Sheila Eyajan v. State of Ohio ( 2022 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-3716
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SHEILA MARIE EYAJAN,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF OHIO; HONORABLE LAURA DIGIACOMO;
CITY SOLICITOR MICHAEL FRANKLIN, Esq.;
ASSISTANT CITY SOLICITOR LORI B. LAMER, Esq.;
ASHTABULA COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT;
DEPUTY JAMES LEWIS; DEPUTY SARGENT BRIAN ROSE;
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CENTER OF NORTHEAST OHIO INC;
GERALD L HEINBAUGH; DEFINA, Ashtabula City Police Officer;
MARY SPRINGER, Ashtabula Public Defender; KIM KOSKI, a/k/a Koski Camp;
BILL KAYDO; ATTORNEY RIPMA, Ashtabula Public Defender;
ASHTABULA PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE; ASHTABULA POLICE
DEPARTMENT; DAVID KOSKI; JILL KOSKI; JOHN KOSKI; MARY ANN
STANDY; BRYAN SCHLAICH; TYLER SCHLAICH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00161)
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 1, 2022
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 23, 2022)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
In 2019, Sheila Eyajan, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against over 20 defendants in Ohio, alleging various
constitutional violations arising from a criminal proceeding then pending against her in
that state. For relief, she requested solely: “This criminal case should be dismissed for
grounds of civil violation and malicious process.” (ECF 12 at 10). The District Court
dismissed the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), holding that
interference with state criminal proceedings would not be appropriate under the doctrine
of Younger abstention. Eyajan timely appealed. 1
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over a district court’s decision to abstain under Younger. See PDX N., Inc. v.
Comm’r N.J. Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020).
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Eyajan also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied after she
filed her notice of appeal. Because Eyajan did not file a timely new or amended notice of
appeal encompassing the order denying her motion for reconsideration, we lack
jurisdiction to consider that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v.
McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008).
2
In her appellate brief, Eyajan has not challenged the District Court’s decision to
apply the Younger abstention doctrine, and on our independent review, we discern no
error. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This doctrine “reflects a
strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. Lower
Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). The
Supreme Court has explained that “Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which
federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal
proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” See Sprint
Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). Eyajan’s case falls squarely within those
contours. Although the Supreme Court has limited the application of Younger when
there is “a showing that the charges had been brought in bad faith or with an intent to
harass,” ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2014), Eyajan
failed to make such a showing here. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975)
(“‘[B]ad faith’ in this context generally means that a prosecution has been brought
without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.”) (citing Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)).
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err in applying
Younger, and we will affirm the judgment.
3