Henry v. Phila Adult , 297 F. App'x 90 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-24-2008
    Henry v. Phila Adult
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-3863
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    Recommended Citation
    "Henry v. Phila Adult" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 330.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/330
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    NON-PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Case No: 07-3863
    NORMA K. HENRY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA
    STALLWORTH AND EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA HENRY;
    FRANKLIN COFER, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES LEE COFER,
    Appellants
    v.
    PHILADELPHIA ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE;
    CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; BI CORPORATION
    _________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    District Court No. 05-CV-04809
    District Judge: The Honorable Jan E. Dubois
    _____________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    October 20, 2008
    Before: SMITH, COWEN, Circuit Judges and THOMPSON, District Judge *
    (Filed: October 24, 2008)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    *
    The Honorable Anne E. Thompson, Senior United States District Judge for the
    District Court of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
    1
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    On July 16, 2003, Sean Brown was convicted of attempted burglary and retail
    theft, and was sentenced to house arrest for a period of six to twenty-three months. On
    August 21, 2003, Brown was confined to his grandmother’s house for his house arrest,
    and the Philadelphia Adult Probation and Parole Department (“PAPPD”)1 attached an
    electronic monitoring device to his person. On August 26, 2003, the electronic
    monitoring device sent a signal to PAPPD that Brown had left the area of his house arrest.
    The following day, PAPPD contacted Jim Telese, Brown’s Probation Officer, regarding
    the signal. On August 29, 2007, Officer Telese sent officers from the Warrant Unit to
    Brown’s residence, but they were unable to find Brown. At that time, Brown’s
    grandmother informed the Warrant Unit that Brown “was going on the run.”
    On September 2, 2003, Officer Telese initiated the “Wanted Card” process for
    Brown, which meant that Brown’s information and wanted status were entered into the
    Philadelphia Crime Information Center and the National Crime Information Center
    computer systems. Neither PAPPD nor Officer Telese alerted the Philadelphia Police
    Department (“the Police Department”) of Brown’s escape. On September 23, 2003,
    Brown raped and murdered fifteen-year-old Patricia Stallworth and her mother, Patricia
    Henry, and murdered James Cofer. The Police Department arrested Brown on October 7,
    1
    PAPPD is an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and not the City of
    Philadelphia. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist., 
    426 F.3d 233
    , 235, 240 (3d. Cir. 2005).
    The Eleventh Amendment would have barred any claims on appeal against the PAPPD.
    2
    2003.
    On September 9, 2007, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania granted Summary Judgment for the defendants PAPPD, BI, Inc., and the
    City of Philadelphia (“the City”). The executors of the decedents’ estates appealed the
    order as to all of the defendants.2 The only issue that the executors argue on appeal,
    however, is whether the District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the City
    on the executors’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Accordingly, this is the only issue before this
    Court. We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s grant of Summary Judgment.
    Bushman v. Halm, 
    798 F.2d 651
    , 656 (3d Cir. 1986). Because we find that this case is
    controlled by Bright v. Westmoreland County, 
    443 F.3d 276
    (3d Cir. 2006), we will
    affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    The executors argue that the City violated their substantive Due Process Clause
    rights by failing to apprehend Brown before he committed these reprehensible crimes.
    The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
    does not “impose an affirmative obligation on the State” to protect “the life, liberty, and
    property [interests] of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” Deshaney v.
    Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 
    489 U.S. 189
    , 195 (1989). Interpreting
    Deshaney, this Court has held that states cannot violate the Due Process Clause “by
    2
    The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
    1367(a). We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    3
    failing to more expeditiously seek someone’s detention . . . or by taking note of a
    probation violation without taking steps to promptly secure the revocation of the
    probationer’s probation.” 
    Bright, 443 F.3d at 283
    –84. The facts of the present case are
    indistinguishable from our holding in Bright. Brown, who was undeniably a private
    actor, was the one who took the decedents’ lives. Setting aside the fact that PAPPD never
    notified the Police Department of Brown’s escape, the City’s delay in apprehending
    Brown did not give rise to a substantive Due Process Clause violation.
    For the reasons articulated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District
    Court.
    4