United States v. Richard Murphy ( 2020 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-3391
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICHARD MURPHY,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. No. 3-13-cr-00230-001)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 2, 2020
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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 7, 2020)
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OPINION
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
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Richard Murphy appeals the District Court’s judgment revoking his supervised
release. Because there was sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that Murphy
violated the terms of his supervised release, we will affirm.
I
Murphy was on supervised release following his 41-month prison term for a drug-
related offense. One of the conditions of Murphy’s supervised release was that he not
commit another federal, state, or local crime. The United States Probation Office learned
that state law enforcement had charged Murphy with burglary and assault based on
allegations that he kicked down the door of the residence of his estranged girlfriend,
Mindalia Colon, and assaulted her. The state later dropped the charges.1
The District Court convened a hearing to determine whether Murphy’s supervised
release should be revoked based on these allegations. The Court heard a 911 call that
Colon had placed as well as testimony from Colon, a police officer, and other witnesses.
During the 911 call, Colon reported that Murphy had kicked in the door to her home and
beat her. The officer who responded to Colon’s home testified that Colon told him that
Murphy kicked in the door, beat her, and fled. Police photographed Colon’s injuries and
the damage to the door.
1
Sometime after the incident, Colon asked the responding officer to rescind the
arrest warrant filed against Murphy and told the officer that Murphy was not the
perpetrator. Colon also told the District Attorney’s office that Murphy was not the
offender and attempted to hire an attorney to assist in Murphy’s defense.
2
Colon’s friend, Susan McMullins, testified that Colon called from the hospital and
told McMullins that Murphy broke in and beat her. McMullins’s husband corroborated
Colon’s call and testified that he tried to repair the broken-in door at Colon’s house, but it
was too badly damaged. The McMullins also stated that they knew Colon and Murphy
had been arguing before the assault.2
Colon admitted that she placed the 911 call but testified that she lied to the 911
operator and police officers. Colon testified instead that Murphy had not broken in and
did not harm her, and that he had permission to come and go from her home, as they had
a child together. She also denied telling Susan McMullins that Murphy assaulted her.
The District Court considered the 911 call, statements and testimony from the
McMullins, the responding officer, and Colon, as well as crime scene photographs. The
Court found that Colon’s statements to the 911 operator, police, and Susan McMullins
describing Murphy as the assailant were credible and that Colon’s recantation was
“incredible.” App. 58-60.
Based on this evidence, the District Court held that Murphy violated his
supervised release by committing violations of state law. The Court found that
circumstantial evidence showed that Murphy committed burglary because he intended to
commit assault and “gained entry by kicking the door in, which is breaking and entering
regardless of whether, on other[,] [ ] happier occasions [Murphy] [was] welcomed into
the house.” App 58. Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of a burglary
conviction did not prevent the Court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence
2
While on supervised release, Murphy was going to stay with the McMullins.
3
that Murphy committed burglary. Likewise, the Court concluded that the 911 call, Susan
McMullins’s testimony, and the photographs of Colon’s injuries established that Murphy
committed assault. The fact that the District Attorney had decided not to pursue the
burglary and assault charges was not determinative because, in the Court’s view, the
evidence would have been sufficient to find Murphy guilty of assault not just by a
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the Court
revoked Murphy’s supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment. Murphy appeals.
II3
Murphy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the District Court’s
decision to revoke his supervised release.4 To revoke a term of supervised release, the
Court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of his supervised release.5 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). “When the condition is that
the defendant not commit a crime, there is no requirement of conviction or even
3
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and
3583(e)(3). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
4
The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a violation of a
condition of supervised release is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Poellnitz, 372
F.3d 562, 565 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004). A finding is clearly erroneous where “although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation omitted). We review legal questions de novo.
United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008). We review a district court’s
decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion. Id.5
“[T]he preponderance standard simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the
existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Blackston,
940 F.2d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
4
indictment.” United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) . “What
matters is whether [the defendant] committed [a] crime as a matter of fact.” Id. at 567.
Thus, “to revoke [supervised release,] it is not necessary that the [defendant] be adjudged
guilty of a crime, but only that the court be reasonably satisfied that he has violated one
of the conditions” of his release. Id. at 566 (citation omitted).
Here, Murphy was charged with violating the term of supervised release that
required that he not commit any federal, state, or local crime, and that he violated this
condition by committing burglary and assault in violation of Pennsylvania law. Under
Pennsylvania law, “[a] person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to
commit a crime therein, the person . . . enters a building or occupied structure, . . . and the
person commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein,” 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3502(a), unless “[t]he actor is licensed or privileged to enter,” § 3502(b)(3).
“[A] person is guilty of assault [under Pennsylvania law] if he . . . attempts to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2701(a)(1). The preponderance of the evidence shows that Murphy committed
both offenses.
The evidence showed that Murphy forcibly entered Colon’s residence, and once
inside, he beat Colon. In the 911 call, Colon reported that Murphy broke into the
premises and beat her. Photographs of the door, as well as testimony from the police and
Mr. McMullins confirmed the forced entry. In addition, photographs of Colon, her own
statements to the 911 operator, and her statements to others immediately after the event
confirm that she had been beaten and that Murphy did it. Taking this evidence together,
5
the District Court had sufficient evidence to find that Murphy committed burglary and
assault. App. 58-60.
Murphy contends that he was “licensed or privileged to enter,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3502(b)(3), based on Colon’s testimony that he was authorized on the premises and had a
key and thus could not have committed a burglary. We disagree. As the District Court
observed, those who are welcome and authorized do not need to kick the door down.
Once inside, Murphy beat and injured Colon. Thus, the Court had a sufficient basis to
conclude that Murphy violated the conditions of his supervised release by committing
burglary.
Murphy also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a revocation
because Colon reported only an assault, and not a burglary, she testified that Murphy was
not the attacker, and he had permission to enter her property.. We disagree here too.
Although it is true that Colon recanted her accusations against Murphy, the District Court
found Colon’s recantation “incredible.” App. 58-60. We generally will not disturb a
district court’s credibility determinations. United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441
(3d Cir. 1997) (“[Our] review is more deferential with respect to determinations about the
credibility of witnesses, and when the district court’s decision is based on testimony that
is coherent and plausible, not internally inconsistent and not contradicted by external
evidence, there can almost never be a finding of clear error.”). Moreover, the evidence
supports the Court’s conclusion that Colon’s recantation was unworthy of credence.
Immediately after the assault, Colon placed a 911 call recounting Murphy’s forcible entry
and beating. Photographs corroborated Colon’s injuries, consistent with a beating, and
6
documented the broken-in door. Moreover, shortly after the incident, Colon told police
and Susan McMullins that Murphy broke down her door and beat her, and the McMullins
observed Colon and Murphy arguing beforehand.
In light of this evidence, the “relaxed burden of proof[,] and our deferential scope
of review,” United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1991), we cannot say
that the District Court erred in finding that Murphy violated a condition of his supervised
release.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
7