United States v. Rakahn Burton , 404 F. App'x 617 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-2467
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RAKAHN BURTON, a/k/a Rakhan Burton a/k/a Rak
Rakahn Burton,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00640-001)
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 16, 2010
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 17, 2010)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
On February 2, 2009, Rakahn Burton was found guilty of distribution of crack
cocaine and conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Burton appeals his conviction on
numerous grounds. He asserts that the District Court erred by refusing to suppress
incriminating evidence seized during three separate searches, denying his motion to sever
the counts against him arising from his drug dealing activity in 2005 and 2007, and
permitting a narcotics expert to testify at his trial. We will affirm.
I. Background
A. The Searches
Burton asserts that drug evidence seized during three separate searches should be
suppressed since those searches were conducted without probable cause: the search of a
residence at 7545 Battersby Street in 2005; the search of a residence at 7209 Kindred
Street in 2007; and the search of an Oldsmobile car in 2007 which was located in the
driveway of the home in which Burton was arrested.
i. 7545 Battersby Street
In 2005, police officers searched 7545 Battersby Street pursuant to a warrant. An
officer with years of narcotics investigation experience executed the affidavit for the
search warrant for the Battersby residence and asserted that he believed evidence of
illegal drug dealing would be found in the home. The basis for that belief included the
following: the police received numerous anonymous complaints about drug activity at
7545 Battersby Street; narcotics officers observed individuals, including Burton, leave
the house momentarily on numerous occasions to drop off black bags to drivers parked in
front of the residence; when stopped for investigation, Burton gave a fictitious address
even though officers had observed him entering the home with a key; and a search of the
trash of the home had revealed various items consistent with the packaging and
2
distribution of illegal drugs, including small plastic bags and a box for a digital scale
typically used by drug dealers. The search of the residence in fact did uncover illegal
drugs and drug paraphernalia. The District Court denied Burton’s motion to suppress that
evidence.
ii. 7209 Kindred Street
In 2007, police officers and agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)
searched 7209 Kindred Street pursuant to a warrant. A DEA agent executed the affidavit
for the search warrant of the Kindred residence and asserted that he believed evidence of
illegal drug dealing would be found in the home because of the following: a DEA
confidential informant, who had been reliable in the past, identified Burton as a large
volume cocaine dealer and stated that Burton stored drugs at his girlfriend’s house and
that Tyree Barnwell helped Burton deal drugs; Burton’s girlfriend was observed entering
and leaving the Kindred residence; undercover DEA agents purchased cocaine from
Barnwell four times; Barnwell identified Burton as his partner and supplier of cocaine;
Barnwell stated that he had seen Burton cooking crack cocaine inside the Kindred
residence; and Barnwell admitted to picking up drugs from Burton at the Kindred
residence on nine separate occasions. A search of 7209 Kindred Street revealed evidence
that linked Burton to the distribution of crack cocaine. The District Court denied
Burton’s motion to suppress that evidence.
3
iii. The Oldsmobile
When officers arrested Burton in September, 2007 at a residence in Coatesville,
Pennsylvania, a white Oldsmobile was parked in the driveway of the home. Burton
stipulated to the District Court that the officers who executed the arrest warrant had
information that Burton and Barnwell used a white Oldsmobile to distribute crack
cocaine. The arresting officers searched the car and found two packets of crack cocaine.
The District Court denied Burton’s motion to suppress that evidence.
B. Joinder
Burton was initially charged with two counts relating to his distribution of crack
cocaine in 2005. A superseding indictment added five charges against Burton and Tyree
Barnwell relating to distribution of crack cocaine in 2007. Barnwell pled guilty on
March 3, 2008. On March 13, 2008, Burton filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 8(a) and 14(a) to sever the new counts against him. The District
Court denied the motion, and Burton was tried on all counts of the superseding
indictment.
C. Admission of Expert Testimony
Seven months before trial, the government stated in a hearing before the District
Court that it intended to call an expert witness on the use, production, and distribution of
crack cocaine. Later, two weeks before trial and after plea negotiations between Burton
and the government had ended unsuccessfully, the government formally disclosed to
Burton the name of its expert witness, Detective Andrew Callaghan, and the topics of his
anticipated testimony, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. After
4
receiving the disclosure, Burton filed a motion in limine to exclude Callaghan’s
testimony on four grounds: that it was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
(“FRE”) 702 because it would be unreliable and would not assist the jury in any
significant way; that it would be inadmissible under FRE 704(b) because it would address
Burton’s state of mind; that it would be inadmissible under FRE 403 because its
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value; and that the government did not provide
adequate notice of its intent to call Callaghan as an expert witness. The District Court
permitted Callaghan to testify as an expert over Burton’s objections.
II. Discussion1
Burton argues that the District Court erred in denying his motions to suppress, his
motion to sever, and his motion in limine to exclude Callaghan’s testimony. We address
each contention in turn.
A. Motions to Suppress
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, “we review factual findings for
clear error and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions.”
United States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2010). We adopt the well-reasoned
opinion of the District Court with regard to the suppression of evidence in this case, as all
three challenged searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because they
were supported by probable cause. The corroboration of the anonymous tips and the
experienced officer’s reasonable belief that 7545 Battersby Street contained contraband
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
gave rise to probable cause sufficient to support issuance of the search warrant for that
residence. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (holding that a “fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”
will justify a search and that confirmation of anonymous tips may give rise to probable
cause). The corroboration of the proven reliable DEA informant’s statements and the
experienced agent’s reasonable belief that the house at 7209 Kindred Street contained
contraband likewise gave rise to probable cause sufficient to support issuance of the
search warrant for that residence. See United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 297 (3d
Cir. 2000) (“[A] number of … courts of appeals have held that evidence of involvement
in the drug trade is likely to be found where the dealers reside.”); United States v.
Singleton, 439 F.2d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 1971) (probable cause may be established by
verifying the tip of a previously reliable informant). As for the automobile search, since
the local officers who arrested Burton had probable cause to believe that contraband
would be found in the Oldsmobile, the warrantless search of that car was permissible.
See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (“If there is probable cause to believe a
vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity … a search of any area of the vehicle in
which the evidence might be found [is authorized].” (citing United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982))).
B. Joinder
We review the joinder of offenses de novo. United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d
273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003). The counts against Burton were properly joined. Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs joinder of offenses and defendants in a
6
criminal prosecution. Both parties acknowledge that Rule 8(a) provides the proper
standard to analyze joinder of the counts in this case. That rule provides that a defendant
may be charged with two or more offenses if the offenses “are of the same or similar
character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute
parts of a common scheme or plan.” Burton’s acts in 2005 concerned distribution of
crack cocaine and so did his acts in 2007. At a minimum, those acts were of the same or
similar character, as required for joinder under Rule 8(a).
Likewise, Rule 14 does not prevent joinder of the offenses against Burton. Rule
14 requires a defendant to show that the prejudice from joinder was “clear and
substantial.” See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992). Burton
has not shown, and the record does not support a conclusion of, any such prejudice in this
case. Evidence of Burton’s activities in 2005 likely would have been admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake for
his drug activities in 2007, and vice versa. See United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 187
(3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, a jury instruction was given directing the jury to consider each
count and offense separately.2 Because the evidence of one set of crimes was likely
admissible in a prosecution for the other and the jury was instructed to consider each
count separately, we conclude that Burton was not substantially prejudiced by the joinder
of offenses against him.
2
It is an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their
instructions.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (citing Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 (1985)).
7
C. Admission of Expert Testimony
We review a District Court’s decision on the admissibility of expert testimony for
abuse of discretion.3 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). “The
Rules of Evidence embody a strong preference for admitting any evidence that may assist
the trier of fact.” Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).
Therefore, “[w]e will not interfere with the district court’s decision unless there is a
definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Id. (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted). Burton argues that the District Court erred under FRE
702, FRE 704(b), and FRE 403 by permitting Detective Callaghan to testify at his trial as
a narcotics expert, and further erred under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
because there was inadequate notice regarding the government’s intent to call Callaghan
as a witness. We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s finding that Detective
Callaghan’s testimony was admissible.
i. FRE 702
“Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the proffered witness must be an
expert, i.e., must be qualified; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring
scientific, technical or specialized knowledge [, i.e., reliability]; and (3) the expert’s
testimony must assist the trier of fact [, i.e., fit].” United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152,
3
“An abuse of discretion arises when the District Court’s decision rests upon a clearly
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to
fact.” Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
8
172 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244) (internal quotations omitted). “It is
well established that experts may describe, in general and factual terms, the common
practices of drug dealers.” United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, “the operations of narcotics dealers have repeatedly been found to be a
suitable topic for expert testimony because they are not within the common knowledge of
the average juror.” Id. at 307 (citing United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587,
590-92. (3d Cir. 1989)). In this case, Callaghan’s twenty years of experience as a
narcotics officer qualified him to testify as an expert on narcotics, his testimony was
reliably based on that experience, and his testimony assisted the jury to understand
aspects of the drug trade outside the purview of a lay juror. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at
141-42, 147-49 (1999). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Callaghan’s testimony met the requirements of Rule 702.
ii. FRE 704(b)
Nor did the Court err in deciding that Detective Callaghan’s testimony was
consistent with Rule 704(b). Under FRE 704(b), no expert witness “testifying with
respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.” Fed. R.
Evid. 704(b). Callaghan’s testimony did not cross that line. Instead, Callaghan described
the relevance of the drug evidence admitted in the case. Callaghan’s testimony simply
supported the inference that the evidence admitted in the case was indicative of someone
9
who distributed crack cocaine. See Watson, 260 F.3d at 307-8. Hence, the testimony did
not violate Rule 704(b). See United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2005).
iii. FRE 403
Callaghan’s testimony also did not violate Rule 403, because the probative value
of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “A
district court’s ruling under Rule 403 may be reversed only if it is arbitrary or irrational.”
United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). As already noted, Detective Callaghan’s testimony was helpful to
explain the meaning and relevance of the drug evidence in the case against Burton. The
testimony elicited the “inferential step” that certain items, some seemingly innocuous,
were typically used by a person who distributed drugs. Id. The testimony may have been
prejudicial to him, of course, but only in the permissible way that any evidence indicative
of guilt is to any defendant. It certainly was not unfairly prejudicial. See id. The District
Court’s decision that the testimony would be admissible under Rule 403 was not arbitrary
or irrational.
iv. Adequate Notice
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Detective Callaghan
to testify when Burton received notice two weeks before trial that the government
intended to call Callaghan as a witness. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 requires
the government to give the defendant a “written summary” of any expert testimony, at the
10
defendant’s request.4 The government complied with the requirements of the rule by
sending an appropriate “written summary” to Burton’s counsel. Burton’s argument that
he was prejudiced by the timing of the government’s written disclosure is unavailing on
this record. He was aware for months before trial of the government’s intention to call an
expert on narcotics and of the subject of that expert’s testimony. There was no bad faith
or inordinate delay that we can discern from the government’s interaction with Burton.
The government’s formal written notice under Rule 16 was sent in early January, 2009,
promptly after it learned that an expert would indeed be needed for a trial. On these
facts, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the
expert testimony of Detective Callaghan.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
4
The required disclosure under Rule 16 is not an automatic obligation on the
government; it arises only upon request of a defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) (“At
the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of
any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.”).
11