United States v. Dextrick Lawton ( 2021 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-2118
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEXTRICK LAWTON,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-12-cr-00295-001)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 15, 2021
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Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and MATEY,
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 18, 2021)
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OPINION
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
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Dextrick Lawton appeals from the District Court’s April 21, 2020 Order
denying his Motion for a Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We
will affirm.
I
In 2012, a grand jury indicted Lawton for conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i), and
846. Lawton ultimately consented to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C)
(“Type–C”) agreement to plead guilty to the § 846 charge in exchange for an agreed-
upon sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised
release and a special assessment fee. The plea included the government’s agreement not
to file an Information under 21 U.S.C. § 8511 (“§ 851 Information”) and the parties’
stipulation that the applicable controlled substance for purposes of sentencing was one to
three kilograms of heroin.
Following that agreement, but before a plea hearing, Lawton submitted a pro se
letter to the District Court requesting that it substitute Lawton’s court-appointed counsel
with new counsel. During oral argument on that request, the prosecutor indicated that he
believed Lawton’s request was intended as a delaying tactic and stated that the
government would consider the plea agreement rejected if the District Court granted the
motion. The government further explained that there had been a “death of an individual
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The § 851 Information would have indicated that Defendant had a prior controlled
substance offense.
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in connection with” the conspiracy and said that it would “move forward with the other
charges” if Lawton rejected the plea offer. Supp. App. 9–10. After a brief recess, Lawton
notified the District Court that he would accept the plea offer, and the District Court
denied as moot Lawton’s request for new counsel. A plea hearing ensued shortly
thereafter, and the District Court accepted Lawton’s plea.
Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) that calculated Lawton’s Guideline range of imprisonment
as 151 to 188 months. The PSR also stated that Lawton held a leadership role in the drug
conspiracy, which resulted in a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), and
identified Lawton’s activities as causing the overdose death of an individual. Lawton
objected to the inclusion of those paragraphs in the PSR, and the Probation Office issued
a PSR addendum addressing those objections and stating that it stood by their inclusion.
At sentencing, Lawton asked that those paragraphs be excised from the PSR
because they would be used in determining his classification at the Bureau of Prisons.
The District Court agreed, reasoning they “may impact the defendant’s placement in a
prison,” but did not make any finding as to the veracity of the paragraphs. App. 73.
Lawton later moved for a reduction of his 180-month sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), invoking Amendment 782—an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines
that retroactively reduced certain drug crimes by two offense levels. See U.S.S.G.
§§ 1B1.10(d), 2D1.1, U.S.S.G. App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 1, 2014); see also Hughes
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018). The District Court denied the motion,
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reasoning that Lawton received substantial benefits as a result of his guilty plea. This
appeal followed.
II2
The Supreme Court has set forth a two-step approach to guide courts when
reviewing claims brought under § 3582(c)(2). See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817,
827 (2010). “At step one, § 3582(c)(2) requires the court to follow the Commission’s
instructions . . . to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the
extent of the reduction authorized.” Id. “At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2) instructs
a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its
discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.”3 Id.
In appeals arising under § 3582(c), we exercise de novo review over “purely legal
question[s] concerning the interpretation and legal status of § 3582(c)(2) and the related
policy statement by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527,
531 (3d Cir. 2012). We review all other § 3582(c) rulings for abuse of discretion. Id.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(2), and this
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court “may affirm the District
Court’s order ‘on any basis supported by the record.’” United States v. Rivera-Cruz, 904
F.3d 324, 326 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam)).
3
Here, both parties agree that Lawton is eligible for a sentence reduction. Thus, only the
District Court’s analysis at step two is at issue.
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Further, we review all constitutional questions de novo. See United States v. Gonzalez,
905 F.3d 165, 205 (3d Cir. 2018).
III
Lawton’s theory is that the District Court impermissibly considered the parties’
plea negotiations when denying his § 3582(c) motion. His arguments misconstrue the
record and are belied by apposite Supreme Court precedent. In Hughes v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a district court “can
consider the benefits the defendant gained by entering a Type–C agreement when it
decides whether a reduction is appropriate (or when it determines the extent of any
reduction), ‘for the statute permits but does not require the court to reduce a sentence.’”
Id. at 1777 (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 532 (2011)). Further, as we
explained in United States v. Baylin, a court may consider factual matters—like Lawton’s
benefits from the Type–C agreement—as a basis for a sentence if there is “some minimal
indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation” that bears “some rational relationship” to
the sentence. 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute on other grounds
as recognized in United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1993).
Contrary to the picture of unfounded speculation that Lawton paints, the District
Court based its determination on reliable information in the record to determine that
Lawton gained a substantial benefit upon entering into the plea agreement such that a
reduction in his sentence was unwarranted. Specifically, the District Court appropriately
reasoned that by pleading guilty, Lawton avoided “the very real risk that he would face
life imprisonment if the Government superseded the indictment to charge that the heroin
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at issue had resulted in the [overdose] death . . . .” App. 8. As the District Court
explained, “[Lawton] benefited immensely from such an agreement [because] it
eliminated the risk of a far greater sentence for [Lawton] and essentially represented a
compromise between two or more statutory sentencing possibilities.” App. 9.
Moreover, the District Court correctly observed that although the government’s
allegations pertaining to his role in the overdose death “were never charged and proved,”
they heavily influenced Lawton’s plea negotiations. App. 10. The record supports the
District Court’s assessment. During oral argument on Lawton’s request for substitute
counsel, Lawton chose to move forward with the plea agreement immediately after the
government stated it would consider the plea agreement rejected and potentially bring
charges associated with the overdose death. Also, Lawton’s initial counsel explained in a
letter exhibit that the government agreed not to file a § 851 Information or superseding
indictment in exchange for Lawton’s guilty plea, and subsequent counsel agreed that the
potential charge pertaining to the overdose death “was likely material” to Lawton’s
decision to plead guilty. Supp. App. 23, 34. Thus, the District Court correctly focused
upon the benefits the plea agreement conferred upon Lawton, as contemplated in Hughes,
138 S. Ct. at 1777. Lawton has not shown that the District Court erred in its analysis, and
his constitutional and statutory arguments lack merit.
* * *
We will affirm the order of the District Court.
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