Latoyia Smith v. State of Indiana , 34 N.E.3d 252 ( 2015 )

May 13 2015, 10:48 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Latoyia Smith, May 13, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A05-1409-CR-400
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
State of Indiana, The Honorable Clayton Graham,
Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff
The Honorable Steven Rubick,
Magistrate.
Cause No. 49G17-1307-CM-47880
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, Latoiya Smith (Smith), appeals her conviction for
battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (a)(1)(A) (2012).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Smith raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether there was
sufficient evidence to support her misdemeanor battery conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Smith is the mother of a teenage daughter, J.W., born in May 1999. In the
spring of 2013, J.W. was thirteen years old. Going through J.W.’s electronic
devices, Smith discovered that J.W. was having conversations with boys on
social media sites that were “very sexual in nature.” (Transcript p. 128). Smith
observed that in most conversations, J.W. was “the aggressor”; J.W. “was
sexting[,] sending naked pictures of herself to guys, [and] talking to random
people on the internet.” (Tr. pp. 120, 128). In addition, J.W. was sneaking
away from home and would arrange to meet with boys at nearby parks. In an
attempt to correct J.W.’s behavior, Smith imposed a progression of discipline
measures. Smith removed J.W. from public school and placed her in a private
Christian school. Smith took all of J.W.’s clothes and left her with “sweats and
polo shirts.” (Tr. p. 128). Smith took away J.W.’s electronic devices, and also
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had J.W. deactivate her social media accounts. Concerned for her daughter’s
safety, Smith had J.W.’s stepfather advise J.W. of the dangers of interacting
with random boys on the internet.
[5] In the last week of April 2013, and despite grounding J.W., Smith allowed J.W.
to go on a school field trip to Washington D.C. On that field trip, J.W. came
into possession of an iPod through a friend. Unbeknownst to Smith, J.W.
reactivated many of her social media accounts. Shortly after the trip, Smith
went to J.W.’s bedroom in the middle of the night to check on her. The lights
were off but J.W. was not asleep. Smith found J.W. using the iPod1 that she
had recently acquired. Smith was disappointed and she felt utter frustration
with J.W.’s disobedience. At that point, Smith grabbed a belt from J.W.’s
closet and she ordered J.W. to lie “across the bed on her stomach,” but J.W.
refused. (Tr. p. 134). Smith tried to hold her down, but J.W. dodged the
spanking by swinging, rolling herself on the floor, kicking, and grabbing the
belt. At some point, Smith reached out for a second belt to complete the
spanking. J.W. “wasn’t crying” and Smith stopped because “[i]t was taking
1
The record does not reveal what kind of iPod J.W. had. However, we note that iPod touch as well as iPod
nano have built-in apps such as iMessage, FaceTime, email, and web browser which are accessible over Wi-
Fi. In addition, the devices allow users to download apps in the Apple store such as Facebook, and
Instagram. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT1353 (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
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more energy than it was worth.” (Tr. p. 152). Altogether, Smith hit J.W. with
the belt somewhere between “ten [] and twenty [] times” on her arms, shoulder,
and legs. (Tr. p. 77). Type
[6] The following day, J.W. went to school. A teaching assistant saw J.W. sitting
in a classroom between periods, and J.W. seemed emotionally upset. The
teaching assistant pulled J.W. in the hallway for a private conversation, and
J.W. revealed the contusions on her shoulder that resulted from Smith’s
beating. The teaching assistant reported the incident to the school’s principal,
who then contacted the Department of Child Services (DCS). Two days after
the incident, May 3, 2013, J.W. went to the school nurse for an icepack to nurse
her aching shoulder. Nurse Cynthia Litwiler (Nurse Litwiler) asked J.W. if she
had reported the injury to her mother, and J.W. indicated that she had not.
Thinking that the injury must not have been grave, Nurse Litwiler sent J.W.
back to class without treatment. Later that afternoon, a DCS worker showed
up at J.W.’s school to investigate the extent of J.W.’s injuries. The DCS
worker and Nurse Litwiler took J.W. to the bathroom and they photographed
J.W.’s injuries. J.W.’s injuries included: a swollen right shoulder which was
painful to touch, welts and scratches to her right inner thigh, upper left thigh,
upper part of her back, and forehead. Nurse Litwiler gave J.W. an icepack for
her shoulder and ibuprofen for the pain.
[7] On July 24, 2013, the State filed an Information charging Smith with battery, a
Class A misdemeanor. A bifurcated bench trial was conducted on March 20,
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and July 31, 2014. At the close of Smith’s bench trial, the court found Smith
guilty of battery, and it held in part that
. . . the evidence before the [c]ourt is that [] Smith lost control.
Regardless of your daughter’s wayward behavior, you were the adult []
Smith. Though you had taken progressive steps to discipline your
child and though you announced to her that you were going to use
corporal punishment as a result of her contumacious behavior[,] when
she began resisting, you fought with her. You participated in the
escalation of that. You described pushing back, resisting. You
described pushing her, falling all over the bed; tussling. This became a
fight with your child. Your [] decision to use reasonable proportional
force to discipline your child was lost when you began to fight with the
child. She was thirteen []. You were a grown woman. At that
moment, it was incumbent on you to walk away and cool down.
(Tr. p. 161). The trial court then sentenced Smith to 365 days in Marion
County jail, all suspended to non-reporting probation.
[8] Smith now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[9] Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. We neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Perrey v. State,
824 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We only consider the
evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom. Id. Where there is substantial evidence of probative value to
support the judgment, it will not be set aside. Id.
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[10] To convict Smith of battery, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that she knowingly or intentionally touched a person in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner and that touching resulted in bodily injury.
I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A)(2012). Not contesting the elements, Smith asserts the
defense of parental discipline pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1,
which provides: “A person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise
prohibited if he has legal authority to do so.” “This statute has been interpreted
to provide legal authority for a parent to engage in reasonable discipline of her
child, even if such conduct would otherwise constitute battery.” State v. Fettig,
884 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Thus, “[a] parent is privileged to
apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his
[or her] child as he [or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper
control, training, or education.” Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008)
(quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, § 147(1) (1965)).
[11] The defense of parental privilege, like self-defense, is a complete defense to
battery of a child. Id. “[T]o sustain a conviction for battery where a claim of
parental privilege has been asserted, the State must prove that either: (1) the
force the parent used was unreasonable or (2) the parent’s belief that such force
was necessary to control her child and prevent misconduct was unreasonable.”
Id. “The State may refute a claim of the defense of parental privilege by direct
rebuttal or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief.”
Id.
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II. Parental Discipline Privilege
[12] A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a familial
relationship with his or her child. Id. at 180. This fundamental interest includes
the rights of parents to direct the upbringing and education of children,
including the use of reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior.
Id. However, the potential for child abuse cannot be taken lightly. Id.
Consequently, the State has a powerful interest in preventing and deterring the
mistreatment of children. Id. The difficult task of prosecutors and the courts is
to determine when parental use of physical force in disciplining children turns
an otherwise law-abiding citizen into a criminal. Id.
[13] Here, Smith contends that the State’s evidence was insufficient to refute the
claim of parental privilege. Specifically, Smith argues that the force used was
relatively inconsequential, the injury on J.W. was marginal, and her conduct
was moderate and reasonable under the circumstances. In determining whether
the force or confinement is reasonable, the following factors should be
considered:
(a) whether the actor is a parent;
(b) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child;
(c) the nature of his offense and his apparent motive;
(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same family
or group;
(e) whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary and
appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command;
(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily
degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.
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Id. at 182. (quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, § 150 (1965)). Our
supreme court cautioned that the relevant factors “should be balanced against
each other, giving appropriate weight as the circumstances dictate, in
determining whether the force is reasonable.” Id.
[14] In advancing her claim, Smith relies on Willis, where our supreme court held
that the parent’s use of a belt to inflict corporal punishment was protected by
the parental discipline privilege. Id. at 183. In Willis, the mother used
progressive forms of discipline to punish her eleven-year-old son who frequently
got into trouble. Id. According to the defendant in Willis, she had previously
grounded the child after he had been caught stealing, but that punishment had
not been effective. Id. Accordingly, she decided that a harsher punishment,
namely, swatting him with a belt, would be more effective in response to a
subsequent incident where the child had stolen several items of clothing. Id. At
trial, the defendant explained, “I thought about it over the entire weekend and I
even tried to talk to him again. And he continued to lie . . . . I didn’t know
what else to do.” Id.
[15] In applying the aforementioned factors to Willis case, the court concluded that
the defendant had inflicted a reasonable punishment in light of the offense. Id.
Specifically, the Willis court observed that the child was eleven-years-old and
that the punishment was reasonable for a boy of that age. Id. In addition, the
court noted that most parents would likely find that the pattern of being
untruthful and taking away property of others would set the stage for more
aberrant behavior later in life. Id.
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[16] In countering Smith’s argument, the State claims that Smith’s situation is not
comparable to the Willis case. The State argues that the beating in “this case
was much more severe than five to seven swats to which” Willis’ son was
subjected. (Appellee’s Br. p. 7). The State argues that Smith hit J.W. between
ten and twenty times using two belts and that the beating was unreasonable. In
this regard, the State claims that Smith’s situation is more comparable to
Mathews v. State, 892 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. In
Mathews, the defendant was playing cards with her two daughters, twelve-year-
old J.M. and seven-year-old B.M. Id. B.M. threw popcorn at her older sister,
and J.M. responded by hitting B.M. in the face. Id. Mathews then tried to hit
J.M., but missed. Id. J.M. then called Mathews a “fucking bitch” and ran to
the bathroom. Id. Mathews followed J.M., forced entry, and hit J.M. with a
closed fist on her arms and legs. Id. J.M. escaped to her bedroom, but
Mathews pursued her, forcing entry, and beating J.M. with a belt about ten
times. Id. At trial, Mathews stated that she attempted to take away the blanket
that J.M. was using as a shield in order to get a better shot at J.M. Id.
[17] Here, it is uncontroverted that J.W. was a badly behaved thirteen-year-old who
had been caught having inappropriate conversations with boys on social media.
Smith had tried non-physical disciplinary measures to correct J.W.’s wayward
behavior, including grounding her and taking away her electronic devices.
After J.W. returned from her school trip, Smith caught J.W. using an iPod,
which J.W. had sneaked into the house, and J.W. had reactivated most of her
social media accounts. J.W.’s persistent disobedience and the failed attempts to
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correct her behavior preceding the use of the belt, certainly warranted some
form of punishment.
[18] As we stated above, Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1 establishes that a parent
has a right to employ reasonable corporal punishment to discipline a child. See
Dyson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). But there are limits
to that right and parents may be found guilty of, among other things, battery, if
they exceed their disciplinary authority. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d
422, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that dropping four-year-old son to the
floor and kicking him was a battery); Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a parent’s ten-minute beating of a child, involving
fifteen blows to the child’s body and resulting in a laceration and numerous
contusions, was a criminal act).
[19] We decline Smith’s invitation that we reweigh the evidence with regard to her
claimed defense that her actions were justified as reasonable parental discipline.
Despite J.W.’s egregious behavior and the apparent ineffectiveness of previous
disciplinary attempts, the force employed by Smith to discipline J.W. was
unreasonable and we find that it exceeded the privilege allowed to parents. At
her bench trial, Smith stated that she was not angry, but rather, disappointed
and frustrated with J.W.’s behavior. Contrary to Smith’s assertion, the record
reveals that she was angry and that she knowingly and intentionally touched
J.W. in a rude, insolent and angry manner. See I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A)(2012).
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[20] We note that parents do not always act with calmness of mind or considered
judgment when upset with their child’s delinquent behavior. Both mothers in
Willis and in the case at bar were justly upset by their disobedient teenagers.
The stark difference between the two is, that the mother in Willis inflicted only
five to seven swats which we find were more controlled than those displayed
here. At trial, the court noted that Smith pushed J.W. several times to advance
her beating. In addition, the record reveals that when J.W. fought off the
beating, Smith fought back. The trial court noted that what might have begun
as reasonable chastisement, escalated to a fight between a mother and her
thirteen-year-old daughter. As a result, J.W. sustained numerous bruises on
various parts of her body, including her face, shoulder, arms, and legs.
[21] Furthermore, we note that although the beating took place in one room, and it
was not a chase as that displayed in Mathews, we find that the punishment bears
some resemblance. In Mathews, we concluded that when Mathews followed
J.M. to her bedroom and continued to beat her, it crossed from reasonable to
unreasonable. Mathews, 892 N.E.2d at 699. We also noted that Mathews
attempt to remove the blanket that J.M used as a shield so as to have a direct
access for hitting was also unreasonable. Id. Turning to the facts of this case,
Smith grabbed the first belt and she hit J.W. several times with it. At some
point, Smith grabbed a second belt to complete the beating. All the while, J.W.
used her hands to shield herself. We find that Smith reaching out for a second
belt to complete the beating was unreasonable. We also find Smith’s actions
unreasonable when she engaged in a fighting match with J.W. on the night in
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question. Moreover, at her bench trial, Smith admitted that she only stopped
the whipping because she was not getting a reaction from J.W. and that beating
seemed to take more energy than it was worth.
[22] Lastly, Smith’s assertion that J.W.’s injuries were not serious enough to require
medical attention is an invitation to reweigh that evidence, which will not do.
The jury heard evidence that Smith beat then-thirteen-year-old J.W.
approximately ten to twenty times with a belt. Although J.W. could not recall
for how long she was in pain, J.W. testified that she was sore after the beating,
and she had visible red welts and abrasions for days after the incident. The
State also introduced photographic evidence that corroborated J.W.’s
testimony.
[23] In light of the above factors and our deference to the fact-finder in sufficiency
cases, the trial court was entitled to conclude that Smith’s behavior was
excessive, unreasonable, and outside the bounds of appropriate parental
discipline, and the mere fact that it was imposed by an out-of-control parent
upon her disobedient thirteen-year-old does not shield Smith from criminal
liability. See Mitchell, 813 N.E.2d at 427. Under the circumstances, we
conclude that Smith committed a battery not protected by the parental
privilege.
CONCLUSION
[24] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State produced sufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith committed battery.
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[25] Affirmed.
[26] Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur
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