Guy Gentile v. SEC ( 2020 )


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  •                                         PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 19-2252
    ____________
    GUY GENTILE,
    Appellant
    v.
    SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
    ____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. No. 2-19-cv-05155)
    District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
    ____________
    Argued: January 15, 2020
    Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS,
    Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: September 10, 2020)
    Adam C. Ford       [Argued]
    Ford O’Brien
    575 5th Avenue, 17th Floor
    New York, NY 10017
    Counsel for Appellant
    Matthew S. Ferguson         [Argued]
    Samuel M. Forstein
    United States Securities & Exchange Commission
    100 F. Street, N.E.
    Washington, DC 20549
    Counsel for Appellee
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
    Congress often confers significant investigative powers
    upon administrative agencies, such as the Securities and
    Exchange Commission. Those powers commonly include the
    ability to seek testimony and documents through
    administrative subpoena. In this case, Guy Gentile asserts that
    the SEC abused its investigative authority through several
    unauthorized administrative subpoenas, to the detriment of his
    businesses. He sues under the Administrative Procedure Act
    (APA) to hold unlawful and set aside the SEC’s investigation
    under which the subpoenas were issued. But his suit cannot
    proceed because sovereign immunity shields federal agencies
    from suit. And although the APA broadly waives sovereign
    immunity, that waiver does not extend to challenges to an
    agency’s decision to investigate. For that reason, on de novo
    review, we will affirm the order dismissing Gentile’s
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    2
    I.
    Guy Gentile and the Securities and Exchange
    Commission are not strangers. Their acquaintance dates back
    to 2012 when the SEC investigated Gentile for his role in a
    penny-stock manipulation scheme in 2007-08. Later, the SEC
    civilly sued Gentile, and he was indicted for securities fraud
    violations. Gentile challenged both suits, leading to their
    dismissals on timeliness grounds, but this Court reinstated the
    SEC’s civil suit. See SEC v. Gentile, 
    939 F.3d 549
    , 552-53,
    566 (3d Cir. 2019).
    This case involves a separate SEC investigation, one
    related to securities transactions through an unregistered
    broker-dealer in violation of Section 15 of the Securities and
    Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a). The subject
    of that investigation – Traders Café LLC, a day-trading firm –
    maintained an account with Gentile’s Bahamian broker-dealer,
    which was not registered in the United States. The SEC issued
    a Formal Order of Investigation into Traders Café on
    November 25, 2013. But later, without issuing a new Formal
    Order of Investigation, the SEC informed Gentile that he was
    a target in that investigation.
    As part of its investigation, the SEC has twice
    subpoenaed Gentile for testimony – once in March 2016 and
    again in December 2017. He refused to comply with those
    subpoenas, and despite having the ability under the Exchange
    Act to initiate an action to enforce those subpoenas, see
    15 U.S.C. § 78u(c), the SEC has not done so.
    Instead, the SEC has pursued other options for obtaining
    information, and it has not been shy about serving subpoenas
    3
    on other entities associated with Gentile. Two subpoena
    recipients – Gentile’s personal attorney and an entity affiliated
    with Gentile’s Bahamian broker-dealer – refused to comply
    with the SEC’s subpoenas. The SEC commenced enforcement
    actions against those entities in the Southern District of Florida
    in February 2019.1
    Gentile saw those actions as an opportunity to challenge
    the legitimacy of the SEC’s then six-year investigation, which
    he alleges was ruining his businesses,2 and he moved to
    intervene in those cases. The District Court in Florida denied
    Gentile’s motions, reasoning that Gentile lacked a sufficient
    interest in the subpoenas to merit intervention.3 The Court
    1
    See SEC v. Marin, No. 1:19-mc-20493-UU, Application for
    Order, (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019) (seeking to compel non-
    privileged testimony and documents from Gentile’s personal
    attorney); SEC v. MinTrade Techs., LLC, No. 1:19-mc-20496-
    KMW, Application for Order, (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019) (seeking
    to compel documents from an affiliate of Gentile’s Bahamian
    broker-dealer).
    2
    See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 10 (App. 26) (“Several banks and vendors
    have stopped doing business with Mr. Gentile as a result of
    receiving these subpoenas.”), ¶ 57 (App. 36) (“As a result of
    receiving the SEC subpoenas, [two] banks decided to close all
    bank accounts related to Mr. Gentile.”), ¶ 85 (App. 42)
    (“Similarly, Citibank and Key Bank dropped Mr. Gentile as a
    client as a result of the subpoenas that the SEC sent to them
    during or prior to September 2017.”).
    3
    See Marin, No. 19-20493 at ECF No. 55, pg. 9 (May 31,
    2019) (“[T]he undersigned finds that Gentile has not shown
    that he has a legally protected interest in this matter.”);
    4
    explained that Gentile would have other, more concrete
    opportunities to challenge the legitimacy of the SEC’s
    investigation, such as if the SEC brought an action to enforce
    the subpoenas served on him or if the SEC initiated a civil suit
    against him.4 Gentile did not appeal those rulings, and the
    District Court in Florida ordered compliance with each
    subpoena.5
    Gentile challenged the legitimacy of the SEC’s
    investigation on another front as well. On February 8, 2019,
    two days after the SEC commenced the subpoena enforcement
    actions in Florida, Gentile filed this lawsuit in the District of
    New Jersey. See Compl. (App. 23-46). His complaint sought
    a declaration that the Traders Café investigation was unlawful.
    See
    id. at 24
    (App. 46). It also requested the quashing of the
    SEC’s investigative subpoenas served in connection with the
    Traders Café investigation and an injunction to prevent the
    SEC from using the fruits of that investigation against him. See
    id. In response, the
    SEC moved to dismiss that action for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It argued that the doctrine
    MinTrade, No. 19-20496 at ECF No. 27, pg. 5 (May 28, 2019)
    (“First, we find that Gentile has failed to show that he possesses
    a legally protectable interest in these proceedings.”).
    4
    See Marin, No. 19-20493, at ECF No. 64 (Sept. 30, 2019);
    MinTrade, No. 19-20496 at ECF No. 34 (July 17, 2019); see
    also App. 1027; App. 1227.
    5
    See Marin, Order, No. 19-20493, at ECF No. 63 (Sept. 30,
    2019); MinTrade, Order, No. 19-20496, at ECF No. 39
    (Nov. 13, 2019).
    5
    of sovereign immunity barred Gentile’s suit for three reasons:
    (i) Gentile was not challenging a final agency action, see
    5 U.S.C. § 704; (ii) the APA did not allow judicial review
    because the Exchange Act provided the exclusive mechanism
    for challenging an SEC-issued investigative subpoena, see
    15 U.S.C. § 78u(c); and (iii) the SEC’s investigation was a
    matter committed to agency discretion by law, see 5 U.S.C.
    § 701(a)(2).
    The District Court granted the SEC’s motion to dismiss
    and denied a preliminary injunction motion that Gentile had
    also filed. In doing so, the District Court rejected the SEC’s
    finality argument. But the Court dismissed Gentile’s suit on
    sovereign immunity grounds by following a chain of reasoning
    from the Second Circuit in Sprecher v. Graber, 
    716 F.2d 968
    (2d Cir. 1983). The Sprecher sequence begins by accounting
    for a proviso in the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, see
    5 U.S.C. § 702, which makes explicit that the APA’s waiver
    does not affect other limitations on judicial review. The next
    step in the analysis determines that an SEC-initiated
    enforcement action under the Exchange Act, see 15 U.S.C.
    § 78u(c), provides the exclusive mechanism for disputing
    SEC-issued investigative subpoenas. Under the Sprecher
    reasoning, by providing the exclusive method for challenging
    a subpoena, the Exchange Act limits judicial review. Thus, due
    to the proviso, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity could
    not expand the Exchange Act’s limitation on judicial review –
    leaving Gentile’s complaint barred by sovereign immunity.
    With that conclusion, the District Court did not address the
    SEC’s final argument, that sovereign immunity insulated its
    actions from judicial review because they were committed to
    agency discretion by law.
    6
    The District Court’s order dismissing for lack of
    jurisdiction was final for purposes of appeal. Gentile timely
    appealed that order, bringing this case within the appellate
    jurisdiction of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Gould Elecs.
    Inc. v. United States, 
    220 F.3d 169
    , 174 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000). He
    now argues that the District Court erred by following the
    Sprecher analysis. The SEC counters first by defending the
    Sprecher reasoning and second by contending that its decision
    to investigate is unreviewable as a matter committed to agency
    discretion by law. On that second point, the SEC prevails.
    II.
    A.     THE APA’S WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS
    BROAD, BUT IT IS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND
    EXCEPTIONS.
    Because the SEC’s subpoenas have harmed his
    businesses, Gentile sues the SEC to challenge the legitimacy
    of its investigation. But the United States and its agencies are
    generally immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign
    immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 
    510 U.S. 471
    , 475 (1994). And
    absent congressional authorization – through an unequivocal
    statutory waiver – it is “unquestioned” that the federal
    government retains sovereign immunity. Alden v. Maine,
    
    527 U.S. 706
    , 749 (1999); see also FAA v. Cooper, 
    566 U.S. 284
    , 290 (2012) (“We have said on many occasions that a
    waiver of sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally
    expressed’ in statutory text.”). A statutory waiver of sovereign
    immunity thus defines the scope of a “court’s jurisdiction to
    7
    entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 
    312 U.S. 584
    ,
    586 (1941); see also 
    Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475
    .
    In light of that jurisdictional limitation, Gentile attempts
    to bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the
    APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, codified at 5 U.S.C.
    § 702. As originally enacted, § 702 did not contain an
    unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.6 Instead, it
    imposed a ‘statutory standing’ requirement on judicial review,
    which, as amended, provides that:
    A person suffering legal wrong because of
    agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
    by agency action within the meaning of a
    relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
    thereof.
    5 U.S.C. § 702.
    Statutory standing under § 702 depends on agency
    action. To have such standing, a person must suffer a legal
    wrong because of agency action or, under the zone-of-interests
    test, a person must be “adversely affected or aggrieved by
    agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.”
    6
    See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404,
    § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (June 11, 1946); see also Pub. L. No.
    89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 392 (Sept. 6, 1966) (codifying the
    provision at 5 U.S.C. § 702).
    8
    5 U.S.C. § 702; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
    Camp, 
    397 U.S. 150
    , 153 (1970).7
    The 1976 amendments to the APA supplemented § 702.
    The added text explicitly waived sovereign immunity to sue
    the United States for “relief other than money damages”:
    An action in a court of the United States seeking
    relief other than money damages and stating a
    claim that an agency or an officer or employee
    thereof acted or failed to act in an official
    capacity or under color of legal authority shall
    not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on
    the ground that it is against the United States or
    that the United States is an indispensable party.
    Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (Oct. 21, 1976); see
    also 5 U.S.C. § 702.
    To ensure that that broad waiver of sovereign immunity
    did not overtake pre-existing limitations on judicial review, the
    1976 amendments conditioned the waiver through two
    provisos:
    Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on
    judicial review or the power or duty of the court
    to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other
    appropriate legal or equitable ground; or
    (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other
    7
    See also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 
    479 U.S. 388
    , 395-96
    (1987); Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t
    of Homeland Sec., 
    783 F.3d 156
    , 163-64 (3d Cir. 2015).
    9
    statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
    impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.
    Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (Oct. 21, 1976); see
    also 5 U.S.C. § 702.
    Putting the pieces together, to proceed under the APA’s
    waiver of sovereign immunity a person must (i) possess
    statutory standing; (ii) seek relief other than money damages;
    and (iii) not be excluded by the waiver’s two provisos.
    As a further limitation, two exceptions apply to the
    APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See Heckler v. Chaney,
    
    470 U.S. 821
    , 828 (1985) (“[B]efore any review at all may be
    had, a party must first clear the hurdle of [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a).”).
    Under the first exception, the APA’s waiver of sovereign
    immunity does not apply when “statutes preclude judicial
    review,” either for an entire subject matter8 or for a specific
    class of persons.9 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). The second exception
    8
    See Dunlop v. Backowski, 
    421 U.S. 560
    , 567-68 (1975)
    (requiring evidence that Congress meant to preclude “all
    judicial review” of a decision of the Secretary of Labor); see
    also Traynor v. Turnage, 
    485 U.S. 535
    , 543-45 (1988)
    (reversing a determination that a statute, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a),
    precluded review of a claim to extend the period for obtaining
    veterans education benefits); Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
    
    470 U.S. 768
    , 779-80 (1985) (declining preclusion because the
    statute did not bar judicial review of all aspects of civil service
    claims for disability).
    9
    See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 
    467 U.S. 340
    , 345-
    48 (1984) (interpreting the Agricultural Marketing Adjustment
    10
    prevents judicial review of “agency action [that] is committed
    to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
    B.     THE ONLY DISCRETE AGENCY ACTION CHALLENGED IN
    GENTILE’S COMPLAINT IS THE SEC’S FORMAL ORDER
    OF INVESTIGATION OF TRADERS CAFÉ.
    Gentile seeks very broad relief. His complaint prays
    that the SEC’s investigation be deemed an unauthorized abuse
    of process, that all subpoenas be quashed, and that the SEC be
    barred from using any evidence obtained from the subpoenas
    “for any purpose in any future proceeding.” Compl. at 24
    (App. 46). Each of those requests for relief other than money
    damages depends on the legal question of whether the SEC has
    legal authority to investigate him. Without such authority, the
    SEC could not permissibly investigate Gentile, issue
    subpoenas, or initiate further proceedings.
    But the APA’s statutory standing requirement excludes
    from judicial review legal questions untethered to agency
    action. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Rather, the APA’s waiver of sovereign
    immunity extends only to challenges to agency action. See
    id. To that end,
    the APA enumerates several specific categories of
    agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining “agency
    action” so that it “includes the whole or a part of an agency
    rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
    thereof, or failure to act”). Those categories are exemplary, not
    Act to preclude consumers from challenging milk marketing
    orders).
    11
    exhaustive,10 and the APA also enables a person to challenge
    “some particular ‘agency action.’” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
    Fed’n, 
    497 U.S. 871
    , 891 (1990). Thus, the APA allows
    challenges to discrete agency action, but not broad challenges
    to the administration of an entire program. Such programmatic
    challenges “cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale
    correction under the APA.”
    Id. at 893.
    Under those standards, Gentile’s complaint challenges
    only one discrete agency action: the SEC’s Formal Order of
    Investigation of Traders Café. Gentile argues that the Formal
    Order of Investigation exceeds the SEC’s authority because it
    does not have a sufficient nexus to his conduct and because it
    allows a retributive investigation.11 By attacking the Formal
    10
    See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,
    
    136 S. Ct. 1807
    , 1811, 1813 (2016) (permitting judicial review
    under the APA of a “jurisdictional determination” by Army
    Corps of Engineers); Bennett v. Spear, 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 177-78
    (1997) (permitting judicial review under the APA of a
    “biological opinion” issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service).
    But see Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 
    542 U.S. 55
    , 62-63
    (2004) (holding that a “failure to act” means only “a failure to
    take one of the agency actions (including their equivalents)
    earlier defined in § 551(13)”).
    11
    See Compl. ¶ 101 (App. 45) (describing the controversy as
    concerning “(a) the authority of the [SEC] to investigate
    individuals under a [Formal Order of Investigation] which has
    no nexus to them, and (b) the authority of the [SEC] to
    investigate an individual for more than five years after a
    [Formal Order of Investigation] has issued for purposes that
    are plainly punitive and retributive . . . .”).
    12
    Order of Investigation, Gentile seeks to invalidate the entire
    Traders Café investigation including the administrative
    subpoenas served in connection with the investigation.
    Those administrative subpoenas also constitute a
    discrete agency action. But Gentile’s complaint does not seek
    to quash those subpoenas based on any attribute of any
    individual subpoena. Rather, Gentile aspires to undermine the
    SEC’s authority for this investigation – with the consequence
    of nullifying all subpoenas in the matter. Without challenging
    any individual subpoena or disputing any other discrete agency
    action, the only agency action challenged by Gentile’s
    complaint is the SEC’s Formal Order of Investigation.
    C.    THE FIRST PROVISO IN THE APA’S WAIVER OF
    SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR GENTILE’S
    CHALLENGE    TO  THE  FORMAL ORDER OF
    INVESTIGATION.
    To defend itself, the SEC leads with the Sprecher
    argument.      The SEC starts with the Second Circuit’s
    conclusion that subpoena enforcement actions under the
    Exchange Act, “are the exclusive method by which the validity
    of SEC investigations and subpoenas may be tested in federal
    courts.” 
    Sprecher, 716 F.2d at 975
    . From that premise, the
    SEC argues that by providing the exclusive dispute
    mechanism, the Exchange Act imposes a limitation on judicial
    review. Thus, according to the SEC, Gentile’s action falls
    outside the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity due to the
    first proviso, which ensures that the APA’s waiver does not
    13
    override “other limitations on judicial review.”       5 U.S.C.
    § 702.
    But that argument supposes that Gentile’s complaint
    challenges individual SEC subpoenas. And while Gentile does
    seek to quash every subpoena, he does so not due to any
    particularized defect in any subpoena. Rather, he does so by
    challenging the legality of the Formal Order of Investigation.
    And by directing his challenge to the SEC’s Formal Order of
    Investigation, Gentile avoids the SEC’s Sprecher argument,
    which involved a challenge to individual subpoenas – not
    solely a direct challenge to the agency’s decision to open an
    investigation. Thus, regardless of whether § 78u(c) of the
    Exchange Act provides the exclusive mechanism for
    challenging a subpoena, it does not bar Gentile’s challenge to
    a Formal Order of Investigation.
    D.     THE    SEC’S   DECISION TO OPEN A FORMAL
    INVESTIGATION IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
    The SEC next argues that due to the exception for
    “agency action committed to agency discretion by law,”
    5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), sovereign immunity prevents judicial
    review of its Formal Order of Investigation. That is correct: an
    agency decision to exercise its investigative power overcomes
    the “basic presumption” in favor of judicial review of agency
    action. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 140 (1967).
    The § 701(a)(2) exception applies only in “those rare
    circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a
    court would have no meaningful standard against which to
    judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Lincoln v. Vigil,
    
    508 U.S. 182
    , 191 (1993) (internal quotation marks and
    14
    citations omitted); see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish &
    Wildlife Serv., 
    139 S. Ct. 361
    , 370 (2018). Those situations
    often involve “a complicated balancing of a number of factors
    which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.” 
    Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831
    . And precedent has identified several classes
    of agency decisions governed by a “tradition of
    nonreviewability.” ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs,
    
    482 U.S. 270
    , 282 (1987). Those include decisions to refrain
    from enforcement or investigative activity,12 decisions
    12
    
    Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838
    (“[A]gency refusals to institute
    investigative or enforcement proceedings [are committed to
    agency discretion], unless Congress has indicated otherwise.”);
    S. Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 
    442 U.S. 444
    , 461-
    64 (1979); Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 
    170 F.3d 381
    , 384 (3d Cir.
    1999) (opining, in a failure to investigate case, that Chaney
    “established a presumption against judicial review of agency
    decisions that involve whether to undertake investigative or
    enforcement actions” (emphasis in original)); see also Webster
    v. Doe, 
    486 U.S. 592
    , 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A
    United States Attorney’s decision to prosecute, for example,
    will not be reviewed on the claim that it was prompted by
    personal animosity.”); United States v. Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    ,
    693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority
    and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case .
    . . .”); see generally Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Wheeling-
    Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 
    648 F.2d 118
    , 127 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981)
    (collecting cases); Leighton v. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n,
    
    221 F.2d 91
    , 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (“The
    discretionary character of the [SEC]’s action [to refuse to
    investigate] likewise removes it from Section 10 of the [APA],
    15
    implicating intelligence and national security concerns,13 and
    the spending of lump-sum appropriations.14
    As with those scenarios, a decision to investigate
    involves a complicated balancing of several factors peculiarly
    within the agency’s expertise, including the allocation of
    scarce resources. Most acutely bearing on this case are the
    Supreme Court’s holdings that agency decisions not to
    investigate, Seaboard Allied 
    Milling, 442 U.S. at 461-64
    , and
    not to prosecute, 
    Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838
    , are committed to
    agency discretion by law.
    Yet the same set of considerations governs both
    decisions to investigate and decisions not to investigate. And
    without judicially manageable standards to evaluate those
    considerations, an agency decision to investigate is similarly
    committed to agency discretion by law. Nor has Congress by
    statute or the SEC by regulation articulated specific standards
    governing a decision to initiate an investigation under the
    Exchange Act.15       Thus, without judicially manageable
    which excepts from its provisions for judicial review agency
    action committed by law to agency discretion.”).
    13
    
    Webster, 486 U.S. at 600-01
    .
    14
    
    Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192-93
    ; see also State of N.J. v. United
    States, 
    91 F.3d 463
    , 471 (3d Cir. 1996).
    15
    See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (“The Commission may, in its
    discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to
    determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is
    about to violate any provisions of [the SEC].”); 17 C.F.R.
    § 200.66 (stating only that “[t]he requirements of the particular
    16
    standards, an agency’s decision on whether to investigate is a
    matter committed to agency discretion by law.
    Gentile attempts to avoid this outcome by limiting his
    challenges to two components of the SEC’s investigation: its
    nexus to him and its allegedly retributive motive. See Compl.
    ¶ 101 (App. 45). But the exception in § 701(a)(2) pertains to
    “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by
    law,” and thus it shields the entirety of an agency action that is
    committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
    (emphasis added). A litigant cannot, therefore, avoid the
    exception by challenging only the most problematic
    component of an agency action that is committed to agency
    discretion by law. And here, because an agency decision to
    investigate fits within the § 701(a)(2) exception, targeted
    piecemeal challenges to that action fall outside of the APA’s
    waiver of sovereign immunity.
    In sum, while even the SEC recognizes that its “power
    to investigate carries with it the power to defame and destroy,”
    17 C.F.R. § 200.66, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars
    Gentile’s direct challenge under the APA to the SEC’s decision
    to open an investigation.
    ***
    For these reasons, Gentile’s complaint had to be
    dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we will
    affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    case alone should induce the exercise of the [SEC’s]
    investigatory power”).
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2252

Filed Date: 9/10/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2020

Authorities (28)

fed-sec-l-rep-p-99476-benjamin-g-sprecher-v-jacob-graber-andrew-e , 716 F.2d 968 ( 1983 )

gould-electronics-inc-fka-gould-inc-american-premier-underwriters , 220 F.3d 169 ( 2000 )

State of New Jersey Christine Todd Whitman William H. ... , 91 F.3d 463 ( 1996 )

William Leighton v. Securities and Exchange Commission , 221 F.2d 91 ( 1955 )

american-disabled-for-attendant-programs-today-disability-rights-action , 170 F.3d 381 ( 1999 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-97833-securities-and-exchange-commission-v , 648 F.2d 118 ( 1981 )

Alden v. Maine , 119 S. Ct. 2240 ( 1999 )

Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. , 136 S. Ct. 1807 ( 2016 )

United States v. Sherwood , 61 S. Ct. 767 ( 1941 )

Southern Railway Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp. , 99 S. Ct. 2388 ( 1979 )

United States v. Nixon , 94 S. Ct. 3090 ( 1974 )

Dunlop v. Bachowski , 95 S. Ct. 1851 ( 1975 )

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance , 124 S. Ct. 2373 ( 2004 )

Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper , 132 S. Ct. 1441 ( 2012 )

Traynor v. Turnage , 108 S. Ct. 1372 ( 1988 )

Webster v. Doe , 108 S. Ct. 2047 ( 1988 )

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation , 110 S. Ct. 3177 ( 1990 )

Lincoln v. Vigil , 113 S. Ct. 2024 ( 1993 )

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. , 202 L. Ed. 2d 269 ( 2018 )

Block v. Community Nutrition Institute , 104 S. Ct. 2450 ( 1984 )

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