Rosedale and Rosehill Cemetery v. Township of Readington ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    Nos. 21-1391 & 21-1403
    ___________
    ROSEDALE AND ROSEHILL CEMETERY ASSOCIATION
    v.
    TOWNSHIP OF READINGTON; THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE
    TOWNSHIP OF READINGTON,
    Appellants in 21-1403
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Appellant in 21-1391
    _______________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (District Court No. No. 3-19-cv-16428)
    District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
    _______________________
    Argued: January 26, 2022
    _______________________
    Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, McKEE and MATEY, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 4, 2022)
    _______________________
    Richard P. Cushing [Argued]
    Gebhardt & Kiefer
    1318 Route 31 North
    P.O. Box 4001
    Annandale, NJ 08801
    Counsel for Township of Readington and The Township Committee of the
    Township of Readington
    Amy Chung [Argued]
    Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
    Division of Law
    25 Market Street
    Hughes Justice Complex
    Trenton, NJ 08625
    Counsel for State of New Jersey
    Mark D. Taticchi [Argued]
    Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath
    One Logan Square
    Suite 2000
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Megan K. Balne
    Hyland Levin Shapiro
    6000 Sagemore Drive
    Suite 6301
    Marlton, NJ 08053
    Robert R. Stanicki
    Mackevich Burke Stanicki
    1435 Raritan Road
    P.O. Box 919
    Clark, NJ 07066
    Counsel for Rosedale and Rosehill Cemetery Association
    _______________________
    OPINION 1
    _______________________
    McKEE, Circuit Judge.
    1
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    2
    The Township of Readington and the Township Committee of Readington appeal
    the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rosedale and Rosehill
    Cemetery Association on Rosedale’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of New
    Jersey’s Cemetery Act. The Act prohibits the creation of a cemetery absent consent of
    the municipality in which the cemetery would be located. 2 In the counts of the complaint
    relevant to this appeal, Rosedale claimed the Cemetery Act is void for vagueness and
    therefore unconstitutional on its face because it fails to provide any standards for granting
    or withholding consent. The District Court agreed and this appeal followed.
    For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment on
    Rosedale’s facial challenge and remand for consideration of Rosedale’s remaining
    claims. 3
    I.
    “In evaluating a facial challenge we must look beyond the application of an
    ordinance in the specific case before us.” 4 Thus, Rosedale must “establish that no set of
    circumstances exists under which [the Cemetery Act] would be valid, or that the
    [Cemetery Act] lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” 5 Rosedale argues that the Cemetery
    Act is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks any standards to guide the municipality’s
    2
    
    N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:27-25
    (a).
    3
    We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
    Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. County of Lehigh, 
    933 F.3d 275
    , 279 (3d Cir.
    2019).
    4
    Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 
    824 F.3d 353
    , 362 (3d Cir. 2016).
    5
    
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. 460
    , 472
    (2010)).
    3
    exercise of discretion. However, its facial challenge should have been rejected out of
    hand because no property interest was alleged . Rosedale’s facial challenge is contained
    in Counts Three and Four of its complaint, yet neither of those counts allege a protected
    property interest and there is no evidence in the summary judgment record supporting
    that Rosedale had such an interest. 6 Although Rosedale does attempt to argue a protected
    property interest in its brief, argument in an opposing brief cannot amend a complaint,
    nor supplement the record on summary judgment. 7
    Rosedale’s entire theory rests upon the unlimited grant of discretion in the
    Cemetery Act, which permits cemetery use contingent upon municipality approval. 8
    However, such “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant
    or deny it in their discretion.” 9 Accordingly, Rosedale’s facial challenge fails as it
    attempts to birth a protected property right from just such a grant of discretion.
    Finally, Rosedale’s void for vagueness attack on the Cemetery Act fails for an
    even more fundamental reason: the Act does not grant discretionary authority to judges,
    juries, or police. Rather, it grants discretion to policymaking bodies of local
    municipalities. For this reason, as the Sixth Circuit observed in Ass’n of Cleveland Fire
    6
    This is true even though the prior averments in the complaint are incorporated into each
    of those counts.
    7
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Green Country Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC,
    
    371 F.3d 1275
    , 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
    8
    N.J.S.A. § 45:27-25(a); see also Appellee Br. at 3; 5; 22-23.
    9
    Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 
    545 U.S. 748
    , 756 (2005); see also West v. Ky.
    Horse Racing Comm’n, 
    972 F.3d 881
    , 890 (6th Cir. 2020) (“. . . [A] party cannot possess
    a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state's decision to award or
    withhold the benefit is wholly discretionary.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Med
    Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 
    296 F.3d 404
    , 409 (6th Cir. 2002))).
    4
    Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, “it is unclear how the void for vagueness doctrine is
    even applicable.” 10 In fact, the void for vagueness doctrine, that court explained, “does
    not apply to this fundamental delegation of authority to [a] legislative body.” 11 Here,
    because the Act delegates authority to a municipality, the doctrine does not apply.
    II.
    For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the District Court and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    
    502 F.3d 545
    , 552 (6th Cir. 2007).
    10
    
    Id.
     at 552–53 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii
    11
    Campaign Comm., 
    849 F.2d 1176
    , 1184 (9th Cir. 1988)).
    5