Justin Pierznik v. Commissioner Social Security ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 22-2369
_____________
JUSTIN PIERZNIK,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
of New Jersey
(District Court No. 1:20-cv-12507)
District Court Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
March 24, 2023
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and MCKEE Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 15, 2023)
_______________________
OPINION ∗
_______________________
∗
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Justin Pierznik appeals the District Court’s decision affirming the Social
Security Administration Acting Commissioner’s denial of his claim for social security
disability benefits. 1 For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I. 2
The role of this Court, like that of the District Court, is to determine whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 3 Substantial evidence
must be “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 4 We will uphold the
Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if we would
have decided the factual inquiry differently.” 5
II.
1
After the Acting Commissioner denied Appellant’s claims initially and on
reconsideration, Appellant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The
ALJ found that Appellant was not disabled. Appellant’s request for review by the
Appeals Council was denied. Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the
Commissioner’s final decision on Appellant’s claim. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d
358, 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
2
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Commissioner
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
3
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”); see also Johnson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
4
Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637
F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200.
5
Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360.
2
Appellant raises multiple issues on appeal. Most of his claims relate to his
argument that the Administrative Law Judge erred by not giving controlling weight to the
opinion of his treating physician, Dr. David P. Aita. Appellant contends that, had the ALJ
properly weighed the opinion, he would have found Appellant to be disabled or, if not, at
least arrived at a different Residual Functional Capacity determination.
Although a treating physician’s opinion is often weighed more heavily than other
evidence in the record, it is not automatically determinative. To be given controlling
weight, the opinion must be “well-supported by medically acceptable . . . techniques and .
. . not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” 6 The ALJ maintains authority to
weigh the medical opinions in the record and to “make the ultimate disability and RFC
determinations.” 7
We consider whether the ALJ’s disability and RFC determinations—and his
underlying decision to adopt some of Dr. Aita’s opinions while rejecting others—were
supported by substantial evidence. 8 We hold that they were. As the District Court rightly
observed, the ALJ offered a detailed explanation of his decisions, in which he
acknowledged and weighed the multiple opinions in the record. The ALJ explained that
the Dr. Aita opinions he did not adopt were “vague” because they “failed to address
specifically [Appellant’s] function-by-function abilities in vocational terms.” 9 He also
6
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
7
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).
8
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .”); see also Johnson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
9
App. 110.
3
noted that they were “inconsistent” with other evidence he considered. 10 This is
supported by substantial evidence such that a “reasonable mind” would accept it as
adequate to support his disability 11 and RFC determinations. 12 Consequently, though we
are not unsympathetic to Appellant, the law and our standard of review do not allow us to
disturb the ALJ’s findings.
Appellant also argues that the ALJ erred in relying upon testimony from the
vocational expert. He contends that the expert was unreliable because he proposed two
jobs—Order Caller and Photocopy-Machine Operator—that include or may include
responsibilities prohibited by Appellant’s RFC. He also argues that the ALJ erred by
accepting an obsolete job and by relying on the expert’s calculations of the number of
jobs available to Appellant in the national economy. Appellant, however, points to
10
Id. The ALJ explained that Dr. Aita’s ambiguous conclusions “limited the probative
value of his opinion” and that his conclusion that Appellant “would require additional
supervision was unsupported and inconsistent with [Appellant’s] limited mental health
treatment, limited positive examination findings, and reported functioning . . . which
suggested that he did not require such a limitation.” Id. Appellant argues that the ALJ
improperly relied on these three pieces of evidence (which he dubbed the “Three ALJ
Reasons”) to find inconsistencies with Appellant’s limitations but offers scant evidence
or legal analysis to support that assertion.
11
Appellant asserts that there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding
that he was not disabled under Listings 12.04 or 12.06. See 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 1, §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B). He contends that the ALJ failed to “provid[e] detail
regarding claimant’s allegations.” Appellant’s Brief, 47. We disagree and adopt the
District Court’s extensive analysis of the ALJ’s detailed examination of Appellant’s
claims. See Justin P. v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-12507 (CPO), 2022 WL 2965857, at *5-8
(D.N.J. May 31, 2022).
12
Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637
F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200.
4
nothing to support these arguments or to demonstrate that the ALJ’s conclusions were not
based on substantial evidence.
As to Appellant’s first argument, an examination of the jobs’ Dictionary of
Occupational Titles entries reveals that neither requires significant interaction with
people that would violate Appellant’s RFC. 13 While we are sympathetic to Appellant’s
second argument that the job of Addresser is likely obsolete, the ALJ need only establish
that a claimant is capable of performing one job that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy. 14 Finally, we reject Appellant’s arguments that there is a meaningful
difference between “full time” and “full time equivalent” based simply on the definition
of “equivalent.” 15
III.
For the reasons described above, we therefore will affirm the District Court.
13
See DOT 209.667-014 and DOT 207.685-014.
14
20 C.F.R. § 416.966(b); see also Penrose v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-00011, 2020
WL 7640585, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2020).
15
App. 19. As the District Court rightly noted, “Black’s Law Dictionary . . . defines
‘equivalent’ as ‘[e]qual in value, force, amount, effect, or significance[;] [c]orresponding
in effect or function; nearly equal; virtually identical.’” Id. (alterations in original) (citing
Black’s Law Dictionary, 682 (11th ed. 2019).
5