United States v. Jennifer McDade , 404 F. App'x 681 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-4906
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JENNIFER MCDADE,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 3-06-cr-00029-007)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2010
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 22, 2010)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Jennifer McDade appeals the District Court’s orders granting the
government’s motion to disqualify her counsel and refusing to give the
Appellant’s proposed jury instruction. We will affirm.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties who are familiar with
the factual context and procedural history of this case, we will recite only the facts
relevant to our analysis. Consesor Cheatham, a/k/a “Skinny,” developed a drug
distribution network in Johnstown, PA. Jennifer McDade traveled between
Johnstown and Allentown to retrieve the drugs for Consesor. Consesor would stay
at McDade’s house while McDade was away getting the drugs and Consesor kept
some of his drugs buried in McDade’s backyard. McDade observed Consesor
cook up cocaine in her kitchen, obtained heroin for Consesor, and helped Consesor
bag marijuana that McDade then sold.
Consesor sold crack and cocaine to some of his customers – including to
the government witness, Jeremy Johnson – at McDade’s house. Johnson
purchased drugs from Consesor at McDade’s house at least seven or eight times.
Normally, Johnson purchased the drugs on McDade’s porch; however, on one
occasion, Johnson entered McDade’s house in order to exchange a gun for drugs.
During the exchange, the gun went off accidentally.
On October 17, 2006, an indictment charged McDade and co-conspirators
with conspiracy to distribute and possess fifty grams or more of crack and five
hundred grams or more of cocaine. On October 27, 2006, the court appointed
Attorney Arthur T. McQuillan to represent McDade. On January 30, 2008, the
government moved to disqualify McDade’s counsel after learning that
McQuillan’s law partner, Robert Gleason, had previously represented Johnson.
On February 1, 2008, the District Court granted the government’s motion to
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disqualify. Subsequently, the Court denied McDade’s motion to reconsider after
holding a hearing regarding the disqualification. During the hearing, when asked
whether Johnson waived the conflict, Attorney Gleason stated that “he got the
impression that it wasn’t much of a concern to [the government witness] unless it
hurt him.” Gleason also testified that he did not believe that his continuing duty of
loyalty to a former client lasted forever. The District Court then appointed
attorney David Chontos as McDade’s new counsel.
At trial, McDade presented evidence that her home had been foreclosed
upon and that her car had been repossessed. Based on that, she requested a jury
instruction providing that her lack of wealth could be circumstantial evidence that
she was not involved in criminal activity. The District Court denied the request.
Following trial, the jury convicted McDade on June 13, 2008, and the Court
subsequently denied McDade’s Motion for a New Trial. On December 9, 2008,
the District Court sentenced McDade, and she filed a timely Notice of Appeal on
December 18, 2008. 1
Discussion
I. Disqualification
McDade asserts that the disqualification of her appointed attorney violated
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. She maintains that the District Court’s
decision was arbitrary because Johnson – the government’s witness – whose
1
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal case by virtue of 18
U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
testimony gave rise to the potential conflict of interest, never testified at the
disqualification hearing. McDade argues the District Court did not thoroughly
investigate (1) whether Johnson’s testimony would indeed lead to a conflict of
interest or (2) whether Johnson would waive the conflict. 2 We disagree.
Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.7 states
that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: . . . (2)
there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client [or] a former
client . . . .” 3 Id. Notwithstanding the conflict of interest, a lawyer may continue
2
We review the District Court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify defense
counsel in two parts. “First, [this Court will] exercise plenary review to determine
whether the district court’s disqualification was arbitrary – ‘the product of a failure
to balance proper considerations of judicial administration against the right to
counsel.’ If we find that the district court’s decision was not arbitrary, we then
determine whether the court abused its discretion in disqualifying the attorneys.”
United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
3
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
encompasses “the right of adequate representation by an attorney of reasonable
competence and the right to the attorney’s undivided loyalty free of conflict of
interest.” United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal
citations omitted). However, this guarantee is not absolute given that the purpose
of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel “‘is simply to ensure that
criminal defendants receive a fair trial,’ and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment
claims, ‘the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the
accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such.’” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme
Court noted that one way in which this right is limited is that “a defendant
[cannot] insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing
relationship with an opposing party, even when the opposing party is the
Government.” Id.4
the representation if “each affected client gives informed consent.” Id.Concurrently, Rule 1.10 imputes one attorney’s conflicts to all other attorneys in
his firm.
Despite the ability of affected clients to waive a concurrent conflict of
interest, the Supreme Court has stated that a trial court “[has] an independent
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards
of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.”
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). Because of this independent
interest, district courts “must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of
conflicts of interest” in both instances where actual or potential conflicts exist. Id.
at 163. Expounding on this topic, we stated,
Usually, the various rights and duties of the attorney clash when a
defendant seeks to waive his right to conflict-free representation in
circumstances in which the counsel of his choice may have divided
loyalties due to concurrent or prior representation of . . . a
government witness. Such a waiver, however, does not necessarily
resolve the matter, for the trial court has an institutional interest in
protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings over which
it is presiding by considering whether the defendant has effective
assistance of counsel, regardless of any proffered waiver. Moreover,
to protect the critically important candor that must exist between
client and attorney, and to engender respect for the court in general,
the trial court may enforce the ethical rules governing the legal
profession with respect both to client-attorney communications and
to conflict-free representation, again regardless of any purported
waiver. Finally, the court has an independent interest in protecting a
fairly-rendered verdict from trial tactics that may be designed to
generate issues on appeal.
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991). Pursuant to this
reasoning, “[a]s long as the court makes a ‘reasoned determination on the basis of
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a fully prepared record,’” the decision to disqualify counsel is not arbitrary. United
States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050, 1075 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Regardless of McDade’s assertion that the District Court had no way of
knowing the content of the government witness’s testimony, we find that the
disqualification was not arbitrary. There was an exchange of pleadings, an
affidavit produced by the law partner, a disqualification hearing, and ultimately
two opinions written, one addressing the initial Motion to Disqualify and the other
following the defendant’s Motion to Reconsider. Defendant cites no case in which
a court required a government witness to testify in order to determine whether a
potential conflict of interest existed. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in Wheat,
[A] district court must pass on the issue whether or not to allow a
waiver of a conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the
wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier
pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through
a glass, darkly. The likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts
of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly
familiar with criminal trials. It is a rare attorney who will be
fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his own client, much
less be fully apprised before trial of what each of the Government’s
witnesses will say on the stand.
486 U.S. at 162-63. Moreover, Attorney Gleason’s testimony reveals that Johnson
did not readily waive a potential conflict when he indicated his concern that a
waiver could hurt him. (A-93.) Finally, Gleason’s lack of appreciation for his
ongoing and permanent duty of loyalty to former clients further supports the
District Court’s rational resolution. (A-95.)
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Even if both affected parties waived the conflict, the district court still has
discretion to disregard those waivers given its independent interest in ensuring that
the proceedings are fair. Moscony, 927 F.2d at 749. After extensive development
of the record, it was far from clear that there had been an effective waiver of the
conflict affecting McDade’s counsel. Accordingly, the District Court properly
balanced “considerations of judicial administration against the right to counsel,”
Stewart, 185 F.3d at 120, and did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying
McDade’s appointed counsel. 4
II. Jury Instruction
McDade argues that the District Court abused its discretion by not giving
McDade’s proposed jury instruction that “the defendant’s lack of wealth can be
circumstantial evidence that there is no involvement in illegal activity.” She
asserts that the instruction was an adequate statement of the law, the instruction
was not substantially covered by other parts of the court’s instruction, and the lack
of instruction was prejudicial. 5 We disagree.
4
McDade also asserts that the District Court should not have considered the
Motion to Disqualify because the government, and not one of the affected parties,
raised the issue. However, McDade concedes that this court has previously
considered Motions to Disqualify not raised by one of the affected parties. See
United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). In
this case, the District Court reserved its ruling on the Motion to Reconsider until
after hearing testimony that both 1) Johnson was concerned that a waiver might
hurt him and 2) Attorney Gleason apparently did not understand his duty of
loyalty to former clients lasted forever. (A-93-95.)
5
“[This Court] exercise[s] plenary review to determine whether jury
instructions misstated the applicable law, but in the absence of a misstatement we
7
“The district court has wide discretion in charging the jury. We will find
that the court erred in refusing to give an instruction only if the instruction was
correct, not substantially covered by other instructions, and was so important that
the omission of the instruction prejudiced the defendant.” United States v. Smith,
789 F.2d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d
Cir. 1999) (same). The District Court determined that the instruction was not
necessarily correct given that “[a]lthough an unexplained acquisition of wealth
establishes the receipt of income through some unknown source, the lack of
wealth can be explained not only by a lack of income, but also by an unwise use of
that income.” 6 (A-22 n.1.) Additionally, the Court determined that the lack of this
instruction did not prejudice McDade because it had given the general
circumstantial evidence instruction. (Id.) The Court’s circumstantial evidence
instruction adequately informed the jury concerning their ability to determine that
McDade was not guilty because she had arguably not received any monetary fruits
from the drug conspiracy. Moreover, neither party cites any case law in this
Circuit that addresses the propriety of giving this instruction. Accordingly, we
review for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 173-
74 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
6
Indeed, McDade requested that the district court give the inverse of the
common jury charge that “the sudden unexplained acquisition of wealth by an
impecunious person at or about the time of a theft which he had an opportunity to
commit, is competent evidence of guilt and will support conviction.” United
States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 575 (3d Cir. 1971).
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will find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give
McDade’s proposed instruction.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decisions on
all grounds.
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