Joseph Phillips v. Richard James , 403 F. App'x 641 ( 2010 )


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  • GLD-040                                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 10-3118
    ___________
    JOSEPH S. PHILLIPS,
    Appellant
    v.
    RICHARD JAMES; PAUL LUTTY; GENE STRASSBURGER, et al.
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-01474)
    District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    November 18, 2010
    Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: December 13, 2010 )
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Joseph S. Phillips appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing
    his complaint. We will affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 (2010).
    I.
    Phillips filed a complaint against Richard James and two Pennsylvania state
    judges, the Honorable Gene Strassburger and the Honorable Paul Lutty. Phillips, who
    alleges that he suffers from a mental disability, entered into a contract with James to buy
    a house from him. He alleges that James violated the Americans With Disabilities Act,
    
    42 U.S.C. § 12101
     et seq. (“ADA”) because, with knowledge of his disability, James (1)
    entered into the contract with the intent to defraud him, and (2) provoked an argument
    that resulted in James filing a state-court action against him for slander.
    Phillips‟s claims against Judges Strassburger and Lutty arise from that state-court
    action. Phillips alleges that an arbitration panel initially found in his favor but that James
    appealed to the Court of Common Pleas and obtained a judgment against him. He alleges
    that Judge Strassburger deprived him of due process during that proceeding by denying
    him a continuance without determining his mental competence. He further alleges that
    Judge Lutty committed “obstruction of justice” by overruling the arbitrators‟ decision
    without legal explanation, holding a non-jury trial despite Phillips‟s jury demand, and
    “withholding” the award from the docket to prevent an appeal. For relief, Phillips
    requested monetary damages and a “remand” to state court for a psychological evaluation
    and a “retrial by jury.”
    All defendants filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). By order entered
    July 8, 2010, the District Court granted their motions and dismissed Phillips‟s complaint
    on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine. The District Court also denied a motion for leave to amend that Phillips had
    2
    filed as moot. Phillips appeals.1
    II.
    We agree that Phillips‟s claim against Judges Lutty and Strassburger are barred by
    the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine deprives federal courts of subject matter
    jurisdiction over claims when: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
    „complains of injuries caused by the state court judgments‟; (3) those judgments were
    rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court
    to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at
    166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005)).
    Although this doctrine is “narrow,” id. at 169, Phillips‟s claims against the judicial
    defendants fit squarely within it. As to those defendants, Phillips claims no injury apart
    from the rulings he believes were erroneous and expressly requests a “remand” to state
    court for a psychological evaluation and “retrial by jury.” Thus, we agree that the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the District Court‟s consideration of these claims.2
    1
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo dismissals of a
    complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and questions of subject matter jurisdiction. See Great
    W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 
    615 F.3d 159
    , 163 (3d Cir. 2010).
    In doing so, we may affirm on alternate grounds. See In re Paoili R.R. Yard PCB
    Litig., 
    221 F.3d 449
    , 461 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the District Court‟s denial of
    leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 
    615 F.3d at 163
    .
    2
    Phillips filed a “Motion to Strike and Amend Defendants,” in which he asked the
    District Court to remove the judicial defendants and substitute the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania as a defendant in their place. The District Court docket reflects no
    ruling on that motion, but we perceive no reversible error in that regard because the
    3
    We do not reach the same conclusion with respect to Phillips‟s claims against
    James because those claims allege injuries apart from the state-court judgment.
    Nevertheless, we will affirm on the alternate ground that Phillips failed to state a federal
    claim that is sufficiently substantial to invoke the District Court‟s subject matter
    jurisdiction. See Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 
    525 F.3d 255
    , 261-62 (3d Cir. 2008).
    Phillips alleges that James violated the ADA because he entered into a contract with the
    intent to defraud him and provoked an argument that apparently led to the action for
    slander. The ADA, however, “„prohibit[s] discrimination in employment against
    members of certain classes,‟” Wishkin v. Potter, 
    476 F.3d 180
    , 185 (3d Cir. 2007)
    (citation omitted), not any of the conduct alleged here. These allegations also do not state
    a colorable claim under any other federal law, and we are satisfied that any attempt to do
    so by amending them would be futile.3
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    result would have been the same even if he had proceeded with these claims against
    the Commonwealth.
    3
    In his motion for leave to amend his complaint (which was effectively his second
    such motion), James did not add any allegations regarding James. He referred to
    another Pennsylvania state judge whom he alleges ruled against him in a suit
    involving his contract with James, but did not seek any relief in that regard except to
    request a “federal investigation.” In any event, any claims that his motion might be
    read in that regard would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for the reasons
    discussed above.
    4