Anthony Johnson v. City of Philadelphia , 644 F. App'x 130 ( 2016 )

CLD-176 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-3816
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ANTHONY JOHNSON, on behalf of non party African Americans similarly situated
v.
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, as a person; GARY GLAZER, J.; JOHN M.
YOUNGE, J.; THEODORE A. MCKEE, J.; CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.; WILLIAM J.
DITTER, J.; WILLIAM H. YOHN, J.; THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Viz.
U.S.; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; U.S. DISTRICT COURT THIRD CIRCUIT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PA, located in Philadelphia; L. FELIPE RESTREPO, J.;
AARON SHOTLAND, Assistant City Solicitor Philadelphia; THE PHILADELPHIA
DAILY NEWSPAPER; THOMAS N. O'NEILL, J. (all defendants are sued in their
individual and official capacities)
Anthony Johnson,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-05459)
District Judge Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 10, 2016
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 18, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Anthony Johnson appeals from the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint as
malicious. We will dismiss the appeal as frivolous.
I.
Johnson initiated this action in October 2015 against several state and federal
judges, and other governmental entities and individuals, alleging that they violated his
constitutional rights by prohibiting him from representing others in court, despite his
obtaining their power of attorney. Johnson, who is not an attorney, appears to claim
some constitutional right to represent others by virtue of possessing a power of attorney.
On October 8, 2015, the District Court granted Johnson’s petition to proceed in
forma pauperis and then dismissed his complaint as malicious, noting that it duplicates a
case Johnson filed in the same District approximately two months earlier, asserting the
same claim against different judges.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s
dismissal of the complaint as frivolous or malicious for abuse of discretion. See Denton
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Because Johnson is proceeding IFP, we must
dismiss the appeal if it is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s claim as malicious because it
duplicates a pending suit. Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir.1993) (noting
that a complaint is malicious when it “duplicates allegations of another pending federal
lawsuit by the same plaintiff”). The District Court also accurately noted that Johnson’s
claim is legally frivolous because it is premised on an “indisputably meritless legal
theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995). The Constitution
guarantees no right to represent others,1 and our rule barring non-lawyers from
representing others remains. See Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa.,
937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal as legally frivolous under § 1915(e).
1
In his Argument in Support of Appeal, Johnson argues that Pennsylvania’s prohibition
of the unauthorized practice of law “is nothing more than legalizing the ‘Sedition Act.’”
He does not identify any plausible constitutional basis for a right to represent others or
address the duplicative nature of his suit.
3