Jose Montalban v. Powell ( 2020 )


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  • ALD-115                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 19-1450
    ___________
    JOSE MONTALBAN,
    Appellant
    v.
    MR. POWELL; MR. VERBYLA WILLIAMS;
    MR. JASON GLOSSENGER; MS. PATRICIA BURGERHOLFF;
    MR. MODDROFF; MR WALTER DOBUSHAK;
    MR. M. KABONICK; MR. JARRETT TUTTLE;
    ANTHONY PEDONE; MR. MARK BRENNAN;
    COREY VRABEL; C.O. GUILLARD;
    C.O. SNEE; C.O. SCHULTZ;
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
    MACCA, Correctional Officer;
    DUSTIN M. COOK, PSY, D.;
    CAROLINE M. JOHANSON, PHD. Staff Psych;
    SIA JOHN GINTZ
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 17-cv-00212)
    District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
    Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    February 13, 2020
    Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 1, 2020)
    _________
    OPINION*
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Jose Montalban, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from
    the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants. Because the
    appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the
    District Court.
    On January 27, 2017, Montalban filed a civil rights lawsuit against nineteen
    Federal Bureau of Prison staff members at Canaan United States Penitentiary (“Canaan”),
    where he was incarcerated at the time, relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
    of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971). He amended his complaint once and
    supplemented it to include three defendants in place of John Does. The amended
    complaint alleged that on December 28, 2012, several correctional officers used
    excessive force against Montalban after he assaulted his work supervisor. Montalban
    also claimed that Canaan personnel acted with deliberate indifference to his medical
    needs in the wake of the altercation. Additionally, Montalban claimed that correctional
    officers interfered with his legal materials in July 2014.
    The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint or, in the alternative, for
    summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Montalban’s claims were barred by the
    statute of limitations. The District Court converted the motion to a motion for summary
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    2
    judgment and provided Montalban with notice and an opportunity to submit exhibits.
    After reviewing the record, the District Court concluded that Montalban’s claims were
    time-barred and entered summary judgment for the defendants.
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
    plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Blunt v. Lower
    Merion Sch. Dist., 
    767 F.3d 247
    , 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate
    “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
    dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
    return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “all justifiable
    inferences are to be drawn in . . . favor” of the non-moving party.
    Id. at 255.
    However,
    “the non-movant may not rest on speculation and conjecture in opposing a motion for
    summary judgment.” Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 
    814 F.3d 660
    , 666 (3d Cir.
    2016).
    We conclude that the District Court properly entered summary judgment for the
    defendants because no reasonable factfinder could determine that Montalban’s lawsuit
    was timely filed. Bivens claims are governed by a state’s statute of limitations for
    personal injury claims. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 
    603 F.3d 181
    , 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
    Pennsylvania’s limitations period is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. Montalban
    became aware of his injuries on December 28, 2012 and filed a complaint more than four
    years later, on January 27, 2017. See Bohus v. Beloff, 
    950 F.2d 919
    , 924 (3d Cir. 1991)
    3
    (explaining that the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows that he has
    been injured).1 Accordingly, his claims are time-barred.
    As the District Court correctly determined, the time Montalban spent pursuing
    Canaan’s grievance process did not render his complaint timely filed. See Pearson v.
    Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 
    775 F.3d 598
    , 603 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that the statute of
    limitations is tolled while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies under the Prison
    Litigation Reform Act). The undisputed record shows that Montalban did not file a
    grievance concerning his excessive use of force or deliberate indifference claims prior to
    January 2016, more than a year after the statute of limitations expired. Montalban’s
    assertion that the grievance process was made unavailable to him is unsupported by the
    record, and does not account for the fact that he did not file a lawsuit until January 2017.
    Additionally, while the grievances Montalban filed relevant to his legal property claim
    did toll the statute of limitations, it did not do so long enough to make his complaint
    timely as to those claims. See ECF No. 67 at 20–21 (calculating the tolled period as to
    the legal property claim).
    Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will affirm. Montalban’s
    motion for appointment of counsel is denied, see Tabron v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
    , 155–56
    (3d Cir. 1993), as is his motion to supplement the District Court record, see Fed. R. App.
    1
    To the extent Montalban argued that he did not discover his injuries until January 2013,
    when he first received x-rays indicating a fractured skull, that argument is unavailing
    because a “cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then
    known or predictable.” Wallace v. Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 392 (2007).
    4
    P. 10(e). To the extent that he presents any requests for relief in the other documents he
    has filed, those motions are denied, as well.
    5