Jane Hart v. Wells Fargo Bank NA ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 22-2229
    __________
    JANE ANN HART,
    Appellant
    V.
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-14644)
    District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    April 28, 2023
    Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: May 4, 2023)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    KRAUSE, Circuit Judge
    Appellant Jane Hart appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint against
    Appellee Wells Fargo. Because the District Court correctly held that collateral estoppel
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    barred Hart’s claims, we will affirm.
    I.      DISCUSSION1
    Hart contends the District Court erred in applying collateral estoppel because
    Wells Fargo failed to establish, as was required under New Jersey law,2 that: (1) the New
    Jersey Superior Court’s prior judgments in Wells Fargo’s foreclosure suit against Hart
    were final; (2) the Superior Court’s determination of the issues Wells Fargo now seeks to
    preclude were essential to these prior judgments; and (3) applying collateral estoppel was
    equitable.3 Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 
    186 N.J. 511
    , 521–22 (N.J. 2006). We are
    unpersuaded.
    First, Hart argues that because the Superior Court’s various judgments culminated
    in the dismissal of Wells Fargo’s foreclosure suit without prejudice, these judgments
    were not “final” or “appealable” in the most technical sense and collateral estoppel
    cannot apply. But collateral estoppel “does not require the entry of a judgment, final in
    1
    The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (d)(2). We
    have appellate jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Our review of the District Court’s
    decision to apply collateral estoppel is plenary. Jean Alexander Cosms., Inc. v. L’Oreal
    USA, Inc., 
    458 F.3d 244
    , 247–48 (3d Cir. 2006).
    2
    Wells Fargo sought to preclude litigation of Hart’s claims based on the judgments it
    obtained in its New Jersey Superior Court foreclosure suit against Hart, so we look to
    New Jersey law on collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect New Jersey
    would give these judgments. Bailey v. Ness, 
    733 F.2d 279
    , 281 (3d Cir. 1984).
    3
    In addition, the doctrine requires: (1) the issue to be precluded be identical to the issue
    decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior
    proceeding; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in
    privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. Olivieri, 186 N.J. at 521. Hart failed to
    raise, and therefore forfeited, any challenge to the District Court’s holdings with respect
    to these elements, however. Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 
    877 F.3d 136
    , 147 (3d Cir. 2017).
    2
    the sense of being appealable.”4 In re Brown, 
    951 F.2d 564
    , 569 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying
    New Jersey law). Rather, it requires that “any prior adjudication of an issue in another
    action . . . be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” 
    Id.
     And in determining
    whether the resolution of an issue was sufficiently firm, courts consider “whether the
    parties were fully heard, whether a reasoned opinion was filed, and whether that decision
    could have been, or actually was, appealed.” 
    Id.
    The Superior Court’s detailed opinions here meet this threshold. Those opinions—
    which together run over forty pages in length and are informed by full briefing and
    argument—explain why, under the relevant legal standards, Hart’s claims were futile in
    the first instance and repetitious in the second. They thus reflect the requisite
    “appreciation of the relevant facts and familiarity with the applicable law” to be
    sufficiently firm.5 
    Id. at 570
    .
    Second, the Superior Court’s rulings on the issues Wells Fargo now seeks to
    preclude were “critical to [its] judgment[s].” Nat’l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Penn. Public
    4
    In any event, as the District Court correctly found, the issue here was appealable via an
    interlocutory appeal. Interlocutory appeals are discretionary and allowed under New
    Jersey Law “in the interest of justice,” N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-4, or where there are other
    extraordinary circumstances. Caggiano v. Fontoura, 
    804 A.2d 1193
    , 1201 (N.J. Super.
    2002). Here, while Hart argues that an interlocutory appeal may have been denied, it was
    nonetheless a possible avenue of appeal.
    5
    Even if they were not, “the fact that [a] decision was not actually appealable is of little
    consequence,” where a party’s asserted argument failed as a matter of law, Burlington N.
    R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd, 
    63 F.3d 1227
    , 1233 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995), and, as
    the Superior Court recognized in its first opinion, Hart’s claims lacked merit because
    Hart’s mortgage agreement unambiguously allowed Wells Fargo to charge property
    inspection fees and because Hart had suffered no harm as the fees had never been added
    to the amount due on her account.
    3
    Util. Comm’n, 
    288 F.3d 519
    , 527 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
    Its determination that Hart’s claims lacked merit were not dicta; they formed the basis for
    the Superior Court’s denial of her motion to amend and thus were “essential to the prior
    judgment.” Olivieri, 186 N.J. at 521.
    Finally, it is not inequitable to apply collateral estoppel in this case, and Hart
    offers no meaningful argument to the contrary. Considerations relevant to the fairness of
    applying collateral estoppel include “conservation of judicial resources; avoidance of
    repetitious litigation; and prevention of waste, harassment, uncertainty and
    inconsistency.” Allen v. V & A Bros., 
    208 N.J. 114
    , 138 (N.J. 2011). But Hart failed to
    discuss any of these. Instead, she simply repackaged and reasserted her prior arguments,
    so we cannot agree that the equities weigh against the doctrine’s application here.
    II.      CONCLUSION6
    For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in dismissing Hart’s
    claims, and we will affirm its judgment.
    6
    Wells Fargo raised several other reasons as to why our Court should dismiss, but we do
    not address these arguments because we affirm the District Court’s application of
    collateral estoppel.
    4