Albert Hairston v. Roy Hendricks , 578 F. App'x 122 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-3098
____________
ALBERT C. HAIRSTON,
Appellant
v.
ROY L. HENDRICKS; ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 2-99-cv-05225)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
____________
Argued March 6, 2014
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 3, 2014)
Alison Brill, Esq. [Argued]
Office of Federal Public Defender
22 South Clinton Avenue
Station Plaza #4, 4th Floor
Trenton, NJ 08609
Richard Coughlin, Esq.
Office of Federal Public Defender
800-840 Cooper Street
Suite 350
Camden, NJ 08102
Attorneys for Appellant
Sara B. Liebman, Esq. [Argued]
Union County Office of Prosecutor
County Administration Building
32 Rahway Avenue
Elizabeth, NJ 07202
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees
____________
OPINION
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Albert Hairston appeals the District Court’s order denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus, in which he alleged a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The District Court, applying the deferential standard of review established in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, held
that Hairston failed to show that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, Batson. We will affirm.
I
Unlike most habeas defendants, Hairston does not assert his innocence; he admits
to shooting two co-workers, one fatally, and claims intoxication as a defense. The New
Jersey state court provided a thorough and detailed account of the facts, see State v.
Hairston, No. A-4203-91T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 21, 1995) (slip op.), which
the District Court’s opinion recounted as follows:
2
Hairston worked at a bakery in Long Branch, New Jersey, along
with Susan Kerestes and Susan Modoski, the victims of the crimes for
which Hairston was tried and convicted. Kerestes and Modoski shared a
house together in Kenilworth, New Jersey. Over time, they developed a
friendship with Hairston and would occasionally drive him home or
socialize after work.
On December 23, 1989, Hairston called Kerestes and told her his
holiday plans with his girlfriend had not worked out. He asked if he could
stay with Kerestes and Modoski for the Christmas weekend. After
conferring with Modoski, Kerestes told Hairston that he could stay with
them. The women picked him up at the bakery at about 4 p.m. and drove
him to their home. Hairston stayed on the living room couch for the next
two nights. On Christmas morning, Kerestes and Modoski woke early to
attend brunch at Kerestes’ parents’ house. Before they left, they told
Hairston what they had planned for the day, and that Modoski’s father had
invited him to Christmas dinner.
Kerestes and Modoski left around 10:00 a.m. and returned home
around 1:30 p.m. As they entered through the back door, Modoski stopped
at the refrigerator for a drink while Kerestes continued walking towards the
dining room. She saw clothes scattered on the floor and assumed that
Hairston was in the shower. Then he appeared in the hallway and said,
“Oh, I meant to tell you ladies I’m not going.” According to the trial
testimony of Kerestes, who survived the events of the next minutes,
Hairston then shot Modoski, turned, and began firing at Kerestes. She was
hit by a number of shots and was propelled backwards until she fell to the
floor of the hallway.
Hairston stopped firing, turned, and walked into the kitchen.
Kerestes heard him fire another shot, presumably at Modoski. When
Kerestes tried to stand, using a door handle for support, Hairston returned
to the hallway and shot at her again. She fell back to the floor and Hairston
stood over her. When he fired at her again, she turned her head and the
bullet struck the floor next to her. She later described Hairston as being
“very focused looking straight at her” when he fired that shot.
Kerestes managed to get to her feet, reach a telephone, and call her
parents, yelling into the phone for them to call for help. Hairston left the
3
house. An alert went out, and a short time later, a patrolman in the
neighboring town of Roselle Park observed and detained Hairston, who was
walking across a dirt lot at a quick pace with blood stains on his pants and
shoes. After other officers arrived, Hairston was subdued and placed under
arrest. He carried $21.61 in change, a two-dollar bill, and a key in his front
pants pockets and four twenty-dollar bills in his sock. He claimed that the
money was his and that he had a habit of putting money in his socks. The
subsequent police investigation indicated that Hairston had stolen this
money from Kerestes and Modoski’s house: Hairston’s fingerprints were
found on a jar in the house where the victims had kept money, including at
the time four twenty-dollar bills, change, and a number of two-dollar bills.
At trial Hairston testified that he received the money from an electrical job
he had performed prior to the weekend in question.
An officer searching the crime scene near the house found
Hairston’s blood-stained denim jacket with a box of bullets and a
photograph taken from the house in one of the pockets. Another officer
found two pistols in nearby shrubbery. Kerestes confirmed that she and
Modoski owned these pistols and that they were the guns that Hairston used
to shoot them. Hairston’s fingerprints were found on one of the pistols.
Modoski died as a result of the gunshot wounds. Kerestes survived
and testified for the State at Hairston’s trial.
Hairston gave the police conflicting accounts of what happened. At
times he admitted that he might have shot the victims, while at other times
he denied committing the crimes. When he testified in his defense, he said
he had been drinking heavily the entire weekend, and that he was very
drunk on Christmas day―so drunk that he was hallucinating and thought
that the victims were three African-American men who were demanding
money for drugs he had bought in New York. He claimed that all he
remembered about the shooting was seeing Modoski lying on the floor
while Kerestes was screaming at him to get out of the house.
Hairston v. Hendrick, No. Civ. A. 99-5225 (D.N.J. July 27, 2012) (internal citations
omitted).
4
Hairston was charged in state court with first-degree murder and the prosecution
sought the death penalty. Hairston pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury in the
fall of 1991. In part because of the high stakes and racial dimension of the trial, voir dire
took several months and involved hundreds of potential jurors. Each prospective juror
completed a two-part, 19-page questionnaire. Part I contained five questions pertaining to
the juror’s background, education, and potential biases; Part II asked five questions about
the juror’s views on the death penalty. After administering the questionnaire, the trial
court and parties met with each juror individually, asking questions similar to those in the
questionnaire. It took 27 days to select the final pool of 52 eligible jurors.
The state exercised ten of its twelve peremptory challenges; seven of the ten were
used to strike African-Americans. Hairston’s counsel moved for a mistrial pursuant to
Batson and State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986),1 alleging racial discrimination.
After hearing the prosecution’s explanations for exercising its peremptory challenges, as
well as defense counsel’s rebuttal, the trial court denied the Batson motion.
Soon thereafter, the jury, which included three African-Americans, was seated.
After a thirteen-day trial, the jury convicted Hairston on all counts but did not impose the
1
The New Jersey state counterpart to Batson, Gilmore enunciated a similar three-
step test to establish unconstitutional discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.
Gilmore, 103 A.2d at 1157.
5
death penalty. The trial court sentenced Hairston to life imprisonment with forty years’
parole ineligibility.
Hairston appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, raising,
inter alia, the Batson claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating: “After hearing
argument by both sides, the trial judge denied defendant’s motion finding that the State
had put forth valid reasons for the exercise of its challenges . . . . We hold that the [trial]
judge’s findings were sufficiently grounded in the record.” A116-17; State v. Hairston,
A4203-91T4 (N.J. App. Div. Feb. 21, 1995) (Hairston II). Hairston appealed to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, which denied certification. 658 A.2d 728 (N.J. 1995) (Hairston
III).
In 1997, Hairston petitioned the same New Jersey trial court for post-conviction
relief, again raising the Batson claim. A125-31 (Hairston IV). The trial court declared the
Batson issue moot because it was already resolved on the merits. A131; see N.J. Ct. R.
3:22-5 (barring a petitioner for post-conviction relief from presenting a claim that has
been previously adjudicated). Hairston appealed this decision to the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction
relief. State v. Hairston, No. A4659-96T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 31, 1998)
(Hairston V). The New Jersey Supreme Court again denied certification. State v.
Hairston, 731 A.2d 46 (N.J. 1999) (Hairston VI).
6
In November 1999, having exhausted his state remedies, Hairston filed a pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. Again, he raised Batson claims along with three
other grounds for relief. In February 2000, the District Court dismissed the petition for
failure to file within AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Hairston moved to reinstate his petition, arguing that it was timely because the one-year
limitation period began to run on April 24, 1996, AEDPA’s effective date, and was tolled
while his petition was pending until April 30, 1999, the date the New Jersey Supreme
Court denied certification. Therefore, he argued, the one-year limitation period began
running on April 30, 1999, and his petition, filed November 9, 1999, was within the one-
year limitation period. The District Court agreed and reinstated his petition on March 7,
2000.
Over the next twelve years, Hairston filed pro se motions and wrote letters to the
District Court requesting an answer to his petition for habeas relief. On June 17, 2002,
Hairston sent a letter to the court inquiring about the case and received a response from
Roy Hendrick, Attorney General of New Jersey. 2 On September 2, 2003, Hairston filed a
motion to compel the state to answer his habeas petition. The District Court granted the
motion to compel on December 1, 2003. The state’s answer to the petition is missing
2
This letter is missing from the record. Many of the state court files were purged
in 2009, and parts of the District Court record are also, for reasons unknown, unavailable.
7
from the record. Over the next nine years, Hairston wrote eight more letters to the
District Court inquiring about the status of the case.
On July 9, 2012, the District Court denied Hairston’s § 2254 petition and request
for a certificate of appealability relying on the record from the state courts; it did not hold
an evidentiary hearing. Hairston v. Hendricks, No. Civ. A. 99-5225 (D.N.J. July 27,
2012) (unpublished). Hairston timely appealed and we issued a certificate of appealability
for the Batson claim only. We appointed counsel for Hairston.
II3
Because the District Court “did not hold an evidentiary hearing and engage in
independent factfinding . . . our review of its final judgment is plenary.” Hardcastle v.
Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, we will apply “the same standard [of review] that the District Court was
required to apply.” Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation
omitted).
AEDPA applies to Hairston’s petition, which was filed on November 8, 1999. 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, we review the state court’s determinations on the merits
only to ascertain whether the court reached a decision that was “contrary to, or involved
3
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
8
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court . . . [or] was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). This is a
high bar, since a state court’s findings are “presumed to be correct,” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1), and we may grant habeas relief only if “the state court decision . . . resulted in
an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent.”
Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2004).
AEDPA deference is due only if the state court has adjudicated the issue on the
merits; if not, we exercise plenary review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Holloway v. Horn,
355 F.3d 707, 718 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We have interpreted § 2254’s ‘adjudication on the
merits’ language to mean that when . . . the state court has not reached the merits of a
claim thereafter presented to a federal habeas court, the deferential standards provided by
AEDPA . . . do not apply.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
We review the “last reasoned state-court opinion,” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.
797, 803-04 (1991), which in this case is Hairston II, the New Jersey Appellate
Division’s decision on direct appeal.4 Therefore, the applicable standard of review hinges
4
The Supreme Court “reconfirm[ed]” in Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,
785 (2011), that “[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state
court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on
the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the
9
on whether the Hairston II court properly adjudicated the Batson claim on the merits. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 780.
B
Batson established “a three-step inquiry for determining the constitutionality of
challenged peremptory strikes.” Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 255 (citing Riley v. Taylor, 277
F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2001)).
First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a
prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge
on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in
question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason,
“[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is
persuasive or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inherently
discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the court must then determine whether the
defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This
final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification”
proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion rests
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
A Batson claim has been adjudicated on the merits when all three steps of the
analysis have been reached. Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Failure to
contrary.” Id. at 784-85. However, the presumption “may be overcome when there is
reason to think another explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely”—such as
a dismissal of the claim on procedural grounds. Id. at 785, 787 (internal citations
omitted). In this appeal, the presumption of adjudication does not apply to the state court
decisions on post-conviction review (Hairston IV-V) because the Batson issue was
procedurally barred under New Jersey law.
10
make a step-three finding . . . would render the state court’s decision either ‘contrary to’
or an ‘unreasonable application’ of Batson . . . and we would not apply AEDPA
deference.”) (citing Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 259). Because the Hairston II court
“essentially incorporated” the trial court’s reasoning, see Bond, 539 F.3d at 269, we will
examine both courts’ adjudications of the Batson claim.
III
Jury selection in Hairston’s trial was a painstaking affair, taking several months
and involving hundreds of potential jurors. During this process, seven of the state’s ten
peremptory challenges were used to strike African-Americans. Defense counsel moved
for a mistrial pursuant to Batson and Gilmore, alleging that the prosecution exercised its
challenges on the basis of race. The trial court found that Hairston had succeeded in
making a prima facie case of discrimination. The prosecution then proceeded to explain
its decisions to strike each of the seven excused African-American jurors.
The first excused juror “struggled with the idea of imposing the death penalty” and
believed that “alcohol and drugs make you do things that you wouldn’t do.” A66-67. This
led the prosecution to believe she would be amenable to Hairston’s intoxication defense.
The second excused juror showed up on the wrong day and looked uninterested
and even “pained by the process.” A68-69. Noting the fact that the juror “went to the
Fashion Institute of Technology,” the prosecutor stated: “I know we sometimes make
generalizations, but it’s been some of my experience that people in that field tend to be
11
more liberal people.” A68. The prosecutor also believed she lacked the “mental upkeep”
required to understand a complex trial. A68-69. The juror indicated that she was opposed
to the death penalty “unless the crime was against innocent children,” and “[only] if she
was convinced that there was no rehabilitation.” A69.
The third excused juror said he would impose the death penalty only for a
premeditated murder, and seemed amenable to imposing a 30-year sentence in this case.
He also stated that “the more alcohol people drink, the more they are affected,” which led
the prosecution to believe he would be sympathetic to the intoxication defense. A71-72.
Finally, the prosecution noted that he had not disclosed a prior disorderly-person
conviction, which counsel believed rendered him untrustworthy.
The fourth juror believed people could drink so much that they become unaware
of their own actions, and appeared to the prosecution as if “she absolutely [did] not want
to be [there].” A72. Regarding the death penalty, she stated that “there are always
extended [sic] circumstances,” suggesting that she would be prone to finding mitigating
factors at the penalty phase. A73.
The fifth juror was excused because he had a graduate degree in behavioral
sciences and worked in the alcoholism field for 23 years, leading prosecutors to believe
he would be favorably disposed to the intoxication defense.
The sixth juror spoke of “blackouts” from drinking, and, in response to the
prosecution’s hypothetical involving the perpetrator of a murder-robbery, stated “I’m not
12
certain. The guy may be innocent.” A77-78. This led the prosecution to believe that she
would “never execute.” A77-78.
The seventh juror’s husband was an alcoholic and attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings herself. She believed that her brother, who was incarcerated at the
time, had not been treated fairly by the criminal justice system. In addition, her nephew
had been recently charged with dealing drugs in a nearby town, a case that may have
been handled by the same prosecutor’s office. This led the prosecution to believe that she
might not be able to give their side a “fair hearing.” A78. She also expressed ambivalence
about imposing the death penalty.
After the prosecutor articulated these explanations, the trial court turned to defense
counsel and asked if he had any other comments to make in response.
THE COURT: Counsel, any response?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’d like to have some time to prepare an adequate
response, your Honor. We’ve talked about 7 jurors right now.
THE COURT: What do you – by proper response you [sic] going to seek to argue
that he was reasonable or unreasonable on each one of these?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Oh absolutely.
THE COURT: Well, I don’t think that’s absolutely necessary, truthfully. He has to
put forth an argument that he believes will justify his exercise of challenges; that
doesn’t mean that you have a right to respond to each and every statement he
made based upon what he says. You disagree with it so be it, but we’re not going
to take the time for you to sit down and prepare a step by step rebuttal to this stuff.
13
A81. Defense counsel responded that the State’s proffered explanations were “vague,
unexplainable reasons” and argued that the stricken jurors’ answers had not been very
different from those of the remaining, sitting jurors. A81-82. He pointed to one white
juror who was an alcoholic and had been through Alcoholics Anonymous three times, yet
was not excused. He argued that the prosecution had mischaracterized statements the
stricken jurors had made, and that many of the potential jurors excused for being averse
to the death penalty had actually expressed “average” support for the death penalty. At
various points during defense counsel’s rebuttal, the trial court attempted to cut him off,
stating: “[W]e’re not going to argue everybody who’s on this jury as against the people
that are off this jury, we will never finish the case that way.” A82. “I don’t want you to
go into every sitting juror here, comparing them to people who have been excused.
Confine your comments to those people who have been excused you think wrongfully
please.” A89.
Defense counsel responded to the trial court by pointing out that Batson and
Gilmore actually require courts to consider comparable facts about sitting jurors in order
to determine whether the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual. Still, the trial
court insisted that defense counsel limit his discussion to those jurors who were
14
dismissed.5 Accordingly, defense counsel confined his rebuttal to the following points:
(1) the first juror was presented as weak on the death penalty, but her support for the
death penalty was average for the pool of jurors, including the remaining jurors. (2) The
second juror, a college graduate, was presented as intellectually incapable of
understanding the law yet was more educated than several sitting jurors. (3) The third
juror was never asked about his disorderly-person conviction, so he did not fail to
disclose it. Moreover, he had expressed that if an alcoholic had an opportunity to get help
and did not, then he would readily give the death penalty. (4) The fourth juror’s views on
alcoholism would not have trumped his otherwise strongly pro-death penalty stance. (5)
The fifth juror was excused partially for her answer to the “reality question” of “could
you do it?” but a white male whose answer to the same question was more problematic
for the prosecution remained on the jury. (6) The sixth juror had clearly stated that
“drugs or alcohol are not an excuse” for criminal conduct. (7) Despite the seventh juror’s
experience with alcoholism, she stated that alcohol makes people do things they have
within them, and strongly supported the death penalty, expressing concern over the
expense of keeping such a perpetrator in prison.
At the conclusion of defense counsel’s rebuttal, the trial judge stated:
5
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court held that “side-by-side comparisons” of
stricken black jurors and sitting white jurors can be “powerful” evidence of
discrimination in a Batson determination. Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).
15
Each one of these people took an hour and a half to two hours to qualify
when we did the voir dire. It . . . is possible . . . to pull out in that hour and a
half anything . . . to support your view. . . . I find the State has put forth
valid reasons for the exercise of these challenges. That the defense doesn’t
concur is not surprising. Of course, each side has a very distinct point of
view in this case, in all cases, but the defense does not have a right . . . to
put . . . himself into [the] prosecutor’s shoes [to] determine what challenges
in their view were valid.
[The] Prosecutor set forth on the record reasons for excusing each one of
these people relating to views about the death penalty, reasons about use of
alcohol, reasons involving family members in crime, and those reasons I
find to be valid and sufficient in the record. Therefore the defense request
for a mistrial is denied.
A91-92 (emphasis added). After another comment from defense counsel, the trial court
repeated its position, stating: “All the State needs to do it’s done. It [has] set forth reasons
which I find to be valid for the exercise of his challenge.” A94.
The Appellate Division (Hairston II) first found that Batson’s first two steps were
satisfied: Hairston had made a prima facie case of discrimination, and the prosecution had
presented race-neutral explanations for each of the peremptory challenges used to strike
African-American prospective jurors. A114-17. It then concluded:
After hearing argument by both sides, the trial judge denied defendant’s
motion finding that the State had put forth valid reasons for the exercise of
its challenges . . . . We hold that the [trial] judge’s findings were
sufficiently grounded in the record and that his denial of a mistrial
constituted a reasonable exercise of his discretion. The State carried its
burden by articulating clear and reasonably specific explanations of its
legitimate reasons for exercising each of the peremptory challenges.
A116-17 (emphases added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
16
The parties do not dispute that the first two steps of Batson were reached. At issue,
then, is whether the Appellate Division—which incorporated the reasoning of the trial
court—reached Batson’s third step to determine whether Hairston had carried his burden
of proving purposeful discrimination, i.e., “that it is more likely than not that the
prosecutor struck at least one juror because of race.” Bond, 539 F.3d at 264 (internal
citation omitted). “At step three, the trial judge must make a finding regarding the
[prosecutor’s] motivation.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Unfortunately, this is a case where “[t]he state courts repeatedly failed to identify
the three steps of the Batson analysis explicitly. This renders our task harder on review,
as we must attempt to discern what those courts did in fact perform at each step.” Bond,
539 F.3d at 268. The record here, as in Bond, “gives serious cause for concern that the
state courts did not reach the third step of the Batson analysis.” Id. In Bond, we were
troubled that the trial court had indicated that it
believed that it could stop after the prosecutor satisfied the second step of
the Batson analysis by stating a race-neutral explanation for a strike. The
voir dire transcript never explicitly clarifies whether, in accepting
explanations to be race-neutral, the trial court or the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court believed that the prosecutor truly had acted in a race-neutral fashion
(satisfying step three of the Batson analysis), or merely that the stated
explanations were race-neutral (at step two).
Id. We were also concerned that the trial court had stated, as the trial court stated here,
that it was “not going to try and get into the [prosecutor’s] mind” and further suggested
that it only needed “some objective statement that’s racially neutral.” Id. (internal
17
citations omitted). Nevertheless, after reviewing the state court record closely, we
concluded in Bond that the state court had, in fact, reached step three:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially incorporated the reasoning of
the trial court . . . . It described the trial court as accepting the prosecutor's
explanations as “legitimate and race neutral,” and referred to the trial
court's findings “as to the legitimacy of the race neutral responses offered in
this case.” The emphasis on legitimacy demonstrates that the Supreme
Court considered the third step of the Batson analysis. Had it stopped at the
second step, it merely would have inquired into the existence of “race
neutral” explanations or responses. But it also described the legitimacy of
those “race neutral” explanations. It considered, in other words, whether the
prosecutor had told the truth when he offered race-neutral explanations. It
concluded that he had done so. This amounts to a determination on the
merits at the third step of the Batson analysis.
Id. at 269.
Here, as in Bond, we are concerned to the extent that the Appellate Division
implied that the Batson analysis was over once “[t]he State carried its burden by
articulating clear and reasonably specific explanations” of its peremptory challenges.
A117. Scrutiny of the trial court’s ruling from the bench and the Appellate Division’s
analysis of the claim, however, shows that neither the trial court nor the Appellate
Division stopped at step two. Although the Supreme Court had declined in Batson “to
formulate the particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objections
to a prosecutor’s challenges,” it did instruct that it is the trial court’s “duty to determine if
the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” 476 U.S. at 98, 99. And the
Supreme Court reiterated that “‘a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of
18
fact’ entitled to . . . great deference.” Id. at 98 & n.21 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). Consistent with this instruction, the trial judge heard
argument from both sides about the strikes. Defense counsel made arguments in rebuttal,
and then prompted the trial court to consider these arguments, stating:
This is not a case of accepting that the prosecutor has a—valid reasons.
You’ve heard the reasons. Now the court’s got to make a determination if
they’re valid or not. The only way I think we can do that is to, to reflect
that against the people who were not excused . . . .
A91 (emphasis added). The trial court then declared: “[The] Prosecutor set forth on the
record reasons for excusing each [stricken juror] . . . and those reasons I find to be valid
and sufficient in the record. A92 (emphasis added). In other words, the trial court made a
finding that the reasons proffered by the prosecutor, who had conducted voir dire before
the judge for 27 days, were credible.
The Appellate Division recognized that the trial judge had proceeded to step three
in the Batson analysis. It noted that the trial court did not simply accept the prosecution’s
reasons as race-neutral without evaluating their credibility. Rather, the Appellate Division
pointed out that the trial court had heard argument from “both sides.” A116. In fact, the
record shows the trial court gave defense counsel multiple—though not unlimited—
opportunities to rebut the prosecution’s proffered race-neutral explanations. The
Appellate Division then concluded that the trial judge had made findings, and held that
“the [trial] judge’s findings were sufficiently grounded in the record.” A117 (emphasis
19
added). The focus on the trial judge’s findings demonstrates that the state courts reached
the third step of the Batson analysis. Moreover, the phrase “sufficiently grounded in the
record” evidences a consideration of all of the facts and arguments presented. This is
sufficient to establish a step three finding. See Bond, 539 F.3d at 267 (finding that step
three was reached when the trial court stated: “Reviewing the totality of the
circumstances, there is no showing of intentional discrimination.”); see also Hardcastle,
368 F.3d at 259 (“[A] judge considering a Batson challenge is not required to comment
explicitly on every piece of evidence in the record. However, some engagement with the
evidence considered is necessary as part of step three of the Batson inquiry . . . .”).
Obviously, an implicit step-three finding such as the one presented here requires
us to engage in analysis that would not be necessary had the trial court explicitly adverted
to each step. In Hairston’s case, however, the Batson motion was made during jury
selection—in “live combat,” as the District Court put it—and the trial court was able to
hear arguments from both sides and make credibility determinations. A17, 19
(“Deference must be paid to the trial judge, who had witnessed the jurors during voir dire
and was able from his own experience of the question-and-answer to gauge credibility
when the prosecutor gave his reasons.”). The dissent believes that the trial judge was not
equipped to make the necessary findings because it did not permit the defense to fully
present its case. We conclude that a trial judge who presided over 27 days of voir dire
conducted by the same counsel was well equipped to make a finding about whether he
20
believed the reasons given by the prosecutor for exercising the state’s strike were a
pretext for discrimination. Moreover, by referencing both sides’ arguments and the full
record, the Appellate Division demonstrated that it had considered the validity of the
race-neutral explanations offered by the prosecution. This is a step-three finding, so we
apply the deferential AEDPA standard of review. Bond, 539 F.3d at 269 (citing Taylor v.
Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that AEDPA deference applies to
implicit as well as explicit factual findings)).6
V
As in so many habeas cases, the standard of review is outcome-determinative in
this appeal. AEDPA “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error
6
Hairston also argues that the Batson claim was not adjudicated on the merits
because the state courts exclusively discussed the Gilmore standard and made only
passing reference to Batson. See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013)
(establishing a presumption of adjudication on the merits of the federal claim when the
state-law rule is “at least as protective as the federal standard”). The Batson and Gilmore
tests are nearly identical, except that the Gilmore standard sets a higher threshold at step
one, requiring a showing of a “substantial likelihood” of discrimination, see Johnson v.
California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005), whereas Batson simply requires a statement of
facts that creates an “inference of discriminatory purpose” at step one. Batson, 476 U.S.
at 94; see also State v. Osorio, 973 A.2d 365, 376-77 (N.J. 2009) (confirming that step
one of Batson was less onerous than its Gilmore counterpart).
Here, the state court found that Hairston cleared step one; only step three was at
issue. Therefore, on these facts, the Batson standard was not less protective than the state
standard, and the presumption of adjudication applies. Williams, 133 S. Ct. at 1096.
21
correction through appeal.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quotation omitted). The Supreme
Court has stated that AEDPA “‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-
court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’”
Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
Applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, we “ask whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with
the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. Only if the petitioner
demonstrates that the state court decision “was so lacking in justification” as to present
error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” may we grant habeas relief.
Id. at 786-87.
Hairston fails to meet this high threshold. The question here is not whether the
state court correctly decided the Batson issue but whether there is any reasonable
argument to be made that Hairston did not succeed in establishing purposeful
discrimination. We hold that there was. Although defense counsel’s rebuttal raised valid
questions, it fell short of compelling the conclusion that the prosecution harbored racially
discriminatory intent. Accordingly, we will defer to the Appellate Division’s finding that
the prosecution’s exercise of its peremptory challenges was constitutional and affirm the
order of the District Court.
22
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
While I recognize that AEDPA “‘imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt,’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1308 (2011) (quoting Renico
v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 772 (2010)), I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the state
court engaged in an objectively reasonable application of step three of the Batson inquiry
on direct appeal. The record of both the state trial and appellate court proceedings reveal
that both courts ended their analysis at step two. Thus, the Batson claim was never fully
adjudicated on the merits. Where this error occurs in the state courts, our precedent
dictates that we should conduct the step three analysis ourselves and determine from the
voir dire transcripts whether the strikes were pretextual. See, e.g., Hardcastle v. Horn,
368 F.3d 246, 262 (3d Cir. 2004). If that is not possible, habeas should be granted. See
Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir. 1995). I do not vote to grant habeas relief
in this case lightly, but given our inability to reconstruct all that occurred in voir dire, 1
and given the questions raised by the portion of the record that we do have, I do not
hesitate to urge that habeas relief should be afforded to Mr. Hairston.
1
Jury voir dire was conducted over several months. Prospective jurors filled out a two-
part, 19-page questionnaire. Some jurors were excused as early as July 1991 and the
remainder were interviewed individually by the trial court and counsel beginning in
September 1991. As the majority notes, it took approximately 27 days to select the final
pool of 52 eligible jurors. Of the 43 jurors who were seated in court on the day the
peremptory strikes were exercised, 10 were African American. Of the 10 peremptory
strikes the prosecutor used, 7 were against African Americans.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the records of voir dire have been destroyed.
(See App. 945-47.) We have the voir dire transcripts for only five impaneled jurors and
one of the seven stricken African American jurors (Andrew Bryant). The races of the
impaneled jurors whose voir dire testimony we have is not discernible from the record.
1
I.
A.
It is worth elaborating upon the analysis required in the Batson three-step inquiry
in order to parse out the difference between steps two and three. After a defendant
establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination at step one, at step two, “the
burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging
black jurors.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). The Batson Court held that the
“neutral explanation” should be “related to the particular case to be tried” and should not
merely be an affirmation of the prosecutor’s good faith. Id. at 98. Only if the trial court
accepts the prosecutor’s explanation at step two to be “facially valid[],” will it proceed to
step three. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).
At step three, “the trial court . . . [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has
established purposeful discrimination.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. “In deciding if the
defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake ‘a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’” Id. at
93 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)). Though the Supreme Court in Batson declined “to formulate particular
procedures to be followed,” id. at 99, in performing the inquiry at each step, it notably
drew upon Title VII jurisprudence to describe the burden shifting framework applicable
in a Batson challenge. The Court stated, “[o]ur decisions concerning ‘disparate treatment’
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the operation of prima
facie burden of proof rules. The party alleging that he has been the victim of intentional
2
discrimination carries the ultimate burden of persuasion.” id. at 94 n.18 (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983)).
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established the three-step burden
shifting framework applicable in an employment discrimination case under Title VII.
First, the employee must make out a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802.
The burden then shifts to the employer to present a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action the employee has suffered. Id. Finally, the employee must
demonstrate that the reason given by the employer is pretextual. Id. at 804. In Burdine,
the Court explained that an employee could meet his burden by “persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 450 U.S. at 256. The
McDonnell Douglas Court noted that particularly relevant at the third step would be
evidence that employees similarly situated to the plaintiff, but of a different race, did not
suffer adverse employment action. 411 U.S. at 804 (“Especially relevant to [] a showing
[of pretext] would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against [the
employer] of comparable seriousness . . . were nevertheless retained or rehired.”).
Although the Batson Court did not explicitly elaborate upon the analysis required
at step three, by pointing to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, the
Court made clear that a Batson challenger has an analogous burden to show that opposing
3
counsel’s justifications for the challenged peremptory strikes are pretextual.2 Once a
defendant is given “a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that” the reasons offered by
the prosecutor for his use of peremptory strikes “were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision,” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, the trial court “must
decide which party’s explanation of the [prosecutor’s] motivation it believes.” Aikens,
460 U.S. at 716. In other words, the trial court must make a finding of fact as to the
prosecutor’s true intentions. Difficult as making such a finding may be, the Supreme
Court explained in Aikens, another Title VII case cited in Batson, “[t]he law often obliges
finders of fact to inquire into a person’s state of mind,” id. at 716, by comparing the
treatment of the plaintiff with the treatment of others.
B.
Similarly, at step three of Batson, it is the exercise of comparing that is key. Here,
it is abundantly clear that both the state trial and appellate courts failed to reach step
three. The majority relies primarily upon Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008), in
asserting that the state courts reached step three of Batson. In Bond, we found that the
trial court reached the necessary step three conclusion when it stated: “Reviewing the
totality of the circumstances, there is no showing of intentional discrimination by the
prosecutor in the jury selection process and defendants are not entitled to a new trial on
that basis.” 539 F.3d at 267 (citations omitted). We explained:
2
Just as side by side comparisons between black and white employees are the most
powerful evidence in a Title VII case, side by side comparisons between black and white
jury venire panelists are the most powerful evidence in a Batson challenge. The Supreme
Court later reinforced the utility of side by side comparisons of stricken and impaneled
jurors at step three of the Batson inquiry in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).
4
Here, the trial court does more than conclude that the prosecutor offered a
race-neutral explanation for a strike; it concludes that Bond did not meet his
burden of showing that purposeful racial discrimination, not the proffered
explanation, motivated the prosecutor’s conduct. This step-three conclusion
indicates that the trial court indeed did understand the steps of a Batson
analysis.
Id. at 268-69.
In Bond, it was clear that the trial court made a determination as to whether the
defendant had met his ultimate burden of showing intentional discrimination. Here, the
trial court made no such finding. Rather, instead, the trial judge robbed defense counsel
of the opportunity to carry his burden at step three, stating that he did not “have a right”
to put “himself into [the] prosecutor’s shoes,” (App. 92) and critique the prosecutor’s
treatment of other jurors. Furthermore, the court suggested that a step three determination
was impossible because, “[a]fter an hour and a half interview of anybody it is possible for
either side to conclude that a segment supports their position.” (App. 94.) As the majority
notes, it was exactly this kind of language in Bond that gave us serious pause. See Bond,
539 F.3d at 268 (noting that trial court’s statement that it was “not going to try and get
into [the prosecutor’s] mind” implied that court believed it could stop analysis after
prosecutor satisfied step two); Majority Op. at 17.
By stating that “[a]ll the State needs to do it’s done” (App. 94) and that the
prosecutor’s reasons for his strikes were “valid and sufficient in the record,” (App. 92)
the trial judge merely performed the step two inquiry.3 At step two, the prosecutor carries
3
The majority fails to note the context in which the trial court made the statement that the
prosecutor’s reasons were “valid and sufficient in the record.” (App 92.) Here, context is
key. Immediately before stating this conclusion, the trial court said:
5
the burden to present justifications for the challenged strikes and the relevant question for
the trial judge is whether the given justifications are “facially valid.” Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 360. The issue at step three is whether the prosecutor’s reasons “relating to views
about the death penalty, reasons about use of alcohol, [and] reasons involving family
members in crime,” were pretextual. (App. 92.)
Had the trial judge permitted defense counsel to make, and had the judge actually
considered, the necessary side by side comparisons between seated white and excused
black jurors that defense counsel urged he should be allowed to present, the judge would
have been at least equipped to determine if intentional discrimination was at play. For
example, while the prosecutor could meet his burden at step two by stating that he had
exercised a strike against a black juror because of the juror’s views on capital
punishment, the judge could have found this reason to be pretextual at step three if white
jurors with similar views on capital punishment were, nevertheless, seated. Instead,
Each one of these people took an hour and a half to two hours to qualify
when we did the voir dire. It is . . . possible really to pull out in that hour
and a half anything . . . to support your view. Gilmore requires that if
there’s a showing, that the State must come forward with reasons as to why
it used its challenges. . . . I do find now the State has put forth valid reasons
for the exercise of these challenges. That the defense doesn’t concur is not
surprising. Of course each side has a distinct point of view of . . . this case,
in all cases, but the defense does not have a right I don’t believe to put its
own place – put himself into [the] prosecutor’s shoes [to] determine what
challenges in their view were valid, invalid.
(App. 91-92.) The trial court thus indicated that it is impossible to uncover a prosecutor’s
true motivations for his strikes, even though this is precisely a trial judge’s task at step
three of Batson. I, therefore, cannot agree with the majority that the trial court’s finding
that the prosecutor’s reasons were “valid and sufficient in the record” had anything to do
with an evaluation of the credibility of the reasons given. See Majority Op. at 19.
6
however, the trial judge here effectively ruled that defense counsel did not have the right
to challenge the credibility of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons by drawing comparisons
once the judge found them to be race neutral at step two. While defense counsel was able
to sneak some comparisons between seated and excused jurors into the record in spite of
the judge’s instructions, the judge made it clear that he was not interested in, and would
not consider, these comparisons.4
Simply acknowledging that the prosecutor has satisfied his burden at step two
cannot constitute a determination as to whether the defendant has shown purposeful
discrimination; otherwise, step three would be superfluous. Here, the trial judge not only
failed to comment on the credibility of the explanations offered by the prosecutor but also
indicated that he believed it would be impossible to discern from the record whether or
not there had been intentional discrimination. Therefore, the trial judge omitted the third
step of the Batson inquiry.
The Appellate Division committed the same error in failing to evaluate the
credibility of the prosecutor’s proffered explanations. The majority acknowledges that the
Appellate Division “essentially incorporated,” Majority Op. at 16 (quoting Bond, 539
F.3d at 269), the trial court’s reasoning in its Batson determination, yet the majority is
4
Similarly, it is irrelevant that the Batson motion was made during jury selection – in
“live combat,” as the District Court and majority note. The fact that the trial judge
presided over 27 days of voir dire and may have been “equipped to make a finding about
whether he believed the reasons given by the prosecutor for exercising the state’s strike,”
does not mean that he actually made such a credibility determination. Here, we have no
reason to think that he did since he suggested that such a determination would be
impossible. Moreover, the length of the voir dire proceedings in this case actually
indicates that it was highly improbable that the trial judge was able to recall the true
responses of a prospective juror without reviewing the record and refreshing his memory.
7
satisfied with the Appellate Division’s analysis because the Appellate Division concluded
that the trial court had only accepted the prosecutor’s proffered explanations as “valid”
and “legitimate,” “[a]fter hearing argument by both sides.” (App. 116-17); see Majority
Op. at 19. The Appellate Division further stated that the trial court’s finding of validity
was “sufficiently grounded in the record.” (App. 117.) The majority fails to note,
however, that the “finding” made by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate
Division was only that the prosecutor had satisfied his burden at step two. Indeed, at the
end of its analysis of the peremptory strikes, the Appellate Division quoted directly from
Batson’s step two: “The State carried its burden by articulating ‘clear and reasonably
specific’ explanations of its ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising each of the peremptory
challenges.” (App. 117 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20) (additional citations
omitted).) As previously explained, in Batson, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s
“neutral explanation” should be “related to the particular case to be tried” and should not
merely be an affirmation of the prosecutor’s good faith. Id. at 98. The footnote in Batson
quoted by the Appellate Division was merely a clarification of the prosecutor’s burden at
step two.5 Indeed, the Supreme Court has since explained exactly what was meant by this
footnote:
5
In full, the footnote reads:
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v.
Abrams, that “[t]here are any number of bases” on which a prosecutor
reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a juror who is not
excusable for cause. As we explained in another context, however, the
prosecutor must give a “clear and reasonably specific” explanation of his
“legitimate reasons” for exercising the challenges.
8
This warning was meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy
his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discriminatory
motive or by merely affirming his good faith. What it means by a
‘legitimate reason’ is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does
not deny equal protection.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam). The Court explained that only at
the third step does the question of whether or not a reason “makes sense” come into play:
“It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant-
the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 768.
Thus a court must find a prosecutor’s justification to be “legitimate,” “valid,” and
“sufficiently grounded in the record” before it may even proceed to step three. Only “then
will [the trial court] have the duty to determine if the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. Here, the statement by the Appellate
Division that the prosecutor had provided “legitimate reasons” for his challenges only
meant that he had provided race neutral reasons actually “related to the particular case to
be tried,” id., not that those reasons were truthful or genuine.6
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (citations omitted).
6
I note that in Bond, we concluded that the use of the word “legitimate” conveyed a step
three determination. But there, the state appellate court reasoned as follows: “[b]ased
upon our review of the record we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court
as to the legitimacy of the race neutral responses.” 539 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We held that, “[t]he emphasis on legitimacy demonstrates that the
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court considered the third step of the Batson analysis. Had it
stopped at the second step, it merely would have inquired into the existence of ‘race
neutral’ explanations or responses.” Id. at 269.
9
Where state courts have omitted step three, we have not hesitated to conduct de
novo review. In Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2004), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reviewed Hardcastle’s challenge to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
strikes on direct appeal in light of the intervening change in law announced in Batson.
The court independently combed through the records of voir dire to determine if there
were possible race-neutral bases for the challenged peremptory strikes. Id. at 252. After
coming up with potential justifications for each strike, the court “concluded that
Hardcastle failed to establish a prima facie case of improper use of peremptory
challenges under Batson.” Id. at 253. On appeal of the district court’s grant of
Hardcastle’s habeas petition and under AEDPA, we agreed with the district court that the
state court had failed to properly engage in step one but held that the court’s decision to
proceed with step two “moot[ed] the issue of whether Hardcastle made a sufficient
showing at step one.” Id. at 256. Thus we proceeded to review the state court’s findings
The use of the word “legitimate” in Bond, however, is distinguishable in three
ways. First, it is clear that in Bond, the word “legitimate” referred to the truthfulness of
the prosecutor’s reasons rather than whether or not the proffered reasons were actually
race neutral because the appellate court commented on the “legitimacy of the race neutral
responses,” (emphasis added) rather than on whether the prosecutor had offered
“legitimate reasons.” Second, as previously noted, in Hairston II, the appellate court was
actually quoting directly from a footnote in Batson describing the prosecutor’s burden at
step two. Finally, in Bond, it was possible for the appellate court to say that the trial court
had actually made findings as to the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanations because
the trial court had stated that, “[r]eviewing the totality of the circumstances, there is no
showing of intentional discrimination by the prosecutor in the jury selection process.”
539 F.3d at 267 (citations omitted). In other words, the trial court had actually made a
step three determination to which the appellate court could defer. Here, the trial court did
no such thing.
10
at the remaining steps and determined that the state court had completely omitted step
three. We explained:
“[A] judge considering a Batson challenge is not required to comment
explicitly on every piece of evidence in the record.” However, “some
engagement with the evidence considered is necessary as part of step three
of the Batson inquiry,” and this requires “something more than a terse,
abrupt comment that the prosecutor has satisfied Batson.”
Id. at 259 (quoting Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2001)). Then, quoting
the district court, we stated that the state court’s decision “does not indicate that the court
engaged in any analysis or consideration of the credibility of the potential justifications it
had proffered. Rather, the court’s decision reads as if the court accepted the justifications
at face value.” Id. We therefore held that there was no step three determination to which
we could defer and remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing and
de novo review of Hardcastle’s Batson claim. Id. We are now faced with a substantially
similar situation in which the trial and appellate courts made no effort to evaluate “the
credibility of the potential justifications” proffered. Id. Indeed, here, the trial court
blocked defense counsel’s efforts to mount a credibility challenge. This is the crux of step
three. In the absence of any analysis of the credibility of the prosecutor’s proffered
justifications for his strikes, there is no step three determination to which we can defer.
As such, AEDPA deference does not apply to the Appellate Division’s decision and,
ideally, step three analysis of Hairston’s Batson claim should be conducted de novo.
II.
11
Here, however, it is not possible to conduct a step three analysis based on the
available trial records. Without all of the voir dire transcripts, we cannot determine
whether or not the prosecutor’s justifications were pretextual. For example, even though
we have the full voir dire transcript of Mr. Bryant, it is impossible to determine whether
the prosecutor’s proffered justification for striking Mr. Bryant was pretextual because
defense counsel was improperly cut off by the trial judge when he attempted to make the
side by side comparisons between Mr. Bryant and impaneled jurors that are the hallmark
of step three. Although defense counsel was still able to draw some comparisons on the
record that could indicate pretext on the part of the prosecutor, we are missing relevant
voir dire testimony of potential jurors and are left with defense counsel’s
characterizations of what was said. These characterizations alone should give us serious
pause.
Specifically, the prosecutor asserted that he had exercised a peremptory strike
against Mr. Bryant because Mr. Bryant had worked to rehabilitate drug users and
alcoholics, and therefore would be sympathetic to Mr. Hairston. Defense counsel noted,
however, that the prosecutor had failed to use a strike against Denise Jones, who was
married to an alcoholic, and against Michael Pidgeon, who had enrolled in Alcoholics
Anonymous three times. If defense counsel’s descriptions of Ms. Jones’s and Mr.
Pidgeon’s personal histories are true, this raises questions as to whether the prosecutor
acted for the race-neutral reasons stated.
These questions are compounded by the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the
record in offering justifications for his strike. The prosecutor told the trial judge that Mr.
12
Bryant had said that he had a graduate degree in sociology and had written a dissertation
on “the relationship between people.” (App. 74.) The prosecutor stated that when he
asked for clarification regarding Mr. Bryant’s dissertation, he received no response. From
the voir dire transcripts, however, it is clear that the prosecutor never asked Mr. Bryant to
explain the subject of his thesis, but that Mr. Bryant did so anyway when questioned by
defense counsel. The prosecution’s claim that it was confused as to what Mr. Bryant
wrote his dissertation on is, therefore, belied by the record. In Miller-El v. Dretke, the
Supreme Court indicated that failing to inquire during voir dire on an issue of alleged
importance suggests pretext for discrimination. 545 U.S. at 241. Here, there is some
evidence that the prosecutor’s justifications for striking Mr. Bryant were pretextual, but
without further evidence corroborating defense counsel’s assertions regarding Ms. Jones
and Mr. Pidgeon, we cannot conclusively determine whether the prosecutor purposefully
discriminated against African Americans in striking Mr. Bryant from the jury panel.
III.
We have held that where reconstruction of the record is not possible, “the
prejudice stemming from our inability to review [a Batson] claim is not fairly borne by
[the defendant].” Simmons, 44 F.3d at 1168. The appropriate remedy, therefore, is to
grant Hairston’s habeas petition, give the state an opportunity to retry him, and specify
the time period within which the state must retry or release him. See id. at 1171. I, thus,
respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the District Court’s denial of
Hairston’s habeas petition.
13