Linda Franulovic v. Coca Cola Co. , 390 F. App'x 125 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3068
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LINDA FRANULOVIC, individually and
on behalf of a class of persons,
Appellant
v.
THE COCA COLA COMPANY
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(C.A. No. 07-539)
District Judge: Renee M. Bumb
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on July 15, 2010
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE, AND WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: August 10, 2010)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
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Linda Franulovic (“Franulovic”) appeals from the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment for the Coca Cola Company (“Coca Cola”) on her claim
charging Coca Cola with violating the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A.
56:8-1 et seq. For the following reasons, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we only discuss the facts and
proceedings to the extent necessary for resolution of this case. The Center for
Science in the Public Interest (“CSPI”) filed suit in February 2007, asserting that
Coca Cola engaged in fraudulent and deceptive marketing of Enviga, a green tea
soft drink. Coca Cola advertised Enviga as a calorie-burning drink based on the
results of a short-term scientific study funded by its corporate partners.
Challenging the validity of the study, CSPI sought declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent Coca Cola from marketing Enviga as the “calorie burner.”
In a second amended complaint, Franulovic replaced CSPI as the named
plaintiff, suing on behalf of herself and in a representative capacity. In the
complaint, she challenged the veracity of Coca Cola’s advertisements claiming
that drinking three cans per day would lead to weight loss. The District Court
dismissed the claim for failure to plead an ascertainable injury, but granted
Franulovic leave to file an amended complaint and conduct limited discovery
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relating to class certification. Franulovic moved for Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) class
certification and, thereafter, filed a third amended complaint in which she asserted
that she did not lose weight while drinking Enviga.
Coca Cola moved for summary judgment and Franulovic filed a Rule 56(f)
affidavit seeking a continuance, which the court denied. The Court then granted
summary judgment in Coca Cola’s favor, finding that a reasonable jury could
determine neither that Franulovic failed to lose weight, nor that the failure to do so
was caused by drinking Enviga. The court relied on Franulovic’s deposition
testimony, wherein she admitted that she failed to monitor her weight or caloric
intake while drinking Enviga. Indeed, she testified that the only indication of
weight gain was tighter fitting pants. The District Court held that this factual
record, combined with Franulovic’s testimony, was insufficient to defeat Coca
Cola’s summary judgment motion.
Franulovic moved for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, which,
among other claims, asserted that Coca Cola advertised Enviga as a calorie
burning drink without prior substantiation. The court ruled that the proposed
complaint did not state a claim because (1) the complaint did not allege that
Franulovic failed to lose calories, and (2) it did not address whether Coca Cola
lacked evidence proving that Enviga would burn calories. In a motion for
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reconsideration Franulovic asserted that she did not need to address these issues
because she pled a prior substantiation claim. The District Court held that the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not recognize this theory of liability, and,
therefore, denied her leave to file an amended complaint because of futility. It did,
however, permit her to further amend the complaint in light of the court’s
determination. Franuloivc instead filed a notice of appeal.
II.
Franulovic contends that the District Court erred in (1) granting summary
judgment for Coca Cola; (2) denying her motion to file a fourth amended
complaint; and (3) denying her Rule 56(f) motion.
A. Summary Judgment
We consider a district court’s grant of summary judgment under a plenary
standard of review. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008). To
prevail on her CFA claim, Franulovic must show (1) unlawful conduct by Coca
Cola; (2) an ascertainable injury; and (3) a causal relationship between Coca
Cola’s unlawful conduct and her ascertainable injury. See N.J. Citizen Action v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)
(referring to N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19).
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The District Court correctly ruled that Franulovic did not set forth sufficient
evidence to show that she suffered an ascertainable loss. Although Franulovic
argues that she gained weight as a result of drinking Enviga, she did not monitor
her weight before she began the Enviga program and never kept track of how
many calories she consumed or how much she weighed during the relevant time
period. Her only supporting evidence was testimony that her pants felt tighter.
This “purely subjective impression without any factual support amounts to nothing
of legal significance and is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1990).
Franulovic’s failure to monitor her weight and caloric intake also makes it
impossible to prove with any legal certainty that any weight gain was the result of
drinking Enviga. Accordingly, she cannot show that Coca Cola caused her any
ascertainable loss.
Because Franulovic cannot show a disputed material fact relating to loss or
causation, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in Coca Cola’s favor
was proper.
B. Prior Substantiation
In her motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, Franulovic
claimed that Coca Cola was required to adequately substantiate its advertising
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claims prior to marketing Enviga. Franulovic assigns error to the District Court’s
determination that the CFA does not recognize a prior substantiation claim.
A court’s decision to deny a party’s motion to amend a complaint is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d
231, 243 (3d Cir. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion when the decision is
based on an “errant conclusion of law.” Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,
820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987). No New Jersey or Third Circuit decision has
applied the prior substantiation theory to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and
we, therefore, decline to do so here. Because the District Court correctly held that
a New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claim cannot be premised on a prior
substantiation theory of liability, it did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Franulovic’s leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
C. Discovery
Finally, the District Court did not err when it denied Franulovic’s Rule
56(f) motion. We review a court’s decision to preclude further discovery in
response to a summary judgment motion under an abuse of discretion standard.
Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). Franulovic argues that
she should have been permitted to obtain discovery pertaining to the
reasonableness of measuring weight loss by the snugness of one’s pants,
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monitoring calorie intake, and the effect of minor variations in diet. She
additionally claims that she should have been allowed discovery regarding
investigations Coca Cola conducted during class certification discovery. It is
unclear, however, how further discovery along these lines would have had any
bearing upon the District Court’s disposition of the pending summary judgment
motion. The Court’s ruling was based on Franulovic’s testimony, which failed to
support her claim that she suffered an ascertainable loss or that this loss was
attributable to Enviga. The Court’s determination that her claims were based on
conjecture and speculation would not be remedied by further discovery. As a
result, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for continuance.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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