Marco Robertson v. Executive Director Brain Insti , 578 F. App'x 76 ( 2014 )


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  • ALD-333                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 14-1514
    ___________
    MARCO MIGUEL ROBERTSON,
    Appellant
    v.
    EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BRAIN INSTITUTE
    GEISINGER MEDICAL CENTER
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 3-14-cv-00010)
    District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and Possible Dismissal
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit
    L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    August 14, 2014
    Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: October 8, 2014)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se litigant Marco Miguel Robertson, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the
    District Court’s order dismissing his complaint against the Executive Director of the
    Brain Institute at Geisinger Medical Center. For the reasons set forth below, we will
    summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    Robertson is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg,
    Pennsylvania. He initiated this action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in January
    2014, asserting Eighth Amendment violations against the Defendant, pursuant to Bivens
    v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971). As
    relief, Robertson requested transfer to another facility and “all applicable monetary
    damages.”
    Because he filed in forma pauperis, Robertson’s complaint was subject to the
    screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Magistrate Judge recommended that
    the complaint be dismissed because this action against the Brain Institute’s Executive
    Director, a private party, cannot lie under Bivens; only federal officials can be sued in a
    such an action. The Magistrate Judge also noted that Robertson’s complaint requested
    relief that the Defendant could not possibly provide, as the Executive Director of the
    Brain Institute does not control where prisoners are incarcerated. Robertson filed
    objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, but in his eight pages of argument addressed
    only the first issue, and then in a single, passing reference. He wrote: “Though
    Geisinger Medical Center in Danville, Pa. is a private entity[,] what’s now here before
    [the] court is heavily intertwined with deliberately indifferent sadistic minded staff,
    which did and does have [an] adverse effect on defendant doing vital job properly.”
    2
    The District Court reviewed Robertson’s objections, adopted the Magistrate
    Judge’s report in its entirety, and dismissed the complaint. The dismissal was without
    prejudice, allowing Robertson 20 days to correct the complaint’s defects. Robertson
    declined to do so and filed a timely notice of appeal instead. We have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 12911 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing
    the complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
    The District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint. It is well-settled that a
    Bivens action can only be brought against federal officials, not private entities. See Corr.
    Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
    534 U.S. 61
    , 66 (2001); see also Minneci v. Pollard, 
    132 S. Ct. 617
    , 626 (2012). This is true even if the private entity being sued was acting under color
    of federal law. See 
    Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66
    . The Brain Institute’s Executive Director, as
    a private entity, is thus not subject to Bivens liability. Because the sole defendant has no
    liability for the claims presented, the complaint was properly dismissed.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    1
    Although Robertson was given leave to amend, this appeal presents no jurisdictional
    problem. Robertson clearly demonstrated his election to stand on the complaint when he
    filed his notice of appeal within the 20-day amendment period. See Batoff v. State Farm
    Ins. Co., 
    977 F.2d 848
    , 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992).
    3