Maurice Scott v. Gordon Miller , 382 F. App'x 123 ( 2010 )

ALD-196 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 10-1181
MAURICE E. SCOTT,
Appellant
v.
PRESIDENT JUDGE GORDON R. MILLER; AGENT RANDAL T. SCHIRRA; ROSS
C. PRATHER, ESQ.; ROBERT E. DRAUDT, ESQ.; JUDGE JOHN F. SPATARO
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00298)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 13, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 26, 2010)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Maurice Scott, a Pennsylvania state prisoner who is proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. For the
following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
In December 2008, Scott filed this civil rights action against Judges John F.
Spataro and Gordon R. Miller, attorneys Robert Draudt and Ross Prather, and Randal
Schirra, an agent with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Narcotics
Investigation and Drug Control.1 He alleged that Judges Miller and Spataro and attorneys
Prather and Draudt “conspired to keep him incarcerated past the 180 day speedy trial
rule” imposed by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. The alleged conspiracy
occurred on May 8, 2006 when Prather failed to file a nominal bail motion and Judge
Miller “used a continuance.” Scott also claimed that Schirra violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by illegally searching and seizing his vehicle on October 1, 2005.
The Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending that Spataro’s, Miller’s,
Prather’s, and Schirra’s motions to dismiss be granted and that the claim against
defendant Draudt be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the claims against Judges Spataro and Miller were
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and that the claims against the remaining
defendants were time-barred. Scott filed partial objections to the report, arguing that the
1
Scott filed an amended complaint on March 9, 2009.
2
The Magistrate Judge noted that, due to an administrative error, defendant Draudt
had not been served with the complaint. The Magistrate Judge thus considered the claim
against Draudt under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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claims against defendants Spataro and Miller were not barred by judicial immunity. The
District Court rejected the objections and issued a memorandum order dismissing the
complaint and adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendations.
Scott now appeals.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will summarily
affirm the District Court because no substantial issues are presented on appeal. See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
The Magistrate Judge’s report and the District Judge’s memorandum opinion are
thoughtful and comprehensive, and we see no reason to discuss Scott’s claims in any
detail here. Suffice it to say that all counts in the complaint were properly dismissed for
the reasons fully explained by the District Court. The District Court properly applied the
doctrine of judicial immunity to bar the claims against the judges, and properly rejected as
time-barred the remaining claims.3 See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)
(explaining that judges are immune from suit except when the challenged action is taken
in a nonjudicial capacity or when a judicial action is taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction); Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that there
3
Although defendant Prather did not raise the statute of limitation defense in his
motion to dismiss, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a claim on this basis where the
defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is
required. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. 2002).
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is a two-year statute of limitation for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Pennsylvania). We note
that neither in his Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report nor elsewhere did Scott
provide any basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitation. We also note that the
District Court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to sua sponte dismiss the claim
against defendant Draudt. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111-12
(3d Cir. 2002). Our concerns regarding sua sponte dismissals are not at issue here, as
Scott filed an amended complaint before the Magistrate Judge issued his report and any
further attempt to amend would have been futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229,
235-36 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, a district
court must first permit the plaintiff to file a curative amendment unless the dismissal is
justified by bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435
F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 based on an affirmative defense where the defense is
obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude this appeal presents “no substantial
question,” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6., and will thus summarily affirm District Court’s judgment.
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