United States v. Keisha Anderson , 386 F. App'x 195 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1757
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KEISHA C. ANDERSON,
Appellant.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 08-cr-226-2)
District Judge: Hon. Gustave Diamond
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2010
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
Filed: July 15, 2010
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Kiesha Anderson pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute
and distribution of five grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841
and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania sentenced her to ten months’ imprisonment on each count, to run
concurrently, to be followed by four years of supervised release on each count, also to run
concurrently. Anderson challenges her sentence, arguing that the District Court erred
when it denied her a minor role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and that her
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we
will affirm.
I. Background
A grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a six-count
indictment against Anderson and Damond Goggins, charging them jointly in two of the
counts – the ones to which Anderson pled guilty – and charging only Goggins in the
remaining counts. The District Court granted Anderson’s request for preparation of a
presentence report (“PSR”) in advance of a hearing on a proposed plea agreement. In that
PSR, the Probation Office calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 70-87
months’ imprisonment, resulting from a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history
category of I.1 Each of the crimes with which Anderson was charged carried a statutory
minimum of five years’ imprisonment.
1
According to the PSR, Anderson’s base offense level was 30, because the offenses
involved a combined drug weight of 79.9 grams of crack cocaine, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(5). That base offense level was reduced by three points for acceptance of
responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
2
At the sentencing hearing, Anderson entered an open plea of guilty to the two
counts against her. The District Court acknowledged the Guidelines range calculated in
the PSR and the mandatory minimum sentences but accorded Anderson the benefit of a
safety valve reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(11) and 5C1.2, thereby
permitting a sentence below the statutory minimum. In addition, the District Court
granted Anderson’s request to calculate her base offense level by using the table for
powder cocaine and not crack cocaine. As a result, Anderson’s base offense level was
reduced to 16. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(12). With the two-point safety valve reduction
and a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a),
Anderson’s total offense level was calculated at 12. Combined with her criminal history
category of I, the District Court calculated her advisory Guidelines range at 10 to 16
months.
The District Court sentenced Anderson to a term of imprisonment of 10 months on
each count, to run concurrently, to be followed by a four-year term of supervised release
on each count, also to run concurrently. Anderson now appeals.
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II. Discussion 2
As earlier noted, Anderson claims that her sentence should have been calculated by
taking account of what she claims was her minor role in the crimes. She also says that her
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant’s offense level may be
reduced by two levels “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal
activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A “minor participant” is “a defendant ... who is less
culpable than most other participants but whose role could not be described as minimal.”
Id. cmt. n.5. Anderson contends that she qualifies as a minor participant, and that the
District Court therefore erred in denying her a reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
“We employ a mixed standard of review when considering whether a defendant was
entitled to a downward adjustment as a minor participant.” United States v. Isaza-Zapata,
148 F.3d 236, 237 (3d Cir. 1998). “We exercise plenary review where the district court’s
denial of a downward adjustment is based primarily on a legal interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. (citing United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir.
1990)). “However, where the district court’s decision rests on factual determinations, we
review for clear error.” Id.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which grants to the
“district courts of the United States ... original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.” We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
4
Anderson argues first that the District Court committed legal error when it
determined that because she acted as a drug distributor, “there was nothing minor about
her role,” and “[s]he was an instrumental, integral part of [the] operation.” (App. at 73.)
Anderson contends that the District Court made a legal determination that drug
distributors, as a category of criminals, are per se not entitled to minor role reductions,
and that this determination contravenes our precedent. See Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 238
(explaining that “because the determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a minor
role adjustment is highly dependent on the facts of particular cases . . . a mechanical
application of the guidelines by which a court always denies minor role adjustments to
couriers because they are ‘essential,’ regardless of the particular facts or circumstances”
is error).
Anderson’s argument is unpersuasive, as it relies on selected and out-of-context
statements from the District Court during the sentencing hearing. A fuller reading of the
hearing transcript reveals that the District Court did not rely on a per se rule that
distributors are not entitled to minor role reductions. Rather, the District Court relied on
the record facts in denying Anderson the reduction, explaining that Anderson “made
contact with the person who was purchasing,” “provided the person who was purchasing
with the drugs,” and “accepted funds for the drugs,” and noting that “[a]t the moment she
was active in this crime, her co-defendant wasn’t even on the scene.” (App. at 74.) In
light of this explanation, it is clear that the District Court considered “the nature of the
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defendant’s relationship to other participants, the importance of the defendant’s actions to
the success of the venture, and the defendant’s awareness of the nature and scope of the
criminal enterprise.” United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1991). The
Court did not err in determining that, based on these facts, Anderson was “a principal
participant” in the crime of possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of, crack
cocaine. (App. at 74.)
Anderson also argues that the District Court should have granted her a minor role
reduction because the drug deals were organized and controlled by Goggins. She asserts
that she was relatively unimportant to the scheme, did not know the scope of the
enterprise, and did not receive a significant economic benefit from her involvement.
Again we disagree with her characterization of the facts. The record shows that a
significant amount of crack cocaine (79.9 grams) was entrusted to Anderson; she
conducted two separate exchanges over a period of three months; she confirmed prices
for those exchanges; she was entrusted with collecting cash payments; and she was indeed
paid for her efforts. In light of those facts, the District Court did not err in denying
Anderson a minor role reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 532 F.3d 667, 674
(7th Cir. 2008) (no minor role reduction where defendant was a trusted part of the drug
operation); United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 820 (3d Cir. 2001) (no minor role
reduction where defendant was engaged in illegal activities on multiple days and
interacted with main figure in operation); United States v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1451, 1455
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(10th Cir. 1994) (no minor role reduction where defendant expected to be compensated
for his role in the illegal conduct).
Turning to Anderson’s challenge to the reasonableness of her sentence, we assess
the challenge in two steps. We begin by determining whether the District Court
committed any “significant procedural error, such as ... failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If a sentence is “procedurally
sound,” we then ask whether it is substantively reasonable. Id. “The abuse-of-discretion
standard applies to both our procedural and substantive reasonableness inquiries.” United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
A district court’s “fail[ure] to consider the § 3553(a) factors” can create a
procedurally unreasonable sentence. United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d
Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Indeed, we have held that the touchstone of
reasonableness is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful
consideration of those factors. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007).
However, we have also made it clear that “[t]here are no magic words that a district judge
must invoke when sentencing ... .” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir.
2006). “A sentencing court need not make findings as to each factor if the record
otherwise makes clear that the court took the factors into account.” United States v.
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Anderson contends that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
District Court failed to adequately consider “the kinds of sentences available,” as required
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), and failed to address her argument that a non-incarceration
sentence was sufficiently severe. The record indicates otherwise. The District Court
heard and considered argument from defense counsel that Anderson did “not deserve a
prison sentence in the way of just punishment,” and that “a sentence of home detention”
would be more appropriate (App. at 81-84), but the District Court rejected that argument,
finding that Anderson’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of her offense, the
need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, and the interest in deterrence
counseled in favor of a sentence of incarceration. The District Court noted specifically
that “if a ... non-incarceration sentence were imposed in this case, it would have an
adverse impact on the community with regard to its ability to encourage or deter the
commission of a crime.” (Id. at 90.) The record shows that the District Court considered
imposing a non-incarceration sentence in response to defense counsel’s argument but
decided on a term of imprisonment based upon the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553. We are satisfied that Anderson’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.3
3
There is no merit to Anderson’s contention that the District Court focused on the
seriousness of drug crimes generally and the need for imprisonment to deter and punish
offenders as a whole but failed to address her “particular argument that even though drug
dealing is serious, her circumscribed role made this drug offense comparatively less
serious,” and her “positive evidence put on that incarceration was not necessary to deter
[her] specifically.” (Appellant’s Br. at 37-38.) Again, the record indicates otherwise.
In addition, we reject Anderson’s argument that the District Court based its
8
We are likewise satisfied that the sentence is substantively reasonable. A sentence
fails the test of substantive reasonableness only when “no reasonable sentencing court
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the
district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (“The fact
that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify a reversal of the district court.”). The sentence
imposed was at the extreme low end of Anderson’s Guidelines range, after reflecting the
District Court’s thoughtful adjustment of that range down from the much higher level
Anderson had faced. The suggestion that her sentence is beyond the boundaries of
reasonableness reflects the defendant’s profound misunderstanding of those boundaries.
sentencing decision on her bare arrest record, and that, based on our decision in United
States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2009), this was error. In Berry, the sentencing
court speculated, without anything in the record explaining why prior charges were
dismissed, that “the reason [the defendants didn’t] have any actual adult convictions is
because of the breakdowns in the court – in the state court system – and not because of
innocence.” Id. at 277. The sentencing court then took into account that the defendants’
“criminal history points were probably understated” in fashioning their sentences. Id. at
279. We stated that it was “clear that the sentencing court relied, at least in part, on bare
arrest records in imposing a more lengthy term of imprisonment,” and thus we remanded
for resentencing, holding that “a bare arrest record – without more – does not justify an
assumption that a defendant has committed other crimes and it therefore can not support
increasing his/her sentence in the absence of adequate proof of criminal activity.” Id. at
284. Here, the discussion of Anderson’s arrest record arose only in response to defense
counsel’s argument that her numerous convictions for disorderly conduct were the result
of self-defense. (App. at 83, 87-88.) Thus, the District Court did not rely on Anderson’s
bare arrest record in imposing a more lengthy term of imprisonment. Instead, it is clear
that the District Court properly considered the § 3553 factors in imposing a prison
sentence.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District
Court.
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