United States v. Maurice Ross , 413 F. App'x 457 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 10-1583
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MAURICE LAMAR ROSS,
Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 1:08-00019-001)
Honorable John E. Jones, III, District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 17, 2010
BEFORE: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 9, 2011)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge
This matter comes on before this Court on defendant-appellant Maurice Ross’s
appeal from a sentence that the District Court imposed on him following an order
granting the government’s motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to
correct the original sentence that it had imposed in this case. The Court imposed both the
original and corrected sentences on two counts of an indictment in a drug trafficking and
firearms case in which Ross pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment, possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and to count two of the
indictment, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. §
924(c).1 The Court held its original sentencing hearing on February 2, 2010, at which
time it sentenced Ross to a custodial term of one day on count one and 60 months on
count two, the terms to be consecutive.
Later on the day of the sentencing the government filed a motion to correct the
sentence pursuant to Rule 35, contending that in imposing the sentence the District Court
misapprehended the sentencing guidelines. Ross answered that motion on February 3,
2010, by filing a motion to strike the government’s motion on the ground that the original
sentence was neither illegal as to its terms nor illegally imposed and thus Rule 35 did not
grant the Court authority to change the sentence. Nevertheless, on February 3, 2010, the
Court issued a memorandum and order granting the government’s motion, vacating the
original sentence, and rescheduling Ross’s sentencing. Then the Court on February 12,
2010, held a new sentencing hearing at which it sentenced Ross to a 90-month custodial
term divided into 30 months on count one and 60 months on count two, the terms to be
consecutive. Later on that day it entered a judgment of conviction and sentence
reflecting the new sentence. Ross has filed a timely appeal from the February 12, 2010
1
The indictment had a third count that the Court dismissed and, accordingly, we do not
discuss that count.
2
sentence and the February 3, 2010 order granting the government’s motion to correct the
original sentence.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Inasmuch as Ross does not
challenge the length of the sentence that the Court imposed on February 12, 2010, and
limits his appeal to his contention that the Court did not have the authority to change the
original sentence under Rule 35, we are exercising plenary review on this appeal. See
United States v. Ross, 557 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2009).
We need not go into detail regarding the facts of this case as the parties are
familiar with them. Instead, it is sufficient to point out that Ross’s arrest and indictment
arose from his activity as a retail drug vendor in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, area.
After Ross’s guilty pleas the probation department prepared a presentence report in which
it determined that Ross had 13 criminal history points and therefore had a Criminal
History Category of VI. The report indicated that Ross’s sentencing guidelines range was
100 to 125 months for his drug trafficking conviction 2 on count one and that the Court
statutorily was obliged to impose a 60-month sentence on count two to run consecutively
to the sentence on count one. Ross, however, requested the Court to make a downward
adjustment of his sentencing range predicated on his acceptance of responsibility, but the
Court rejected that request as Ross had engaged in criminal conduct while on pretrial
release pending the disposition of the charges in this case. Ross, however, successfully
2
Ross recognizes that the guideline range that the probation department calculated was
“based upon the possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base count, and excluded
from the calculation the firearms count under Section 924(c).” Appellant’s br. at 5.
3
requested that the Court reduce his criminal history category of VI on the ground that a
criminal history category of VI overrepresented his criminal history. In granting that
request, the Court reduced Ross’s criminal history category to IV. Consequently, Ross’s
sentencing guideline range was reduced to a range of 77 to 96 months on count one.
At the February 2, 2010 sentencing hearing, Ross sought a variance from his
guidelines range because the range reflected the often challenged disparity between the
powder and crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. In this regard Ross asked the Court to
adopt a one-to-one ratio between powder and crack cocaine, a proposal that if accepted
would have reduced Ross’s sentencing guidelines range on count one to 30 to 37 months.
The Court responded that it already had given Ross a significant reduction in the
guidelines range and that, although a variance was warranted, it was not warranted to the
extent of calculating the range on the basis of a one-to-one powder to crack ratio.
Nevertheless, the Court imposed a sentence completely at odds with its stated intention,
sentencing Ross to a one-day custodial term on count one and a consecutive custodial
term of 60 months on count two. Of course, the sentence that the Court imposed was far
more advantageous to Ross than what his sentence would have been if the Court had
granted him the benefit of a sentence based on a one-to-one powder to crack cocaine
ratio, as Ross requested.
The government immediately concluded that the District Court had
misapprehended the sentencing guidelines and reacted by filing its motion to correct
Ross’s sentence. Ross then responded to the government’s motion by filing his motion to
4
strike the government’s motion. On February 3, 2010, the Court granted the
government’s motion and explained its reason for doing so as follows:
From the sentencing recommendation submitted by the
Probation Officer, the Court was of the opinion that the
guideline range expressed in ¶ 64 of the presentence report,
100 to 125 months, was a composite guideline range that
combined the guideline range applicable to Count I with the
60 month mandatory minimum associated with Count II.
Utilizing what we erroneously thought was a composite level,
we then reduced it to 77 months to 96 months after we
granted the Defendant a two-level downward departure in
criminal history category pursuant to the overstatement
provision contained in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1).
Consequently, at the time of sentencing, we were under the
impression that the 77 month to 96 month range established
in our January 25, 2010 Order . . . reflected an aggregated
calculation of the respective ranges associated with Counts I
and II. We sentenced the Defendant accordingly, proceeding
under the theory that our sentence of 60 months and one day
represented an approximate 17 month to 36 month variance
from the guideline range.
***
Therefore, while we initially intended to grant
Defendant an approximate 17 month to 36 month variance in
light of the crack/powder cocaine disparity, by sentencing
Defendant to a term of 60 months and 1 day, we effectively
afforded him an approximate 77 month to 96 month variance
on Count I. This was not at all our intent, and we cannot
justify such an extreme variance given the factors expressed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, we believe that justice
dictates that we vacate the sentence imposed on this date and
convene a future proceeding during which we resentence the
Defendant.
App. at 134-36.
The Court then went on to explain why Rule 35 was applicable:
5
In this case, we believe that we committed either a technical
error or a clear error in fashioning a sentence that did not
adequately or appropriately reflect the advisory guideline
range associated with Count 1. If we failed to correct this
misstep and the Government elected to appeal we would
certainly be confronted with resentencing the Defendant on
remand from the Third Circuit. Accordingly, we believe the
procedure we are undertaking is wholly proper and
appropriate pursuant to the dictates of Rule 35.
App. at 136 n.3.
At the February 12, 2010 sentencing hearing the District Court again noted that it
had made an error when it imposed Ross’s original sentence. Then, after a
comprehensive proceeding at which it fully entertained Ross’s contentions, the Court
imposed consecutive custodial sentences of 30 months on count one and 60 months on
count two, to be followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release.3 When
imposing this 90-month custodial sentence the Court noted that the sentence reflected a
variance based on the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. Ross then
appealed.
Rule 35(a), which is implicated on this appeal, provides that a court may correct a
sentence “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, . . . [if the] sentence . . . resulted from
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Inasmuch as the District Court imposed the
original sentence on Ross on the basis of its erroneous sentencing guidelines calculation,
we are satisfied that the Court appropriately relied on Rule 35(a) to order resentencing.
3
The District Court also imposed a special assessment but we are not concerned with it
on this appeal.
6
After all, it is obvious from what the Court said and did on February 2, 2010, that it made
a “clear error” when it imposed the sentence on that day.
We think that it is beyond doubt that if the District Court had adhered to the
sentence it originally imposed, in the likely event that the government had appealed we
would have vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing because the
Court imposed the original sentence on the basis of its fundamental miscalculation of
how it was granting a variance. We also point out that if the District Court could have
imposed a one-day sentence on count one to be followed by a 60-month mandatory
sentence on count two, in effect the Court would have nullified the mandatory
consecutive aspect of the 60-month sentence on count two for Congress surely intended
that a mandatory consecutive sentence follow a sentence of more than nominal length.
As a practical matter, a 60-month sentence to run consecutively to a one-day sentence is
consecutive to hardly anything and thus, rather than being consecutive to a sentence on
another count or counts, it is a substitute for the sentence on the other count or counts.
Here, as the District Court acknowledged, it made its error because it erroneously
thought that the guideline range that the pretrial report set forth was a composite range
based on both counts one and two, a misunderstanding that led it to believe that it was
granting a variance from the guidelines sentencing range on both counts. Of course,
inasmuch as the range subject to the possibility of a variance was calculated only on
count one, the variance was only from the range on that count and, contrary to its
intention, the Court essentially wiped out the sentence on count one.
7
The procedure to be followed on sentencing begins with the Court making a
correct calculation of the applicable sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Wise,
515 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] district court must begin the process by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237,
247 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “[c]ourts must continue to calculate a defendant’s
Guidelines sentence precisely”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
courts of appeals “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Although the
sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, the change in the force of the guidelines
from mandatory to advisory “does not render optional [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(4)’s
direction to consider the Guidelines that are in effect on the date of the sentencing.”
Wise, 515 F.3d at 220. Thus, we have explained:
Not for jurisdictional reasons, but rather because the
Guidelines still play an integral role in criminal sentencing,
we require that the entirety of the Guidelines calculation be
done correctly, including rulings on Guidelines departures.
Put another way, district courts must still calculate what the
proper Guidelines sentencing range is, otherwise, the
Guidelines cannot be considered properly . . . . The scenario
is simple: error entering this sentencing step may presage the
sentence ultimately set.
United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 838-39 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Beyond any doubt the District Court made a clear error when it originally
misinterpreted the presentence investigation report as it believed that it was granting a
8
sentencing guideline variance of 17 to 36 months, rather than the 77 to 96 months
variance that it granted. The Court was right to correct its error by vacating the original
sentence and resentencing Ross.
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence
entered February 12, 2010.
9