Ronnie Coleman, Jr. v. New Jersey Transit ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-1821
__________
RONNIE COLEMAN, JR.,
Appellant
v.
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT; NEW JERSEY TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT;
and NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-16835)
District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 18, 2020
Before: AMBRO, PORTER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 22, 2020)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Ronnie Coleman, Jr. claims to have been physically harmed by several law
enforcement officers, both during an altercation on a train operated by New Jersey
Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) and during his subsequent detention at the Secaucus
Junction Transit Station in Secaucus, New Jersey. Coleman sued only the entities he
believed were responsible for his assailants and, therefore, his injuries: NJ Transit and
the NJ Transit Police Department (collectively, Defendants).1
Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that as a matter of law they are not considered “person[s]”
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute. The District Court
agreed, and concluded as well that any apparent state law claims raised by Coleman were
equally defective as a matter of law. The District Court thus granted Defendants’ motion
to dismiss.2 This timely appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For a pro se civil rights action like
this one, our rule is that “district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Coleman also named “New Jersey Transit Corporate Headquarters” as a defendant, but
that appears to be a redundancy.
2
The District Court also denied as moot Coleman’s motion for default judgment.
2
is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would
be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482
F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). The District Court does not appear to have considered
whether an opportunity to amend could have benefited Coleman. Cf. Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“[O]utright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying
reason [i.e., inequity or futility] appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it
is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.”).
And, from our vantage point, it seems quite possible that an amended complaint could
have set forth plausible claims under § 1983 against the individual law enforcement
officers that Coleman made reference to in the original pleading.
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
3