United States v. Butler , 405 F. App'x 652 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-2100
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FRANKLIN BUTLER,
Appellant.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 02-cr-00300-1)
District Judge: Hon. Bruce W. Kauffman
Argued May 23, 2007
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and TASHIMA,* Circuit Judges.
____________
(Filed: December 28, 2010)
Guillermo L. Bosch, Esq. (Argued)
12 Oxford Lane
New Oxford, PA 17350-1614
Counsel for Appellant
*
The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
Jose R. Arteaga (Argued)
Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Franklin Butler was tried and convicted of various drug-related offenses arising
out of a warrantless police search of an Allentown, Pennsylvania apartment. On appeal,
Butler contends that this search, which led to his arrest and to the discovery of significant
amounts of inculpatory evidence, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The dispositive
issue is whether the police created the exigent circumstances on which they relied for
executing the warrantless search Butler now challenges. We hold that they did not, and
will affirm Butler’s conviction.
I.
The facts pertinent to this appeal are largely undisputed and may be stated
succinctly. After receiving a report that drug trafficking activity was taking place at an
apartment building located at 941 Hamilton Street in Allentown, Pennsylvania,
undercover Allentown Police Officers Christopher Cruz, Michael Faulkner, and Pete
McAfee went to that address. Appendix (App.) 396. Once on location, Officer Cruz
2
spoke with the complainant, who identified Apartment #304 as the likely locus of the
drug dealing. App. 401. She also cautioned that one of the occupants was armed and
often kept a handgun in his waistband. Cruz then called for backup, and Allentown
Police Officers William Reinik, Michael Mancini, and Kyle Hough responded to Cruz’s
request. App. 403. The officers placed Apartment #304 under surveillance for
approximately fifteen minutes, but their efforts proved fruitless, as they did not observe
anyone entering or departing the apartment.
The officers next decided to employ the so-called “knock and talk” technique to
investigate further. The officers split into two groups. The first group, which consisted
of Officers Cruz, Reinik, and Mancini, proceeded to the front door of Apartment #304.
The remaining officers covered a separate door which led to a different part of the
apartment. App. 405-06. Officers Reinik and Mancini flanked either side of the front
door, while Officer Cruz positioned himself directly in front of the front door.
Officer Cruz knocked on the front door. When a voice from inside asked who was
there, Officer Cruz responded, “Chris.” App. 406-07. A man later identified as Butler
opened the door slightly, holding a pistol at hip level in his left hand, aimed at Officer
Cruz.1 Seeing the handgun pointed at him, Officer Cruz yelled, “Go, go, go, gun,” and
directed Officer Mancini to enter the apartment. App. 254, 409-10. The three officers
simultaneously identified themselves as police, and Butler attempted to slam the door.
1
Butler, for his part, maintains that he never pointed any firearm at Officer Cruz.
For the reasons stated infra, we reject this argument.
3
App. 253-54. Officer Reinik stuck his foot in the doorway, preventing Butler from
slamming the door. Id. Butler fled into the apartment, and Officer Cruz instructed
Officer Mancini and the other officers to enter the apartment. The officers pursued Butler
into a bedroom, where they found him lying under a blanket on a makeshift mattress on
the floor. App. 412. Butler’s co-defendant, Bill Murray, was also in the bedroom. Police
found Murray using a razor to cut a large white rock that was later determined to be crack
cocaine. App. 412, 421, 617. Five crack pipes were present on the table next to Murray.
App. 639. Police secured both men and searched the room for weapons. When Butler
failed to respond to the officers’ inquiries about where the gun he had pointed at Cruz
was located, Officer Hough picked up the blanket that had been covering Butler, and a
loaded nine-millimeter pistol fell to the floor. App. 413-15.
A search of Butler led to the discovery of $672 in cash, and thirty-seven ziploc
bags, each containing crack cocaine. Murray and Butler both waived their Miranda
rights, and Murray (the lessee) consented to a search of the apartment, which turned up
further drug-related paraphernalia, including Inositol, commonly used as a cutting agent
for cocaine, and numerous unused plastic baggies. App. 416-22. Butler also told the
police that he possessed the gun to protect his product, and that he made approximately
$5,000 in a good week selling drugs from Apartment #304. App. 420.
Thereafter, Butler was charged with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and
possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and §
4
841, and with carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Butler moved to suppress the evidence the government obtained
from the search at issue. The District Court denied Butler’s motion, and a jury later
convicted him on all three counts. Butler now appeals.2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
A.
At the outset, we must address the government’s contention that Butler lacks
standing to challenge the search of Apartment #304. The government argues that because
Butler was merely a temporary guest at Apartment #304, he lacks standing to contest the
legality of the government’s search.
The short answer to this is that the government has waived its right to challenge
Butler’s standing. By its own admission, the government failed to raise this argument to
the District Court, and we therefore will not consider it here. Unlike Article III standing,
which cannot be waived, Fourth Amendment standing can be waived if not raised and
properly preserved. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (“[T]his Court’s long
history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already
answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of
those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment
2
Butler’s co-defendant at trial, Murray, is not a party to this appeal.
5
law than within that of standing.”); see also United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236,
240 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004) (“‘Standing to challenge a search or seizure is a matter of
substantive Fourth Amendment law rather than of Article III jurisdiction, meaning that
the government can waive the standing defense by not asserting it.’” (quoting United
States v. Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1050 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002))); United States v. Dewitt,
946 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he issue of [F]ourth [A]mendment
standing could be waived if the government has failed to raise it in a timely fashion
during the litigation.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Accordingly, our
analysis properly proceeds to the merits of Butler’s challenge.
B.
We begin our analysis with the pertinent constitutional text. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
This provision limits government action in two related ways. First, it requires that
the government conduct only reasonable searches and seizures. Second, it sets out (albeit
at a high level of generality) the prerequisites that government officials must complete
before executing a search or seizure, which include obtaining a warrant. “The Supreme
6
Court has read the Amendment’s twin commands in tandem, holding that when people
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their persons or effects, all searches and
seizures must be supported by a warrant, unless they fall into one of the exceptions to that
requirement.” United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has
observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment --
subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”) (quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is when exigent circumstances
exist. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Couden v. Duffy, 446
F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006) (observing that exigent circumstances is an “established
exception[]” to the warrant requirement). Examples of exigent circumstances include, but
are not limited to, the imminent loss or destruction of evidence, hot pursuit of a fleeing
felon, and the risk of danger to police officers or others. See United States v. Coles, 437
F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 518 (3d Cir.
2001) (“It is established that there are exigent circumstances if the safety of either law
enforcement or the general public is threatened . . . . Inasmuch as the officers had reason
to believe that a laser-sighted weapon was being pointed at them, they had reason to fear
for their own safety. Consequently, there were exigent circumstances . . . .”); Couden,
7
446 F.3d at 496 (police officers reasonably believed a person was in imminent danger).
Warrantless searches are permitted in such “limited situations,” we have held, because
“the need for effective law enforcement trumps the right of privacy and the requirement
of a search warrant, thereby excusing an otherwise unconstitutional intrusion.” Coles,
437 F.3d at 366.
At the same time, however, police cannot avail themselves of the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement if they deliberately create the exigent
circumstances. See id. (“Exigent circumstances, however, do not meet Fourth
Amendment standards if the government deliberately creates them.”); United States v.
Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1254 (3d Cir. 1992) (same). In assessing whether the police
impermissibly create exigent circumstances, we focus on “the reasonableness and
propriety of the officers’ actions and investigative tactics leading up to the warrantless
entry.” Coles, 437 F.3d at 370.
Not every interaction police initiate with citizens implicates the Fourth
Amendment. For instance, the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe police from
seeking citizens’ voluntary assistance in discovering or investigating crime. See Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation.”); see also Marasco,
318 F.3d at 519 (“Officers are allowed to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise
approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just as any private citizen
8
may.”). Nor must police necessarily identify themselves as police when they investigate
criminal activity. If they did, virtually all undercover work would run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (“[P]etitioner invited
the undercover agent to his home for the specific purpose of executing a felonious sale of
narcotics . . . . Were we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally
prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any manner
is virtually unconstitutional per se. Such a rule would . . . severely hamper the
Government in ferreting out those organized criminal activities that are characterized by
covert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not protest.”); see also id. at 209
(stating that “the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its
agents” to ferret out criminal activity) (citing Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604(1895), and Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896)).
It is therefore clear that officers may seek citizens’ consent in investigating crimes,
and that officers need not always announce their true identities when they do so. Taken
together, these two principles yield a third principle; namely, that, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, police may employ the so-called “knock and talk” technique as a tool
to investigate criminal activity. “Knock and talk,” as it is commonly referred to, is the
investigatory technique by which law enforcement officials approach a dwelling --
typically, that of a person suspected of some criminal activity -- and try to obtain either an
occupant’s consent to enter (thereby coming within the consent exception to the warrant
9
requirement) or at least to obtain information from an occupant that might enable police
to make the requisite evidentiary showing needed to secure a warrant.
“Knock and talk” investigations normally do not raise Fourth Amendment
concerns, we have held, because “‘when the police come on to private property to
conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their
movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways,
porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth
Amendment.’” Marasco, 318 F.3d at 519 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.3(f) (3d ed. & Supp. 2003); see also
United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 568 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Courts generally have
upheld [the ‘knock and talk’] investigative procedure as a legitimate effort to obtain a
suspect’s consent to search.”); United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“Federal courts have recognized the ‘knock and talk’ strategy as a reasonable
investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant’s consent to search or when
officers reasonably suspect criminal activity.”); United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103,
1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, under materially identical circumstances, “no
suspicion needed to be shown in order to justify the ‘knock and talk’”). The flip side of
this is that citizens are free not to cooperate with a “knock and talk” investigation, and,
absent a warrant, police cannot detain them, demand entry into their homes, or otherwise
compel their cooperation unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See
10
United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between
“permissible consensual encounter[s]” and encounters involving “coercive police conduct
[such that] the Defendant reasonably believed he had no choice but to comply”)
(quotation marks and alterations omitted).
C.
It is undisputed that the police did not obtain a search warrant before entering
Apartment #304. The government nonetheless argues that exigent circumstances justified
police officers’ warrantless entry into the apartment. More precisely, the government
maintains that when Butler opened the door and pointed a gun at Officer Cruz, he gave
Cruz a reasonable belief that his life and the lives of his fellow officers were in danger.
Cf. Marasco, 318 F.3d at 518 (finding exigent circumstances existed where police
reasonably believed that defendant pointed a weapon at them). The government further
argues that once Butler pointed a gun at Officer Cruz, the police had probable cause to
believe that Butler had committed various criminal offenses under state law, including
felony aggravated assault of a law enforcement official,3 and could therefore pursue
3
It is immaterial that Butler did not know that Cruz was a police officer when he
pointed the gun at him. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made clear that
[§ 2702’s] requirement that the officer be “in the performance of duty” in
no way implies that liability depends on whether the defendant is aware of
his victim’s official status. The duties of a police officer, like the officers in
the instant case, frequently include undercover investigation in which the
officer’s official status is intentionally concealed. We do not interpret the
language “in performance of duty” to require a defendant to have
knowledge of the officer’s official status since such a reading would all but
11
Butler once he fled into the apartment to effectuate his arrest for those crimes
notwithstanding the officers’ lack of a warrant. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)(6) (defining
aggravated assault of various public officials, including police officers). The District
Court agreed, finding that the warrantless entry in issue here fell within the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, and therefore denied Butler’s motion
to suppress the evidence authorities obtained in their search of Apartment #304.
“The presence of exigent circumstances is a finding of fact, which we review for
clear error.” Coles, 437 F.3d at 366. The question, then, is whether the District Court
committed clear error in determining that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
entry in issue here.
Butler, for his part, makes two arguments in an effort to show that the District
Court erred in denying his motion to suppress. First, Butler claims that he did not point a
gun at Officer Cruz when he answered the door, and that Cruz’s testimony to the contrary
is mistaken. In support of this claim, Butler cites the testimony of Officer Reinik, who
testified that he did not see Butler holding a gun. According to Butler, Officer Reinik
was in the best position to see whether Butler was holding a gun given his position to the
side of the door opposite Butler. See Butler Br. at 31 (“P.O. Cruz was in a poor position
to physically see the person who opened the door to Apartment No. 304 and, thus, to see
strip the undercover officer of the protection the legislature intended to
afford him.
Commonwealth v. Flemings, 652 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. 1995).
12
whether or not that person was carrying a weapon. Certainly, P.O. Cruz was in a much
worse position than P.O. Reinik to see the person who opened the door. P.O. Reinik did
not see a gun.”). Because Officer Reinik did not see Butler holding a weapon, Butler
argues that the District Court erred in crediting this aspect of Officer Cruz’s testimony.
Closer examination of Officer Reinik’s testimony reveals that this purported
contradiction is more illusory than real. Officer Reinik testified only that he “didn’t see
[Butler’s] hands at all,” App. 592, which is quite different from saying that he saw
Butler’s hands and that Butler was not holding a weapon. Because Officer Reinik did not
see Butler’s hands, he obviously could not speak to whether or not Butler was holding a
weapon when he answered the door.
Even assuming arguendo that a conflict existed between the testimony of Officer
Reinik and that of Officer Cruz regarding the presence or absence of a gun, we are
compelled to reject Butler’s argument given the deferential clear error standard that we
must apply to the District Court’s factual findings. Reconciling conflicting eyewitness
testimony is grist for the factfinder’s mill, and we cannot overturn that sort of credibility
determination except in the rarest of circumstances. Here, Butler asks us to overrule the
District Court and to credit the testimony of one eyewitness to an event -- Officer Reinik -
- over that of another eyewitness to the same event -- Officer Cruz -- whom the District
Court credited. Yet Butler does not explain why this is the exceptional case in which we
should not defer to the factfinder. Accordingly, even if we were to perceive a conflict
13
between the testimony of Officers Cruz and Reinik (which we do not), we would not
substitute our judgment for that of the District Court.
Butler’s second argument is that the police cannot avail themselves of the exigent
circumstances exception to justify the warrantless search at issue here because the police
themselves manufactured the exigent circumstances on which they based their entry. In
this respect, Butler relies almost exclusively on our decision in United States v. Coles, in
which we invalidated a warrantless search on the ground that police had impermissibly
created the exigency.
The pertinent facts of Coles are as follows. Terrence Coles was staying in a hotel
room in Philadelphia for an extended period of time. The hotel manager, David Bradley,
had unsuccessfully sought to locate Coles to discuss payment for the room, and Bradley
let himself into Coles’s room to see if the room was still occupied. Upon doing so,
Bradley observed what he believed to be drugs and drug-related paraphernalia in the
room, and immediately contacted the police. The police entered Coles’s room without a
warrant, an entry the government later conceded was illegal. Thereafter, the police
decided to put Coles’s room under covert surveillance. Apparently frustrated at the
progress of their stakeout, authorities decided to try to access Coles’s room. Police first
attempted to gain access by subterfuge, knocking on the door and announcing “room
service.” A voice from inside responded that they had not ordered anything, and refused
to open the door. Police again knocked, this time stating that they were from maintenance
14
and were responding to a leak. The occupants refused entry a second time, responding
that there was no leak. Police abandoned subterfuge on their third attempt. Knocking
forcefully on the door, the officers identified themselves as police, telling the occupants
to “‘open the door, this is the police.’” 4 Id. at 363. The majority described what occurred
next:
At this critical juncture, the officers heard the sounds of rustling and
running footsteps. Sgt. Josey attempted to open the door using an electronic
passkey provided by [the hotel manager], but the officers could not enter
because there was a bar latch over the door. After partially opening the
door with the passkey, the officers heard the sound of a toilet flushing and
the sounds of more running.
Coles eventually opened the door for the officers. Upon entering the room,
the police discovered, among other things, several containers of cocaine
base “crack,” multiple bags containing cocaine, 25 vials of “crack” cocaine,
approximately $2,000 in cash, and a firearm inside of Coles’s open carrying
bag . . . . Coles [was] then arrested.
Coles, 437 F.3d at 364 (footnotes omitted).
A divided panel ruled that the police search violated the Fourth Amendment
because the police created the exigent circumstances on which they relied for the
warrantless search. The majority held:
We emphasize that the record reveals no urgency or need for the officers to
take immediate action, prior to the officers’ decision to knock on Coles’s
hotel room door and demand entry. It is, of course, true that once the
officers knocked on the door and announced, “open the door, this is the
police,” they heard sounds indicating that evidence was being destroyed.
But that exigency did not arise naturally or from reasonable police
4
It is unclear what amount of time elapsed between the police’s three attempts to
gain entry in Coles.
15
investigative tactics. Quite to the contrary, the officers, after their
pretextual announcements had failed to gain entry to room 511, deliberately
created the exigency by knocking on the door to room 511 and demanding
entry.
Id. at 371.
This case is clearly distinguishable from Coles. For one, Officer Cruz and his
fellow officers were far less certain that criminal activity was occurring in the dwelling.
It is true that an informant had alleged that drug trafficking was occurring, but the
informant’s reliability was unknown and the officers had been unable to corroborate the
tip, as they did in Coles, by entering the dwelling and viewing the evidence for
themselves. As a part of this investigation, Officer Cruz knocked on the door of
Apartment #304 and identified himself as “Chris,” while his fellow officers provided
backup, a perfectly reasonable precaution in light of the informant’s warning that at least
one occupant of Apartment #304 was armed.5 Butler was free to speak with “Chris” or to
ignore him; had he chosen the latter, Officer Cruz could not have lawfully demanded
entry given the officers’ lack of a warrant. It is undisputed that Butler opened the door
voluntarily. Critically, when he did so, he pointed a gun at Officer Cruz. At that point,
and only at that point, exigent circumstances arose, created by Butler, as Officer Cruz had
5
Butler makes much of the fact that in supporting Officer Cruz, the other officers
arrayed themselves “in combat formation.” The only way that this could conceivably be
relevant is if (i) Butler was aware of these officers’ presence and (ii) as a result, Butler
reasonably believed that he had no option but to open the door and cooperate with Cruz.
Because there is no evidence that Butler was even aware of these officers’ presence (let
alone that they were police officers), the officers’ choice of tactical formation is beside
the point.
16
reason to believe that his life and the lives of his fellow officers were in danger. Officer
Cruz relatedly had probable cause to believe that Butler had committed aggravated assault
by pointing a pistol at him, and could therefore lawfully pursue a fleeing Butler into the
apartment to arrest him. For these reasons, exigent circumstances justified the officers’
entry into Apartment #304 to secure Butler’s arrest.
Butler disagrees, maintaining at oral argument that because the police had probable
cause to obtain a search warrant, they impermissibly engaged in a “knock and talk”
investigation.6 In this respect, Butler relies on our statement in Coles that the police “had
no legitimate reason to utilize the ‘knock and talk’ procedure” in view of the fact that the
officers already had (in the majority’s view) probable cause to obtain a search warrant.
Id. at 370. Because the officers had probable cause to suspect criminal activity was going
on in Apartment #304, Butler argues, the warrantless search at issue here was equally
invalid, and the officers’ failure to obtain a search warrant militates in favor of a finding
that the police created the exigent circumstances in issue. Therefore, Butler asserts, the
evidence they discovered is properly designated fruit of the proverbial poisonous tree.
We are unpersuaded. While it is true that the officers in this case, as in Coles, may
have had probable cause to secure a warrant based on informants’ observations, we
6
We note that in taking this position, Butler directly contradicts the argument he
advanced in his brief, in which he stated that “[i]t is Appellant Butler’s argument that the
Allentown police officers did not have the requisite probable cause . . . to validate their
warrantless entry into, and search, of the premises of Apartment No. 304.” Butler Br. at
16-17.
17
cannot see why the existence of probable cause, in and of itself, should make any
constitutional difference to the warrantless search either in that case or in this one. The
Supreme Court has made clear that “[l]aw enforcement officers are under no
constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the
minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far
short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.” Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). Under a contrary rule, police would be required, in effect, to
make the very evidentiary determinations that the Fourth Amendment expressly reserves
to magistrates. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). What is more,
such a rule likely would have a profound chilling effect on police investigative tactics. If
excessive evidence of criminal activity could invalidate an otherwise permissible
warrantless search, police would understandably be reluctant to employ even those
investigative tactics such as “knock and talk” which normally do not raise Fourth
Amendment concerns. This is so because if police knew that if their “knock and talk”
went as planned and they obtained the requisite consent to enter the apartment or other
information bolstering their ability to demonstrate probable cause, the fruits of their
investigation nonetheless would be susceptible to judicial suppression on the ground that
police had probable cause at the time they initiated the “knock and talk.”
That cannot be right. The Fourth Amendment, as courts have interpreted and
applied it, sets a minimum evidentiary hurdle that law enforcement must clear before they
18
can obtain a warrant that permits them to enter a person’s home lawfully; it does not also
set an evidentiary ceiling that, if transgressed, could invalidate a subsequent warrantless
search even where that search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.
Scrutiny for an overabundance of evidence of criminal activity could moreover
have the anomalous effect of immunizing some criminal activity in the name of the
Fourth Amendment even when a person’s Fourth Amendment rights have not been
implicated. For instance, assume that Coles, in response to the officers’ announcements
of “room service” and “maintenance,” correctly deduced that the men outside his door
were police officers, and opened fire through the door. At the point Coles fired, police
had neither announced themselves nor tried to enter the apartment; thus, at that point,
there would have been no Fourth Amendment violation. It cannot seriously be contended
that, once Coles fired at the officers in our hypothetical, thereby providing probable
cause, the Fourth Amendment would have prevented police from entering the apartment
without a warrant to apprehend Coles in that case, notwithstanding whatever quantum of
inculpatory evidence the officers might have possessed before attempting their ill-fated
“knock and talk.” Cf. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 505 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“When an officer observes facts giving rise to exigent circumstances in the course of
such a consensual encounter, it usually cannot be said that the officer impermissibly
‘created’ the exigent circumstances. Although [the officers’] strategic decision not to
identify themselves immediately may have been ill-advised, and may even have
19
contributed to [the suspect’s] agitation, this conduct did not give rise to a claim that the
police impermissibly created the exigency.”).
In the end, Butler’s proffered interpretation of Coles would require law
enforcement to seek a search warrant as soon as officers believed they could make the
requisite probable cause showing for fear of obtaining too much inculpatory evidence that
could later come back to invalidate an otherwise permissible investigation. At the same
time, however, if officers sought a search warrant too soon, a magistrate would be
constitutionally bound to turn them away. The Fourth Amendment does not compel law
enforcement to perform this sort of “not too soon, not too late, but just right” Goldilocks-
style analysis to determine when they should seek a warrant, and we refuse to endorse an
analysis that would effectively place officers on the horns of this dilemma.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Butler’s suggestion that Officer Cruz’s use of
subterfuge in conducting the “knock and talk” demonstrates the unreasonableness of the
investigation. Officer Cruz testified that he felt identifying himself as law enforcement
would deter the occupants from opening the door and conversing. App. 281. Thus,
Officer Cruz’s subterfuge was simply a prudent and reasonable adaptation of the “knock
and talk” technique to the circumstances, and not, as in Coles, a thinly-veiled attempt to
precipitate the crisis necessary to justify a warrantless intrusion. It is well-established that
police do not necessarily have to identify themselves as police when they investigate
criminal activity. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (stating that “the Government is entitled to
20
use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents” to ferret out criminal activity). The
mere use of subterfuge, without additional evidence of pretext, does not invalidate a
“knock and talk” investigation.
Finally, we cannot agree with Butler that Officer Cruz’s investigation was
unreasonable in light of the officers’ belief that at least one of the occupants of Apartment
#304 was armed. As we have repeatedly noted, firearms are very common tools of the
drug trade, see, e.g., United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 718-19 (3d Cir. 1994), and police officers will almost always
have some reason to suspect that the targets of their drug investigations are armed.
Accordingly, accepting Butler’s argument would effectively doom “knock and talk” as an
acceptable technique in drug investigations. This, we refuse to do.
For all of these reasons, we reject Butler’s contention that the government created
the exigent circumstances in issue here.
D.
Butler’s final argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his conviction. Butler has a daunting burden to carry, as we must view the evidence “in
the light most favorable to the Government, and credit all reasonable inferences that
support the verdict[ ].” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 342 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). Accordingly, we cannot disturb the
jury’s verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt” based on the evidence introduced at trial. Perez, 280
F.3d at 342 (quotation marks omitted).
At the outset, we note that we have already rejected an identical challenge by
Butler’s co-defendant, Bill Murray, in a separate appeal. United States v. Murray, 193 F.
App’x 145 (3d Cir. 2006) (challenging sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for conspiracy).7 As the facts set forth previously make clear, law
enforcement discovered copious amounts of drugs and drug-related paraphernalia in the
course of their search, catching Butler’s co-defendant red-handed. Given this, and given
the incriminating post-arrest statements made by each defendant, it was a short analytical
leap for the jury to conclude as it did: that Butler and Murray were engaged in illicit
narcotics trafficking. In view of this overwhelming evidence of Butler’s guilt, we have
no difficulty determining that the evidence in this case far exceeded the minimum
quantum required to sustain the jury’s verdict against him.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court in all
respects.
7
Because neither party has raised the issue, we do not decide whether Butler’s
sufficiency of the evidence challenge is foreclosed by the law of the case. See United
States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Schaff, 948
F.2d 501, 506 (9th Cir. 1991).
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