, on
    Local 52's appeal from denial of intervention, we are obliged to
    affirm.   We do so, however, only to agree with the District Court’s
    jurisdictional ruling, without intimating any view as to the merits of
    the intervention motion.
    Turning next to Local 52's purported appeal from the injunction
    Order, we encounter the threshold obstacle that Local 52 is not a
    party, and normally a non-party lacks standing to appeal. See Marino
    v. Ortiz, 
    484 U.S. 301
    , 304 (1988) (“The rule that only parties to a
    lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse
    judgment, is well settled.”).
    -12-
    Local 52 seeks to avoid this rule by contending that the Consent
    Injunction did not constitute a final resolution of the case.               It
    views the injunction as an interlocutory injunction, an appeal from
    which does not divest the District Court of its jurisdiction over
    unrelated matters. See New York State NOW v. Terry, 
    886 F.2d 1339
    ,
    1350 (2d Cir. 1989).      First, Local 52 points out, the action has not
    yet been dismissed,2 and the Consent Injunction should therefore be
    treated as an interlocutory injunction.           We disagree.    The Consent
    Injunction disposed of the merits of the litigation; the remaining
    filing of a formal stipulation of dismissal was a ministerial act,
    which did not destroy the finality of the Consent Injunction. Cf.
    Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 
    388 F.3d 39
    , 53-54 (2d Cir. 2004).
    Second, Local 52 argues that the litigation remains pending
    because    Article   2   of   the   Settlement   Agreement   contemplates   the
    possibility of returning to court to seek modification. That argument
    also fails because the District Court’s authority to modify the
    2
    Article 10 of the Settlement Agreement reads:
    This Settlement Agreement constitutes a final
    settlement of all claims between Local 1974 and
    Defendant [Nastasi] arising from or relating to
    the Federal Action. Within ten (10) business days
    after execution of this Settlement Agreement or
    the Court’s entry of the Order, whichever is
    later, the Parties shall execute a stipulation of
    dismissal... and shall file such stipulation with
    the Clerk’s office of the Federal District Court
    for the Eastern District of New York, dismissing
    the Federal Action with prejudice.
    -13-
    Consent Injunction does not deprive it of finality.
    Thus,   Local   52's   status   as     a   non-party   prevents    us    from
    adjudicating the merits of its challenge to the Consent Injunction.
    However, we conclude that its non-party status does not prevent us
    from acting to cut through this appellate Catch-22.             We believe it is
    appropriate to remand Local 52's purported appeal from the Consent
    Injunction to the District Court to enable that Court, with its
    jurisdiction   restored,    to   adjudicate      the   merits    of   Local   52's
    intervention motion. See Marino, 
    484 U.S. at 304
     (“We think the better
    practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for purposes of
    appeal; denials of such motions are, of course, appealable.”); Roe,
    
    909 F.2d at 1100
     (“Although the filing of the notice [of appeal] would
    deprive the district court of power to act on the motion to intervene,
    the cause may be remanded for that purpose.”) (quotation marks
    omitted); 20 Moore’s Federal Practice § 303.10[1][b] at 303-19 (3d ed.
    2006).   If that motion is denied, Local 52 may appeal such a denial.
    If that motion is granted, Local 52, as a party, may then seek any
    relief to which it may be entitled, including a renewal of its
    purported appeal of the injunction Order.              Since Local 52 filed a
    notice of appeal within 30 days of the Order issuing the Consent
    Injunction, albeit at a time when it was not a party, its status as a
    party, if intervention is granted, should permit it to renew its
    appeal. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (premature notice of appeal, filed
    before entry of judgment, treated as filed on date of entry); see also
    United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
    432 U.S. 385
    , 396 (1977) (noting
    -14-
    that post-judgment motion to intervene was filed within time when
    existing parties could have appealed).    To avoid the possibility of a
    delay in renewing such an appeal, we add to our remand the proviso
    that in the event that Local 52 becomes a party, it must renew its
    appeal within 30 days of the date intervention is permitted or the
    date the District Court denies any request Local 52 might make for
    modification of the Consent Injunction Order, whichever is later.
    Conclusion
    Nastasi’s appeal, No. 06-0241, is dismissed; on Local 52's appeal
    in No. 06-1154, the District Court’s denial of Local 52's motion to
    intervene is affirmed solely on the ground that the District Court
    lacked jurisdiction; on Local 52's appeal in No. 06-0242, the case is
    remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    -15-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-0241-cv

Citation Numbers: 488 F.3d 88

Filed Date: 5/16/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (21)

Triangle Construction & Maintenance Corp. v. Our Virgin ... , 425 F.3d 938 ( 2005 )

United States v. John Katsougrakis, John Hiotis , 715 F.2d 769 ( 1983 )

new-york-state-national-organization-for-women-new-york-city-chapter-of-the , 886 F.2d 1339 ( 1989 )

aeronautical-industrial-district-lodge-91-of-the-international-association , 230 F.3d 569 ( 2000 )

United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, ... , 172 F.3d 217 ( 1999 )

Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 168 F.2d 198 ( 1948 )

David Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., in Personam,... , 743 F.2d 298 ( 1984 )

freeman-s-hurd-v-illinois-bell-telephone-company-american-telephone-and , 234 F.2d 942 ( 1956 )

motorola-credit-corporation-and-nokia-corporation , 388 F.3d 39 ( 2004 )

jane-roe-on-behalf-of-herself-and-others-similarly-situated-and-suzanne , 909 F.2d 1097 ( 1990 )

emery-air-freight-corporation-doing-business-as-emery-worldwide-v , 185 F.3d 85 ( 1999 )

people-of-the-state-of-new-york-by-dennis-c-vacco-attorney-general-of , 80 F.3d 64 ( 1996 )

terri-lee-halderman-a-retarded-citizen-by-her-mother-and-guardian , 612 F.2d 131 ( 1979 )

drywall-tapers-and-pointers-of-greater-new-york-local-1974-of-ibpat , 954 F.2d 69 ( 1992 )

Smith's Management Corp., D/B/A Smith's Food King and Smith'... , 737 F.2d 788 ( 1984 )

Ozark Air Lines, Inc. And Thomas J. Korte v. National ... , 797 F.2d 557 ( 1986 )

97-cal-daily-op-serv-7908-97-daily-journal-dar-12683-tom-bates , 127 F.3d 870 ( 1997 )

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. , 103 S. Ct. 400 ( 1982 )

United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald , 97 S. Ct. 2464 ( 1977 )

Marino v. Ortiz , 108 S. Ct. 586 ( 1988 )

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