United States v. Rivera-Pagan , 283 F. App'x 54 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-19-2008
    USA v. Rivera-Pagan
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-2661
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Rivera-Pagan" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1001.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1001
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 07-2661
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    JIMMY RIVERA-PAGAN,
    Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Criminal Action No. 06-cr-00592-1)
    District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 5, 2008
    Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: June 19, 2008)
    OPINION
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge
    Jimmy Rivera-Pagan pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, as well as possession
    with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and aiding and abetting the
    same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He received a 63-month
    term of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. He appeals his
    conviction, contending that the District Court erred in denying a motion to suppress
    cocaine found in his suitcases because the search warrant was not supported by probable
    cause. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.1
    I.
    In September 2006, the Philadelphia office of the Drug Enforcement Agency
    (DEA) received notice from the DEA office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, that a shipment of
    cocaine might be arriving at the Philadelphia International Airport. Further
    communications from the San Juan DEA office named Rivera-Pagan and his two co-
    defendants, Jose Vegas-Torres2 and Irving Cabassa-Rivera, as the suspected smugglers.
    On the basis of the information, Philadelphia DEA agent Merritt Gibson applied for a
    search warrant.
    In the affidavit accompanying the application for a search warrant, Agent Gibson
    summarized his experience as a DEA agent and detailed the information provided by the
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “‘We review the district court’s denial of [a]
    motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review
    as to its legality in light of the court’s properly found facts.’” United States v. Lafferty,
    
    503 F.3d 293
    , 298 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Givan, 
    320 F.3d 452
    , 458 (3d
    Cir. 2003)).
    2
    Jose Vegas-Torres is also referred to as “Jose Vega” in the record.
    2
    San Juan DEA office. Specifically, the affidavit explained that the San Juan office had
    received information that Rivera-Pagan and his co-defendants had bought, in cash, one-
    way tickets from the San Juan International Airport to LaGuardia International Airport,
    with a layover in Philadelphia. Each co-defendant had checked two pieces of luggage,
    four of which were inspected by airport officials and found to be nearly empty. Prior to
    their arrival in Philadelphia, these bags were replaced with other bags that contained
    cocaine. The affidavit explained the DEA’s suspicion that bag-handlers at the San Juan
    Airport were involved in the smuggling operation and had switched the empty bags for
    bags containing cocaine. Agent Gibson further noted in the affidavit that information
    received from the San Juan DEA office one week earlier concerning suspected drug
    smuggling via the Philadelphia International Airport had led to the seizure of 25
    kilograms of cocaine and the arrest of the courier.
    A Magistrate Judge granted the application for a warrant. The bags were searched
    at the Philadelphia Airport and found to contain approximately 83 kilograms of cocaine.
    Rivera-Pagan and his co-defendants were allowed to proceed to LaGuardia with
    replacement luggage containing sham cocaine. When they tried to claim the luggage at
    LaGuardia, they were arrested. They were subsequently indicted for the drug crimes.
    Before the District Court, Rivera-Pagan moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing
    that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. After a hearing, the District Court
    denied the motion. On appeal, Rivera-Pagan renews the probable-cause argument. He
    further contends that, in the absence of probable cause, the fruits of the search cannot be
    3
    admitted under the “good faith” exception to the warrant requirement.
    II.
    In determining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate judge should look at
    the totality of the circumstances to determine if “there is a fair probability that contraband
    or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238 (1983). Our duty is “simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis
    for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” 
    Id. at 238–39
    (quoting Jones v. United
    States, 
    362 U.S. 257
    , 271 (1960)). In making this determination, we look only at the
    materials presented to the magistrate. United States v. Hodge, 
    246 F.3d 301
    , 305 (3d Cir.
    2001).
    Rivera-Pagan contends that the affidavit contains mere speculation and fails to
    allege facts from which a magistrate could conclude that there was a reasonable
    probability that evidence would be found in the suitcases. We disagree. The affidavit in
    this case, while it could have included more detail, provides a substantial basis for
    concluding that probable cause existed. Agent Gibson alleged that he had information
    from the San Juan DEA office about possible smuggling of cocaine into the Philadelphia
    International Airport. While Gibson did not state specifically who in the San Juan DEA’s
    office provided the information, it had the indicia of reliability, especially given that the
    affidavit stated that previous information from the San Juan DEA about a smuggling
    operation with the same modus operandi led to the successful seizure of 25 kilograms of
    cocaine and arrest of the courier. Gibson further stated that he learned from the San Juan
    4
    office that Rivera-Pagan and his co-defendants had purchased their flight tickets in cash
    and each checked two pieces of luggage, some of which were determined during
    screening to be nearly empty. Purchasing tickets in cash and checking nearly empty
    baggage is certainly suspicious behavior.
    Finally, Gibson asserted his belief that the nearly empty bags had been switched by
    bag handlers for luggage containing drugs. While Rivera-Pagan discounts the bag-
    switching theory as merely a “hunch,” Gibson’s belief is supported by the fact that the
    bags checked by Rivera-Pagan and his co-defendants—which were each assigned a
    unique claim check number—were not the same bags that turned up in Philadelphia,
    despite the fact that the new set of luggage bore the original claim check tags.3 On the
    3
    The affidavit described the initial checked luggage as follows: “Three of the pieces of
    luggage were gym bags with the word ‘Tour’ and a red letter ‘X.’ A fourth piece of
    luggage was a black roller type suitcase with no distinct identifiers.” It further stated that
    “Jose Vega’s luggage was assigned baggage ticket numbers 047821 and 047822. Irving
    Cabassa’s luggage was assigned ticket numbers 047828 and 047829. Jimmy Rivera’s
    luggage was assigned baggage numbers 047797 and 047798.” These claim tags,
    however, were affixed to different bags when the plane landed in Philadelphia. We know
    this because the application for a search warrant describes the bags as follows:
    Six items of luggage from US AIR flight # 1996, described as follows: (1) Tag #
    047797 attached to a gray Travelmate suitcase; (2) Tag # 047798 attached to a
    black Travelmate suitcase; (3) Tag # 047821 attached to a gray [T]ravelmate
    suitcase[;] (4) Tag # 047822 attached to a light gray Travelmate suitcase with
    orange striping; (5) Tag # 047828 . . . attached to a black Travelmate suitcase[;]
    (6) Tag # 047829 attached to a light gray Travelmate suitcase with orange
    striping.
    The only inference that can be drawn from this information is that someone swapped
    Rivera and his co-defendants’ empty suitcases for suitcases filled with cocaine.
    5
    basis of these facts, the Magistrate Judge had a substantial basis for concluding by a “fair
    probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in the suitcases.4
    
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 238
    . Thus we affirm.
    4
    Having determined that there existed a substantial basis for finding probable cause,
    we need not entertain the question of whether the good faith exception to the warrant
    requirement applies.
    6