United States v. Mario Samaniego , 439 F. App'x 109 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 10-2763
    ____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    MARIO SAMANIEGO,
    Appellant
    ____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-06-cr-00582-009)
    District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Golden
    ____________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 15, 2011
    Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: July 22, 2011)
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    FISHER, Circuit Judge.
    Mario Samaniego1 appeals from the District Court’s final judgment of sentence on
    six felony drug charges. On appeal, Samaniego contends that he was entitled to a
    1
    We note that Samaniego’s true name is Reymundo Garcia.
    decrease in offense level based on his minor role in the offense. For the reasons stated
    below, we will affirm.
    I.
    We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
    legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
    analysis.
    The Ortega Drug Trafficking Organization (“Ortega DTO”) is a criminal
    organization based in Chester County, Pennsylvania. Since at least 2002, the Ortega
    DTO has been involved in the distribution and trafficking of methamphetamine and
    cocaine, bringing drugs from Mexico and California to be sold in Pennsylvania. In
    September 2006, investigators intercepted a delivery and arrested several members of the
    conspiracy, including Samaniego. Samaniego, who is a commercial truck driver by trade,
    transported a large shipment of drugs hidden inside a pre-packed tractor-trailer wheel
    from California to Pennsylvania. He was paid $300.00 for his participation in the
    conspiracy. Investigators recovered 31 kilograms of cocaine and 22 pounds of
    methamphetamine from the tractor-trailer wheel.
    In the fifty-count, multi-defendant indictment, Samaniego was charged with six
    counts: one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and
    5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1), (b)(1); one
    count of distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    ; one count of
    2
    distribution of 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    ; and three counts of unlawful use of a
    communication facility in the commission or facilitation of a felony drug offence, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 843
    (b).
    In 2007, Samaniego pled guilty to these six charges. Samaniego subsequently
    attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, but the motion was denied. In June 2010, the
    District Court conducted a sentencing hearing. After addressing objections to the
    Presentence Report, the District Court assigned Samaniego a base offense level of 38,
    with a criminal history category of III. It refused to grant Samaniego an offense-level
    reduction under § 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, finding that he had not shown
    himself to be a minor participant in the 2006 trafficking conspiracy. 2 However, after
    reviewing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors of record, the District Court elected to give
    Samaniego a downward variance of 52 months, imposing a below-Guidelines sentence of
    240 months’ imprisonment for each of the first three counts and 48 months’ for each of
    the final three counts, all to run concurrently. Samaniego timely appealed.
    2
    The District Court also declined to grant an offense-level reduction based on
    acceptance of responsibility because Samaniego had previously attempted to withdraw
    his guilty plea. (App. at 260.)
    3
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a).
    We “must sustain the District Court’s factual findings as to a § 3B1.2 minimal or
    minor role adjustment unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” United States v.
    Perez, 
    280 F.3d 318
    , 351 (3d Cir. 2002). Because the District Court’s determination is
    “heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case,” § 3B1.2, cmt. n. 3(C), “district
    courts are allowed broad discretion in applying this section.” United States v. Isaza-
    Zapata, 
    148 F.3d 236
    , 238 (3d Cir. 1998). The defendant bears the burden of
    demonstrating that his role in the offense makes him “substantially less culpable than the
    average participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 3(A); Isaza-Zapata, 
    148 F.3d at 240
    . We
    will reverse only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been committed.” United States v. Grier, 
    475 F.3d 556
    , 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    III.
    Samaniego asserts that his limited role as a courier for the drugs, or “a mere
    mule,” entitled him to a minor role reduction pursuant to § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2
    provides for a four-level decrease in offense level if a defendant was a “minimal
    participant” in an offense, a two-level decrease if he was a “minor participant,” and a
    three-level decrease if he falls between. A defendant is a “minimal participant” if he is
    “plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.” § 3B1.2,
    4
    cmt. n. 4. A minor participant is one “who is less culpable than most other participants,
    but whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id. at cmt. n. 5.
    A defendant’s eligibility for an offense level reduction turns on several factors:
    “(1) the defendant’s awareness of the nature and scope of the criminal enterprise; (2) the
    nature of the defendant’s relationship to the other participants; and (3) the importance of
    the defendant’s actions to the success of the venture.” United States v. Brown, 
    250 F.3d 811
    , 819 (3d Cir. 2001). Samaniego argues that he is entitled to a decrease in offense
    level because his guilt was based on one act of drug distribution with little knowledge of
    the transaction’s details. However, “[t]he fact that a defendant’s participation in a drug
    operation was limited to that of courier is not alone indicative of a minor or minimal
    role.” United States v. Headley, 
    923 F.2d 1079
    , 1084 (3d Cir. 1991). After reviewing the
    record, we are satisfied that the District Court did not commit clear error.
    At a minimum, Samaniego knew that the Ortega DTO was involved in selling and
    distributing drugs and that his job was to transport a drug shipment from California.
    Moreover, Samaniego’s role in transporting the drugs to Pennsylvania was crucial to the
    success of the conspiracy. The importance of his role is highlighted by the sheer quantity
    and value of drugs he was delivering and the distance he had to travel in order to deliver
    them. Furthermore, given his confessed awareness that the tractor-trailer wheel he was
    transporting contained drugs, the claim that Samaniego never actually examined the tire
    does not diminish his culpability. Based on these facts, the District Court did not clearly
    5
    err in concluding Samaniego was a “key participant” in the conspiracy and did not
    deserve a decrease in his offense level based on a minor or minimal role.3 (App. at 14.)
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
    sentence.
    3
    Samaniego also appears to argue that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable
    because the District Court did not grant the § 3B1.2 offense-level reduction. Generally,
    we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard and review a sentence for reasonableness,
    which requires that the sentence be both procedurally sound and substantively reasonable.
    United States v. Wise, 
    515 F.3d 207
    , 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). Because we conclude that
    the District Court did not commit clear error in denying the offense-level reduction, we
    also conclude that the sentence was procedurally sound.
    6