Ricky Sisco v. Commissioner Social Security ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-2101
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RICKY ALLEN SISCO,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-00671)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Karoline Mehalchick
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a):
December 8, 2020
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Before: MCKEE, PORTER, and FISHER,
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 22, 2020)
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OPINION
______________

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
PORTER, Circuit Judge.
On June 26, 2017, Ricky Allen Sisco applied for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. After his claim was initially denied, Sisco
requested a hearing, which took place before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of
the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on August 31, 2018. Following the hearing,
the ALJ determined that Sisco was not disabled during the relevant period and denied his
application for benefits. Sisco requested further review by the Appeals Council—an
administrative appellate body—but the Council upheld the ALJ’s decision.
The following month, Sisco sued the Commissioner of Social Security in the
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeking to overturn the agency’s
adverse decision. The District Court1 rejected Sisco’s challenges to the agency’s denial of
benefits and entered judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Sisco appeals from that
judgment. Like the District Court, we are unpersuaded by Sisco’s arguments, so we will
affirm the judgment under review.2
I
To receive benefits under Title II, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
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The parties consented to proceed before Magistrate Judge Mehalchick.
2
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. A claimant must also be insured for
disability insurance benefits to receive those benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); 20
C.F.R. § 404.131 (2015).
Sisco claimed a disability beginning June 1, 1999, due to traumatic brain injury,
chronic obstructive lung disease, diabetes, sleep apnea, degenerative arthritis, inactive
Hepatitis C, back pain, hypothyroidism, hearing loss, and alcohol dependence. He was
last insured on September 30, 2001, so the ALJ considered whether Sisco was disabled as
of that date. The ALJ concluded that Sisco was not disabled after proceeding through the
five-step sequential analysis provided by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2012). See Hess v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201–03 (3d Cir. 2019). In the five-step analysis, the
“burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on
the Commissioner of Social Security.” Id. at 201.
The ALJ found that Sisco had three severe impairments: vision impairments,
residuals of traumatic brain injury, and traumatic brain injury. The ALJ then determined
that none of these impairments met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment, so
Sisco was not per se disabled. Next, the ALJ assessed Sisco’s residual functional capacity
and determined that, during the relevant period, he was able to perform a full range of
work, with some exceptions. At the final step, the ALJ found that a significant number of
jobs existed in the national economy that Sisco could have performed as of September
2001—specifically, bakery racker, binder machine feeder offbearer, and garment bagger.
The ALJ concluded that because “through the date of last insured, considering [Sisco’s]
age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, [he] was capable of
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making a successful adjustment to other work,” a “finding of ‘not disabled’” was
appropriate. A.R. 22. The Appeals Council denied review.
Sisco then sued the Commissioner, advancing two different arguments against the
agency’s determination that he was not disabled and thus not eligible for benefits. First,
he argued that the ALJ failed to perform the “special technique” required in mental
disorder cases. Second, he argued the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence mainly because the ALJ failed to take unspecified additional evidence. The
District Court rejected both arguments.
As to the first argument, the District Court explained that under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520a(a), the agency was required to use the “special technique” to evaluate the
severity of Sisco’s alleged mental impairments. Under the special technique, the ALJ first
determines whether the claimant has demonstrated “symptoms, signs, and laboratory
findings” that substantiate that an alleged mental impairment is medically determinable.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b) (2018). If the claimant’s mental impairment is medically
determinable, the ALJ proceeds to rate, on a five-point scale, the degree of functional
limitations from the impairment in each of four broad areas of mental functioning: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3)
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself.
§ 404.1520a(c)(3). If the rating in any of the four broad functional areas is more than
“none” or “mild,” the ALJ will consider whether the mental impairment is a per se
disability. § 404.1520a(d)(1). If it is not, the ALJ will proceed to assess the claimant’s
residual functional capacity. Id.
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 The District Court concluded that the ALJ adequately performed the special
technique. The ALJ found moderate limitation in the first three of the four broad areas of
mental functioning and found mild limitation in the last one. The ALJ then concluded
that Sisco’s impairments were insufficient to support a finding of per se disability and
assessed Sisco’s functional limitations resulting from his impairments. All of this was
proper under the agency’s regulations, the District Court reasoned, so Sisco’s first
argument was without merit. The District Court rejected Sisco’s second argument
because, while Sisco may disagree with the ALJ’s factual findings, they are supported by
substantial evidence and so must be upheld under the applicable standard of review. The
District Court entered judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
Sisco timely appealed.
II
Our review of the ALJ’s decision is highly deferential. As the Supreme Court
reaffirmed last year, the agency’s factual findings are “‘conclusive’ if supported by
‘substantial evidence.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 405(g)). The substantial-evidence threshold “is not high.” Id. at 1154.
Substantial evidence “means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co.
of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In reviewing the denial of benefits, “our
focus is not so much on the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s ruling as it is on the administrative
ruling.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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On appeal, the gravamen of Sisco’s challenge to the agency’s decision is that the
ALJ “fail[ed] to take the evidence and perform the testing that is needed in a mental
disorder case.” Appellant’s Br. 5. But Sisco is not clear as to what additional evidence or
testing he believes needed to be taken or performed. His brief expresses disagreement
with the ALJ’s finding that he was not disabled, but it falls well short of demonstrating
that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reject that finding. See Nasrallah
v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020). “Neither the [D]istrict [C]ourt nor this [C]ourt is
empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-
finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). Because we agree with
the District Court that the ALJ properly applied the “special technique” and that the
ALJ’s finding that Sisco was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, we will
uphold the District Court’s judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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