Buchanan v. Legan , 92 N.E.3d 600 ( 2017 )

2017 IL App (3d) 170037
Opinion filed December 7, 2017
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2017
HANNAH E. BUCHANAN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Peoria County, Illinois,
)
v. )
)
MICHAEL LEGAN, SUSAN E. BUCHANAN, ) Appeal No. 3-17-0037
n/k/a Susan E. Blair, and JAMES E. ) Circuit No. 16-F-40
BUCHANAN, )
)
Respondents ) Honorable
) Lisa Y. Wilson,
(Michael Legan, Respondent-Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Carter and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 On March 25, 1997, Susan E. Buchanan gave birth to a daughter, Hannah E. Buchanan
(Hannah), during the course of a marriage with James E. Buchanan. Two years later, the couple’s
marriage was dissolved and a joint parenting agreement resulted in joint custody for the children
born during the course of this marriage, including Hannah. More than a decade later, Susan
Buchanan filed two separate parentage actions in the circuit court. The second 2011 petition,
relevant to this appeal, attempted to simultaneously disestablish the existing parent-child
relationship between Hannah and James Buchanan in order to create a new parent-child
relationship with Hannah’s purported biological father, Michael Legan. The prayer for relief in
the second 2011 petition included a request for the trial court to order DNA testing, enter a
finding that Michael Legan was Hannah’s “natural” father, establish a visitation schedule and
impose child support obligations on Michael Legan as Hannah’s second and only other legal
parent.
¶2 Court-appointed counsel for Hannah filed a motion to dismiss the second 2011 petition,
filed by Susan Buchanan on Hannah’s behalf. The motion to dismiss alleged the shortened
statute of limitations barred the relief requested in the second 2011 petition because all parties
had known for more than two years that someone other than James Buchanan was Hannah’s
biological father. After a hearing, the court entered a written order granting Hannah’s motion to
dismiss the second 2011 petition.
¶3 Four years later, Hannah filed her own amended 2016 petition to determine the existence
of a father-child relationship with Michael Legan shortly after attaining age 18. The amended
2016 petition did not contest the existing parental rights of James Buchanan. The trial court
found that res judicata barred the relief requested in the subsequently amended 2016 petition as a
matter of law, due to the resolution of the prior proceeding in 2012 that was filed in Hannah’s
name. The trial court dismissed the amended 2016 petition over Hannah’s objection. Hannah
Buchanan appeals.
¶4 FACTS
¶5 In 1999, Susan Buchanan (Susan), 1 filed a petition for dissolution of marriage from
James Buchanan (respondent-Buchanan), in Peoria County case No. 99-D-277. The petition
alleged, inter alia, that a child, Hannah, was born March 25, 1997, to Susan and respondent­
1
Susan Buchanan is now known as Susan Blair.
2
Buchanan during the course of their marriage. On May 19, 1999, the trial court entered a
judgment of dissolution and joint parenting agreement that dissolved the marriage and
adjudicated respondent-Buchanan as Hannah’s joint custodial parent.
¶6 I. First 2011 Petition
¶7 On March 7, 2011, Susan filed a “Petition to Determine the Existence of the Father and
Child Relationship and for Determination of Child Related Issues” in Peoria County case No. 11­
F-153 (first 2011 petition). The first 2011 petition sought to determine the existence of the
father-child relationship between Hannah and Michael Legan (respondent-Legan), claiming that
respondent-Legan was Hannah’s natural father. On June 9, 2011, Susan and respondent-Legan
stipulated and agreed to dismiss the first 2011 petition with prejudice. The stipulated dismissal
order contained language stating the stipulated dismissal was “with prejudice as to that cause of
action, but not with prejudice as to other parties who may request a determination as to same.”
¶8 II. Second 2011 Petition
¶9 On May 6, 2011, Susan filed a “Petition to Determine the Existence of a Father-Child
Relationship, the Non-Existence of a Father-Child Relationship, and Child-Related Issues”
(second 2011 petition) in Peoria County case No. 11-F-369. This second 2011 petition, filed by
Susan on behalf of Hannah, differed from the first 2011 petition by naming Michael Legan and
James Buchanan as respondents. The second 2011 petition attempted to disestablish the existing
father-child relationship between Hannah and respondent-Buchanan resulting in Susan becoming
Hannah’s sole custodial parent. The prayer for relief in the second 2011 petition also requested
the trial court to order DNA testing, enter a finding that respondent-Legan was Hannah’s
“natural” father, impose child support obligations on respondent-Legan, and establish a visitation
schedule between Hannah and respondent-Legan.
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¶ 10 The trial court appointed Jeffrey Dunn as guardian ad litem. A report filed by Dunn
indicated that Dunn interviewed Hannah and respondent-Buchanan. Dunn advised the trial court,
based on his investigation, that he believed Susan initiated the second 2011 petition, in her
daughter’s name, solely for Susan’s financial gain and without any regard for Hannah’s best
interests. Dunn concluded this approach was not in Hannah’s best interests because Hannah felt
strongly that respondent-Buchanan should continue his status as her legal parent.
¶ 11 The trial court also appointed Angela Madison, an attorney, to act as Hannah’s child
representative. Madison filed a motion to dismiss the second 2011 petition that designated
Hannah as the petitioner, rather than Susan. Hannah’s motion to dismiss included the following
statements:
“5. An action to declare the non-existence of a parent-child relationship is barred,
under 750 ILCS 45/8 [(West 2010)], if brought later than 2 years after the Petitioner
obtains knowledge of relevant facts and shall not extend beyond the minor’s eighteenth
birthday.
***
7. An action to determine the existence of a father-child relationship can be
brought by HANNAH, herself, pursuant to 750 ILCS 45/8 [(West 2010)] during the two
year period of time after she reaches her majority. Thus, in the event that HANNAH
wants to pursue a determination of the existence of a father-child relationship between
she [sic] and Michael Legan, after reaching her adulthood and is possibly less influenced
by her mother, then HANNAH will still have the right to do so.”
***
4
WHEREFORE, this child representative for the minor, HANNAH BUCHANAN,
prays this Court enter an order dismissing the Petitioner’s Petition to Determine the
Exiistence [sic] of a Father-Child Relationship, the Non-Existence of a Father-Child
Relationship, and Child Related Issues.”
¶ 12 On May 21, 2012, respondent-Legan filed a “Response to Brief Regarding
Representation of the Minor Child by Natural Guardian, Guardian Ad Litem and Child
Representative.” The following language appears in the conclusion paragraph of
respondent-Legan’s response: “Due to the conflict of interest between the minor and
natural guardian portrayed by the GAL, Child Representative, and Respondent, Michael
Legan, the case should be dismissed, with the minor afforded the opportunity to litigate
this issue after she turns eighteen years of age.”
¶ 13 Susan filed a motion to strike Hannah’s motion to dismiss. This motion to strike is
not included in the record on appeal. On July 25, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing
on Susan’s motion to strike and Hannah’s motion to dismiss. The court struggled with
whether Hannah’s motion to dismiss should be treated as a voluntary dismissal or
whether Hannah’s request would result in an involuntary ending to the pending petition.
After much debate, when announcing the court’s ruling to the parties, the trial judge
stated, inter alia, that: “My chief concern is finality. *** When we are talking about a
child’s future, don’t mess around with it, court, get it done, okay, move on.”
¶ 14 The trial court’s written order granted Hannah’s motion to dismiss and included
the following language:
“After hearing arguments and for the reasons stated on the record, the court orders
(1) Motion To Dismiss filed by Child Representative is granted
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(2) Mother’s Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss is denied.”
No party appealed the trial court’s 2012 order or requested a timely modification of the language
included in the court order.
¶ 15 III. Hannah’s 2016 Petition
¶ 16 Three years later, on June 29, 2016, Hannah, then age 18, filed an “Amended Petition to
Determine the Existence of the Father and Child Relationship” (amended 2016 petition) in
Peoria County case No. 16-F-40, naming both custodial parents and Michael Legan as
respondents. The amended 2016 petition sought only to determine the existence of a father-child
relationship between Hannah and respondent-Legan without addressing or questioning the
existing parental status of respondent-Buchanan arising from the final judgment of dissolution.
¶ 17 On July 28, 2016, respondent-Legan filed a section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2016)) motion to dismiss the amended 2016 petition on two grounds. Respondent-Legan claimed
the ruling granting Hannah’s motion to dismiss the second 2011 petition constituted a dismissal
with prejudice and constituted a final resolution of the causes of action set forth in the second
2011 petition. On this basis, respondent-Legan argued res judicata precluded Hannah from
attempting to relitigate any issues that were determined or could have been determined in that
prior proceeding. In addition, respondent-Legan claimed another affirmative matter, the
applicable statute of limitations, barred the amended 2016 petition to establish a father-child
relationship.
¶ 18 The trial court conducted a hearing on respondent-Legan’s section 2-619 motion to
dismiss the amended 2016 petition on November 1, 2016. In a written order dated January 11,
2017, the trial court granted respondent-Legan’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss and found
Hannah’s 2016 attempt to establish a father-child relationship was now barred by the doctrine of
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res judicata resulting from the dismissal of the second 2011 petition with prejudice. The trial
court did not reach the merits of respondent-Legan’s other contention regarding the limitations
period.
¶ 19 Hannah filed a timely notice of appeal on January 12, 2017.
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, Hannah contends the dismissal of the second 2011 petition resulted in a
voluntary dismissal in 2012. Since a voluntary dismissal does not result in a final determination
of the issues, Hannah argues the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine of res judicata
before dismissing her amended 2016 petition. Alternatively, Hannah contends respondent-Legan
made a judicial admission in the prior proceeding that requires a denial of his section 2-619
motion to dismiss the amended 2016 petition. We first address whether res judicata applies
based on the procedural history documented in the record on appeal.
¶ 22 The doctrine of res judicata serves to bar actions in which (1) a final judgment on the
merits has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) an identity of the cause of
action exists, (3) and there is an identity of the parties or their privies in both actions. River Park,
Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 302 (1998). Res judicata prevents the relitigation
of issues that could have been decided in the first action along with those issues that were
actually decided. Id. The trial court’s application of res judicata involves a question of law.
Thus, our standard of review is de novo. Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill. App. 3d 170, 177 (2009).
¶ 23 With regard to the application of res judicata, the parties only dispute whether the trial
court rendered a final judgment on the merits by granting Hannah’s motion to dismiss the second
2011 petition. Hannah asserts the generic motion to dismiss the second 2011 petition filed by her
court-appointed counsel constitutes a voluntary dismissal of the second 2011 petition filed by her
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mother on Hannah’s behalf. Based on the same record, respondent-Legan contends the dismissal
of the second 2011 petition should be treated as an involuntary dismissal with prejudice. The trial
court agreed with respondent-Legan’s view that the dismissal of the second 2011 petition was
with prejudice.
¶ 24 Hannah did not caption her pleading as a motion to strike the second 2011 petition filed
by one parent unilaterally seeking to terminate the other joint parent’s rights established by court
order in the prior dissolution proceeding. Instead, Hannah filed a motion to dismiss the second
2011 petition filed by one parent on her behalf. Hannah’s inartful motion to dismiss did not
designate whether she was seeking a voluntary dismissal under section 2-1009 or was seeking an
involuntary dismissal under section 2-619. 735 ILCS 5/2-1009, 2-619 (West 2010). Thus, this
court must now determine whether the resulting undisputed dismissal in the trial court was
without prejudice as Hannah contends on appeal.
¶ 25 Such confusion can be easily avoided by meticulous procedural practice when drafting
potentially outcome-dispositive pleadings. See Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469,
484 (1994). When a motion to dismiss is silent, as in the case at bar, the nature of the motion
must be gleaned by closely examining the grounds, requests, and the treatment of the motion by
the parties and the trial court. Id.
¶ 26 Based on our careful review, we note first and foremost, Hannah desired to prevent an
untimely attempt to interfere with an existing and long-standing father-child relationship that
began at birth. Hannah’s motion clearly asserted the request to disestablish Hannah’s relationship
with respondent-Buchanan was time-barred based on certain facts and could never be refiled for
this reason. In the trial court, the parties did not take issue with Hannah’s factual allegation that
more than two years had gone by since the parties became aware that Hannah might not be the
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biological child of respondent-Buchanan. These grounds are consistent with a section 2­
619(a)(5) motion for dismissal of the second 2011 petition with prejudice. 735 ILCS 5/2­
619(a)(5) (West 2010).
¶ 27 However, our careful review of the record also reveals the second 2011 petition sought to
simultaneously repeal and then immediately replace an existing parent-child relationship with
another parent as part of the same proceeding initiated by the second 2011 petition.
¶ 28 Significantly, the prayer for relief in the second 2011 petition assumed that Susan would
become Hannah’s sole custodial parent once the court disestablished respondent-Buchanan’s
parental status. Based on this assumption, the prayer for relief requested the trial court to
establish respondent-Legan as Hannah’s second parent and enter an order scheduling visitation
and ordering respondent-Legan to pay child support based on his income.
¶ 29 Neither Hannah nor respondent-Buchanan shared Susan’s interest in disestablishing
respondent-Buchanan’s parental rights. The grounds for dismissal set forth in Hannah’s motion
to dismiss raised an affirmative matter that would once and for all terminate the repetitious
litigation seeking to designate Susan as Hannah’s sole custodial parent and naming another
person, other than respondent-Buchanan, as Hannah’s only other joint parent.
¶ 30 The nature of Hannah’s nondesignated motion to dismiss the second 2011 petition caused
the trial court to carefully reflect on the true nature of the motion. The court commented that
Hannah had the ability to request a voluntary dismissal. Yet, when announcing the court’s ruling
after much debate, the trial court recognized, “My chief concern is finality. *** When we are
talking about a child’s future, don’t mess around with it, court, get it done, okay, move on.” The
trial court’s written order does not include any language indicating the second 2011 petition was
dismissed without prejudice. This order was not challenged by any party or subject to a request
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for reconsideration, modification, or clarification. Such is the unique record submitted for our
review.
¶ 31 The case law provides that when a dismissal order fails to specify that the dismissal is
without prejudice, the order should be viewed as a final adjudication on the merits. Richter v.
Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 25; see Ill. S. Ct. R. 273. In the absence of clarity
arising from the record submitted for our review, this court must follow the path established by
existing case law and Rule 273. Based on the unique procedural record in this case, we conclude
that the trial court’s 2012 order granting Hannah’s motion to dismiss the second 2011 petition,
filed on her behalf, resulted in a dismissal with prejudice.
¶ 32 On this basis, we conclude the trial court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata and
dismissed the amended 2016 petition. Hannah argues respondent-Legan’s statement pertaining to
the request to dismiss the second 2011 petition contains a prior judicial admission relevant to this
appeal. When determining whether any statement constitutes a judicial admission, our review is
de novo. Crittenden v. Cook County Comm’n on Human Rights, 2012 IL App (1st) 112437,
¶¶ 45-48.
¶ 33 A judicial admission constitutes a clear, deliberate, unequivocal statement by a party
about a concrete fact within that party’s knowledge. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 406
(1998). Hannah’s motion to dismiss included the following language: “An action to determine
the existence of a father-child relationship can be brought by HANNAH, herself, pursuant to 750
ILCS 45/8 during the two year period of time after she reaches her majority.” This proclamation
by Hannah’s counsel represents counsel’s legal opinion, a conclusory statement.
¶ 34 Hannah directs our attention to a statement in respondent-Legan’s “Response to Brief
Regarding Representation of the Minor Child by Natural Guardian, Guardian Ad Litem and
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Child Representative” that contains the same broad legal conclusion as originally stated by
Hannah’s counsel. First, we reject Hannah’s contention that this language rises to the level of a
judicial admission by respondent-Legan. Second, respondent-Legan defeated Hannah’s amended
2016 petition on grounds unrelated to the timeliness of Hannah’s 2016 request to establish a third
parent-child relationship following her eighteenth birthday.
¶ 35 Consequently, we conclude respondent-Legan was not precluded from raising the issue of
res judicata and affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue.
¶ 36 CONCLUSION
¶ 37 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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