Robert Ramey v. Donna Mellow , 675 F. App'x 109 ( 2017 )

DLD-087 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-4048
___________
ROBERT MARQUIS RAMEY,
Appellant
v.
DONNA MELLOW, Asst. Superintendent;
DR. RONALD PHILLIPS, Medical Director;
N. SMITH, Health Service Administrator;
E. ASANTE, Grievance Coordinator;
J. DUFFY, Delaware County Sheriff;
J. MOODY; ISSAC OKAI, Correctional Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-01431)
District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 28, 2016
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Robert Marquis Ramey appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s
final order granting judgment to the Defendants. Because no substantial question is
presented, we will summarily affirm the judgment.
Ramey is an inmate at SCI Benner. His present suit alleges that he sustained
injuries when a garage gate dropped and landed on a sheriff’s van in which he was a
passenger while leaving the George W. Hill Correctional Facility (Hill Facility). Ramey
and eleven other passengers were evacuated and evaluated at the Hill Facility medical
center. He described no injury at the initial evaluation, but later submitted a sick call
request alleging back and neck pain, for which he was prescribed ibuprofen and an
analgesic balm. Over the next seven months, he submitted two more sick call requests
complaining of back, neck, and ankle pain, for which he was prescribed additional
medication and recommended an exercise regime.
Ramey then filed the present suit, which the District Court construed as alleging
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
seven members of the prison staff, and a state law negligence claim against one staffer,
based on the alleged injuries and deficient treatment he experienced. After filing his final
amended complaint, the District Court ordered three named Defendants – a health service
administrator, assistant superintendent, and grievance coordinator at the Hill Facility –
dismissed because Ramey failed to state claims against them. Dist. Ct. Doc. 27. Two of
the three remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court
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granted the motion as to the federal claims and dismissed without prejudice the state law
negligence claim against the one remaining Defendant. Ramey timely appealed that
order.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a claim and to grant summary judgment is
plenary. Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2008); Gallo
v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). Dismissal for failure to state a claim
is proper if the pleader does not submit “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that [he is] entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, while viewing the facts in
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am.
States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993), we will affirm the summary
judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The initial dismissal of three named Defendants for failure to state a claim was
proper. First, Ramey did not allege that N. Smith, a “health service administrator,” had
any personal involvement with respect to his injury or medical treatment, instead basing
the claim on Smith’s failure to respond to his grievances. This is insufficient to state a
claim and, as the record reveals no other claim Ramey could submit against Smith, denial
of leave to amend was also proper. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a
prisoner); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Second,
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Ramey did not allege that Donna Mellon, assistant superintendent at the Hill Facility, had
a personal role in any of the incidents that form the basis of his § 1983 action, and Ramey
admitted during a conference that he could not assert a cognizable claim against Mellon.
Dismissal without leave to amend was therefore proper. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Finally, Ramey’s allegation that E. Asante, a
grievance coordinator who is not a member of the medical staff, was deliberately
indifferent for failure to respond to his grievances is not an actionable claim. See Parkell
v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 336-37 (3d Cir. 2016). In light of the foregoing, denial of
leave to amend this claim was also within the District Court’s discretion.
Summary judgment was also proper because Ramey has not demonstrated any
constitutional violation. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must
show “a serious medical need” and “acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate
deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575,
582 (3d Cir. 2003). Deliberate indifference occurs when the defendant has knowledge of
the need for medical care and intentionally refuses to provide it, exposing the inmate to
“undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Monmouth Cty. Corr.
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations
omitted). Mere disagreement with a prescribed treatment is not an actionable
constitutional violation. Id.
The record’s description of Ramey’s treatment by prison staff forecloses his claim
of deliberate indifference, so summary judgment was appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). At his initial evaluation soon after the accident, Ramey listed no complaints;
however, when he subsequently complained of back and neck pain, he was prescribed
ibuprofen and analgesic balm. Ramey made at least two more sick calls in the next seven
months, which revealed no bruising or swelling and an ability to move and bend without
much trouble. Nonetheless, Ramey received additional medication and was advised to
follow an exercise regime. Indeed, Ramey received medical treatment each time he
requested it, either in connection with the injuries he alleges he suffered as a result of the
accident or otherwise. Ramey presents no facts showing that prison staff ever denied him
medical treatment when he requested it. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346. To the extent he
disagrees with the prescribed treatment, such disagreement is insufficient to state an
actionable constitutional claim. See id. Therefore, Ramey has failed to state a claim for
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and summary judgment was appropriate. Cf.
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582-83.
To the extent Ramey alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by a
corrections officer negligently closing the garage gate on a van he was a passenger in,
such a claim fails as a matter of law. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-39
(1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (holding mere negligence by
prison staff is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation). Having properly
disposed of the federal claims, the District Court was well within its discretion to dismiss
without prejudice the remaining state law negligence claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
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For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6
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