Charles Guarnieri, Jr. v. Duryea Bor , 441 F. App'x 74 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 08-3949
    _____________
    CHARLES J. GUARNIERI, JR.,
    v.
    DURYEA BOROUGH; DURYEA BOROUGH COUNCIL;
    ANN DOMMES, Individually and in her Official Capacity as
    Council President; LOIS MORREALE, Individually and in her
    Official Capacity as Borough Secretary; FRANK GROBLEWSKI,
    Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman;
    EDWARD ORKWIS, Individually and in his Official Capacity as
    Councilman; ROBERT WEBB, Individually and in his Official Capacity
    as Councilman; AUDREY YAGER, Individually and in her Official
    Capacity as Councilwoman; JOAN ORLOSKI, Individually and in her
    Official Capacity as Councilwoman; AKULONIS, Individually
    and in his Official Capacity as Councilman,
    Appellants
    _____________
    No. 08-4428
    _____________
    CHARLES J. GUARNIERI, JR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    DURYEA BOROUGH; DURYEA BOROUGH COUNCIL;
    ANN DOMMES, Individually and in her Official Capacity
    as Council President; LOIS MORREALE, Individually and
    in her Official Capacity as Borough Secretary;
    FRANK GROBLEWSKI, Individually and in his Official
    Capacity as Councilman; EDWARD ORKWIS, Individually
    and in his Official Capacity as Councilman; ROBERT WEBB,
    Individually and in his Official Capacity as Councilman;
    AUDREY YAGER, Individually and in her Official Capacity
    as Councilwoman; JOAN ORLOSKI, Individually and in her
    Official Capacity as Councilwoman; AKULONIS, Individually
    and in his Official Capacity as Councilman
    _______
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 3-05-cv-01422)
    District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
    _______
    Argued October 27, 2009
    Not Precedential Opinion filed February 4, 2010
    Certiorari granted June 20, 2011
    On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States
    Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and HARDIMAN Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    Cynthia L. Pollick (Argued)
    The Employment Law Firm
    Pittston, PA 18640
    Attorney for Appellant in No. 08-4428
    Appellee in No. 08-3949
    Karoline Mehalchick (Argued)
    Joseph A. O‟Brien
    Oliver, Price & Rhodes
    Clarks Summit, PA l8411
    Jennifer Walsh
    Ufberg & Associates
    2
    Scranton, PA l8503
    Attorneys for Appellees in No. 08-4428
    Appellants in No. 08-3949
    (Filed : August 2, 2011)
    ______
    OPINION
    _____
    SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
    The Supreme Court has vacated our opinion and judgment in this matter and
    remanded to this court. See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 
    131 S. Ct. 2488
    (2011), reversing Guarnieri v. Duryea Borough, 364 F. App‟x 749 (3d Cir. 2010).
    Charles Guarnieri filed a grievance challenging his termination as Chief of Police
    of the Borough of Duryea (“Borough”). The matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant to
    the police union‟s collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found, inter alia, that
    Guarnieri engaged in misconduct, but ordered his reinstatement after disciplinary
    suspension. Thereafter, the Borough Council issued eleven directives instructing
    Guarnieri in the performance of his duties, but he challenged those directives in a second
    union grievance and filed a lawsuit pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claiming the directives
    were in retaliation for prior activity that he claimed was protected under the Petition
    Clause of the United States Constitution. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded
    Guarnieri compensatory and punitive damages which the District Court sustained. The
    3
    Borough appealed to this court, arguing that Guarnieri‟s actions were not protected under
    the Petition Clause.
    Bound by its prior published opinions,1 this court rejected the Borough‟s position,
    which was contrary to our precedent holding that “a public employee who has petitioned
    the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing of a lawsuit or grievance
    is protected under the Petition Clause from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition
    concerns a matter of solely private concern.” Foraker v. Chaffinch, 
    501 F.3d 231
    , 236
    (3d Cir. 2007) (citing San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 
    30 F.3d 424
     (3d Cir. 1994)). That
    holding has now been definitively rejected by the Supreme Court in this case where it
    held that a government employee‟s claim under the Petition Clause is subject to the
    public concern test applicable to a government employee who files a Free Speech Clause
    claim. Guarnieri, 
    131 S. Ct. at
    2501 (citing Connick v. Myers, 
    461 U.S. 138
     (1983)).
    On receipt of the Supreme Court‟s opinion, we asked the parties to file
    simultaneous memoranda regarding the effect of the Supreme Court‟s decision on the
    remaining issues in this case. Both parties urge this court to determine whether
    Guarnieri‟s Petition Clause claims relate to a matter of public concern. In the alternative,
    1
    See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1:
    It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a
    precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no
    subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential
    opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration is
    required to do so.
    4
    the Borough asks this court to vacate the judgment of the District Court and to remand
    this matter to the District Court for its reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court‟s
    decision.
    As the Supreme Court stated, and the parties agree, whether something is a matter
    of public concern is a question of law for the court. See Connick, 
    461 U.S. at
    148 n.7. In
    its supplemental memorandum the Borough notes the language in the Supreme Court‟s
    Guarnieri opinion where the Court stated that a “petition that involves nothing more than
    a complaint about a change in the employee‟s own duties does not relate to a matter of
    public concern.” Guarnieri, 
    131 S. Ct. at 2501
     (quotations omitted). Guarnieri responds
    that his dismissal was a matter of great actual concern to the residents of Duryea, and he
    refers to newspaper reports of the dispute. The Supreme Court stated that “whether an
    employee‟s petition relates to a matter of public concern will depend on „the content,
    form, and context of [the petition], as revealed by the whole record.‟” 
    Id.
     (alteration in
    original) (quoting Connick, 
    461 U.S. at
    147-48 n.7). We are not prepared to hold on this
    meager record that the dismissal of a police chief in a small town can never be a matter of
    public concern in that community.2 It might be, for example, if the Chief were dismissed
    because he disfavored one race over another, or because he overlooked actions of a
    sexual predator. We do not suggest that there is any such issue lurking in this matter, but
    2
    Guarnieri has filed a motion to expand record and file supplemental
    appendix. Counsel is aware that this court is not the forum to decide questions of
    fact in the first instance. On remand, the parties may raise that issue with the
    District Court. We express no view on that motion.
    5
    merely note that not all dismissals of government employees would necessarily fall on
    one side or another of the rule. As the Supreme Court itself recognized, it would depend
    on the circumstances.
    This is a matter more appropriately to be decided by the District Court. We will
    therefore allow the District Court the opportunity to consider the issue in the first
    instance.
    Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand for
    consideration in light of the Supreme Court‟s opinion.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-3949, 08-4428

Citation Numbers: 441 F. App'x 74

Judges: Fuentes, Hardiman, Sloviter

Filed Date: 8/2/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023