Jones v. Attorney General of the United States , 397 F. App'x 831 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-2137
_____________
IMEH I. JONES,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
_____________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A90-668-783)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling
_____________
Argued April 13, 2010
Before: SLOVITER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI * , Judge
(Filed: October 18, 2010)
Alexander J. Urbelis (Argued)
Justin B. Perri
Michael D. Rips
Steptoe & Johnson
New York, NY 10019
Attorneys for Petitioner
*
Hon. Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
R. Alexander Goring (Argued)
Peter D. Keisler
Jeffrey J. Bernstein
Gregory G. Katsas
Tony West
Richard M. Evans
Thomas W. Hussey
Michelle G. Latour
Virginia M. Lum
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
Washington, D.C. 20044
Attorneys for Respondent
OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Imeh I. Jones has filed a petition for review of a final order of removal of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). We must decide whether the BIA applied the
appropriate standard of review of the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in light of
our recent decision in Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
I.
Jones, a native and citizen of Nigeria, entered the United States in 1981 as a
nonimmigrant. He adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident in 1992.
Since arriving in this country, Jones earned a Ph.D in economics, became Chief Financial
Officer of the Washington D.C. Department of Health and raised three children. Jones
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brought his mother to the United States from Nigeria to be treated for cancer. According
to Jones, he “ran up a substantial amount of debt in trying to pay for the medical needs of
his mother.” Pet’r’s Supplemental Br. at 3. In order to pay his debts, Jones stole money
from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene over the course of
three years and ultimately pled guilty to four counts of “Theft Concerning a Program
Receiving Federal Funds” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). A.R. at 575.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings
against Jones on October 26, 2005, charging Jones with removability pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “the Act”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ found Jones
removable, but granted his application for withholding of removal under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”), and alternatively granted Jones deferral of removal under the
CAT in the event that Jones was found statutorily ineligible for withholding on appeal.
Jones and DHS both appealed to the BIA, which vacated the IJ’s decision with
regard to both bases for CAT protection. Specifically, the BIA found Jones statutorily
ineligible for withholding of removal under the CAT for having been convicted of a
particularly serious crime. The BIA also vacated the decision of the IJ with regard to
deferral of removal under the CAT, finding that there was “insufficient evidence” to
support the IJ’s determination that Jones would more likely than not be detained and
tortured if returned to Nigeria. This petition for review followed.
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II.
This court has jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under INA § 242, 8
U.S.C. § 1252, amended by REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat.
231, 305 (2005). Because Jones was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined under
the Act, our review is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law . . . .” INA §
242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Following oral argument, this court directed the parties to submit contemporaneous
memoranda as to the effect of our recent decision in Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260(3d Cir. 2010).1 In Kaplun, we held that when the BIA reviews an IJ’s determination
regarding whether torture is likely if an alien is removed to his or her country of origin, as
is the case here, it must examine separately the “two distinct parts to the mixed question .
. . .” Id. at 271. The two parts are: (1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if
removed, a factual question subject to clear error review by the BIA; and (2) whether
what is likely to happen rises to the level of torture, a legal question reviewed de novo by
the BIA. Id.Jones argues that Kaplun compels a reversal of the BIA decision because the BIA
did not review for clear error the factual question of what was likely to happen to Jones
upon deportation, instead using terms like “no substantial basis in the record,” “no
1
This court granted the Government’s motion to hold this case in abeyance while the
Government sought rehearing in Kaplun. The petition for rehearing was denied and the
mandate issued on August 4, 2010. As such, the Government agrees that disposition is now
appropriate.
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persuasive evidence,” and “unsubstantiated” without clearly setting forth the standard.
Pet’r’s Mem. of Law with Respect to Kaplun, at 2. Jones argues that the BIA conflated
the two separate inquiries delineated in Kaplun and supplanted its own judgment rather
than deferring to the IJ. He asserts further that the BIA mischaracterized evidence in the
record; namely, Jones’ testimony regarding whether the Nigerian authorities were aware
of his convictions in the United States. Although not binding on this court’s reading of
the BIA decision, Jones also argues that the Government has conceded that the BIA
engaged in a de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings, relying on the now overruled
precedent Matter of V-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500 (BIA 2008).
The Government argues that Kaplun does not alter the ultimate conclusion because
even if the BIA applied what is now the incorrect standard of review, Jones failed to
established a likelihood of detention and torture on the record before the agency under
either standard. The IJ relied on several factors in determining that Jones was likely to be
detained and tortured upon his arrival in Nigeria, including evidence that Jones was
convicted of a crime in the United States, that foreign crimes are held prosecutable
offenses under Nigerian law, and that there is a widespread use of torture in Nigeria to
gain confessions of those accused of crimes. In light of the record before the BIA and the
IJ’s detailed opinion, we will remand to the BIA so that it can apply the proper standard
of review. In doing so, it must explain why the IJ’s decision was clearly erroneous on the
facts or erred as a matter of law, if it so holds. Because we do not address the underlying
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facts in this case, we need not address the new evidence presented by Jones; we leave that
issue to the BIA on remand.
The Government argues that a remand would be futile in light of this court’s
decision in Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005). Jones counters that Auguste is
inapposite because Auguste held that deplorable prison conditions alone do not rise to the
level of torture whereas here Jones argued that he would be subjected to torture by prison
officials for the purpose of extracting a confession. We agree that the Auguste decision is
inapplicable. Moreover, the BIA did not decide whether what would happen to Jones if
he were detained in Nigeria rises to the level of torture because it found, employing a now
incorrect standard of review, that it was unlikely that Jones would be detained at all.
Because the BIA applied the incorrect standard of review with respect to the
likelihood of torture, relevant to both bases for CAT protection, we need not resolve
whether Jones’ conviction constitutes a particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible
for CAT withholding.
III.
For the reasons set forth, we remand this matter to the Board of Immigration
Appeals for reconsideration in light of this court’s decision in Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602
F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
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