Utility Workers United Association Local 537 v. Utility Workers Union of America AFL CIO System Lo ( 2023 )


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  •                                        PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    Nos. 22-2142 & 22-2262
    _____________
    UTILITY WORKERS UNITED ASSOCIATION, LOCAL
    537, an unincorporated association, by J. Kevin Booth, Its
    Trustee ad litem,
    Appellee in 22-2142/
    Cross-Appellant in 22-2262
    v.
    UTILITY WORKERS’ UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
    an unincorporated association; D. MICHAEL LANGFORD,
    an individual; MICHAEL COLEMAN, an individual; JOHN
    DUFFY, an individual; UTILITY WORKERS’ UNION OF
    AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 537,
    an unincorporated association,
    Appellants in 22-2142/
    Cross-Appellees in 22-2262
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-19-cv-01077)
    Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan
    _____________
    Argued April 19, 2023
    Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit
    Judges
    (Filed: August 3, 2023)
    Caitlin D. Kekacs
    Andrew D. Roth [ARGUED]
    Bredhoff & Kaiser
    805 15th Street NW
    Suite 1000
    Washington, DC 20005
    Michael J. Healey
    Healey & Hornack
    247 Fort Pitt Boulevard
    4th Floor
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
    Samuel J. Pasquarelli [ARGUED]
    Sherrard German & Kelly
    535 Smithfield Street
    Suite 300
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
    2
    ________________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ________________
    HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
    These appeals involve a dispute between labor unions.
    The controversy began when Local 537 of the Utility Workers’
    Union of America, AFL-CIO (UWUA) sought to disaffiliate.
    UWUA learned of Local 537’s planned disaffiliation vote and
    imposed a trusteeship the same day that an overwhelming
    majority of Local 537 members voted to form a new union—
    Utility Workers United Association, Local 537 (Independent
    537). UWUA obtained a preliminary injunction to enforce its
    trusteeship over Local 537 and keep Local 537’s assets.
    Independent 537 then brought a civil action to recover those
    assets. The District Court granted Independent 537 summary
    judgment and equitable relief but denied its request for
    attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed. We will affirm.
    I
    A
    Members of Local 537 felt that they were getting
    “nothing” from UWUA and wanted to withdraw from the
    National Benefits Agreement UWUA had negotiated with a
    public utility called American Water. App. 349. So the officers
    of Local 537 decided to call a vote on disaffiliation. The
    disaffiliation vote was scheduled for Monday, March 19, 2018,
    with notices posted on March 2 and March 14. In anticipation
    of disaffiliation, the officers of Local 537 formed a new union,
    3
    Independent 537. Independent 537 was an unincorporated
    association with the same officers as Local 537 and virtually
    identical bylaws as UWUA.
    UWUA officers learned of the impending vote on
    Friday, March 16, three days before it was to occur. So they
    met over the weekend on Sunday, March 18, to plan next steps.
    UWUA President D. Michael Langford declared an emergency
    trusteeship over Local 537, effective March 19, the same day
    as the planned disaffiliation vote, and appointed UWUA Vice-
    President John Duffy as Trustee.
    On March 19, a series of meetings took place in which
    nearly 90 percent of Local 537 members who cast ballots voted
    to disaffiliate Local 537 from UWUA and to make Independent
    537 the new bargaining representative of all 637 members in
    the approximately 21 bargaining units then represented by
    Local 537. That same day, UWUA President Langford sent
    notices of the trusteeship to Local 537’s officers and members,
    stating: “all moneys, books and property of the Local . . . must
    be turned over to the Trustee,” and “[a]ll Local 537 System and
    District Officers are hereby removed.” App. 354.
    At first, the removed officers refused to comply with the
    trusteeship. They continued to act as officers and declined to
    turn over Local 537’s property to Trustee Duffy. That
    prompted UWUA to sue the Local 537 officers in federal court
    seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce the trusteeship and
    to require the removed officers to turn over Local 537’s assets.
    UWUA’s suit did not proceed far. On April 19, just
    three weeks after it was filed, the removed officers agreed to
    the entry of a consent order that granted UWUA the
    preliminary injunctive relief it had requested. The removed
    4
    officers delivered Local 537’s assets to Duffy and promised to
    cease and desist from holding themselves out as officers of
    both Local 537 and Independent 537.
    After the consent decree was entered, the former
    officers of Local 537 did not go away quietly. In their capacity
    as individual employees, they filed petitions with the National
    Labor Relations Board to decertify Local 537 as the bargaining
    representative of the employee-members in three of the Local’s
    bargaining units. They prevailed when, in December 2018, the
    Board conducted decertification elections and certified
    Independent 537 as the new bargaining representative of the
    employee-members in each of the three bargaining units of the
    former Local 537.
    After the Board’s decision, UWUA withdrew its
    trusteeship lawsuit, terminating the consent order. Neither the
    Court nor the Board ever determined whether UWUA had
    lawfully imposed the trusteeship.
    By May 2019, representation of all bargaining units
    previously represented by Local 537 had been transferred,
    either to Independent 537 or another UWUA local affiliate. On
    May 8, UWUA formally lifted the trusteeship and revoked
    Local 537’s charter. UWUA then invoked a section in its
    constitution permitting forfeiture of assets upon revocation of
    a local union’s charter and took possession of Local 537’s
    “books, monies and property.” App. 387, 523.
    B
    After UWUA revoked Local 537’s charter and seized
    its assets, Independent 537 went to federal court. Independent
    537 sued UWUA, Local 537, and three UWUA officers under
    5
    the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
    (LMRDA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 401
     et seq., and the Labor
    Management Relations Act (LMRA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 141
     et seq.
    Independent 537 requested an injunction ordering UWUA to
    return: (1) all the books, records, and documents of Local 537;
    (2) Local 537’s social funds belonging to the employees of the
    districts now represented by Independent 537, plus interest;
    (3) the dues, property, and assets of Local 537;
    (4) reimbursement of any decrease in value of any of the
    property taken from Local 537; and (5) punitive damages and
    attorneys’ fees.
    The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate
    Judge. The District Court entered three orders adverse to
    UWUA: (1) an order denying UWUA’s Rule 12(b)(1) and
    12(b)(6) motions to dismiss; (2) an order denying UWUA’s
    summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment to
    Independent 537 to the extent Independent 537 sought
    equitable distribution of Local 537’s assets but denying
    Independent 537’s request for attorneys’ fees; and (3) a final
    judgment and decree of equitable relief distributing to
    Independent 537 a portion of the funds held by former Local
    537 and books and records related to the bargaining units or
    districts now represented by Independent 537.
    UWUA timely appealed, arguing that the District Court:
    (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) erred in its summary
    judgment rulings; and (3) abused its discretion in awarding so
    high an equitable sum. Independent 537 cross-appealed to
    challenge the amount of the award, seeking to recoup all of
    Local 537’s assets, as well as attorneys’ fees.
    6
    II
    We have appellate jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    UWUA contends the District Court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over Independent 537’s suit, although its
    arguments relate to both subject matter jurisdiction and
    statutory standing. The parties dispute whether: (A) there is a
    contract between labor organizations over which we have
    jurisdiction and (B) Independent 537 has standing to enforce
    that contract. We review these legal issues de novo. See In re
    Phar–Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
    172 F.3d 270
    , 273 (3d Cir. 1999)
    (jurisdiction); Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 
    804 F.3d 316
    ,
    320 (3d Cir. 2015) (standing).
    A
    The District Court found there was jurisdiction under
    both LMRA § 301, and LMRDA Title I, § 102. We agree that
    the District Court had jurisdiction under LMRA § 301. Section
    301 of the LMRA grants federal jurisdiction over “[s]uits for
    violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
    organization representing employees in an industry affecting
    commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations. . . .”
    
    29 U.S.C. § 185
    (a); see also 
    id.
     § 185(c).
    The existence of a contract is no longer a jurisdictional
    element of a § 301 claim. Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc.
    v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc. Union No. 66, 
    580 F.3d 185
    , 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
    
    546 U.S. 500
     (2006) and adopting the standard set in Winnett
    v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
    553 F.3d 1000
    , 1006–07 (6th Cir. 2009)).
    The existence of the contract is instead an element of the cause
    of action. 
    Id.
     So UWUA’s contention that Independent 537 “is
    not and never has been a party” to any contract with the UWUA
    7
    does not affect our jurisdiction. See UWUA Br. 22.
    In any event, there is a contract between labor
    organizations here: the UWUA constitution and its bylaws. See
    United Ass’n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
    and Pipefitting Indus. v. Local 334, 
    452 U.S. 615
    , 622 (1981)
    (“[A] union constitution is a ‘contract’ within the plain
    meaning of § 301(a).”). The Supreme Court has held that union
    members are third-party beneficiaries of their parent union’s
    constitution, which enables them to sue under § 301 for
    violations of a union constitution even when they were not
    original parties to the contract. Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
    Workers, 
    502 U.S. 93
    , 101 (1991). The former members of
    Local 537 thus have rights as third-party beneficiaries of the
    UWUA constitution, the contract between UWUA and Local
    537.
    UWUA also argues that Independent 537 did not allege
    in its Complaint that its members have third-party beneficiary
    rights. But it did, even if indirectly. The Amended Complaint
    asserts that the constitution was a contract between UWUA and
    the members of Local 537, including those who later joined
    Independent 537. And Independent 537’s claim for social
    funds is that the funds are the property of members (not any
    specific union) and is based on the premise that the members
    of Local 537 have rights as beneficiaries of the UWUA
    constitution.
    UWUA’s related fallback position, that third-party
    rights are limited to “current” union members, is unsupported
    by caselaw. See UWUA Br. 23–24. Although the parties in
    Wooddell were then members of the unions they sued, nothing
    in that case indicates that third-party beneficiary rights are
    limited to current members. See Wooddell, 
    502 U.S. at
    95–96,
    8
    100; see also Lewis v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
    Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Loc. Union No. 771, 
    826 F.2d 1310
    , 1314 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that federal courts
    have jurisdiction under § 301(a) “over suits brought by an
    individual union member against his or her local union or the
    international union for violation of a union constitution”).
    UWUA’s theory would deprive the family of deceased
    members of any rights under union contracts. See generally
    United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 
    495 U.S. 362
    , 374–75 (1990) (assuming the right of survivors of
    killed miners to sue under LMRA § 301 and reversing on other
    grounds). And union members cannot be forced to remain with
    a union merely to sue for their rights under a union constitution.
    B
    We turn next to the question of Independent 537’s
    standing to sue on behalf of the former members of Local 537.
    LMRA § 301(b) establishes that a labor organization “may sue
    or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
    represents in the courts of the United States.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 185
    (b) (emphasis added). Independent 537 is a labor
    organization that represents employees in an industry affecting
    commerce. And it satisfied § 301(b) because it sued on behalf
    of the former members of Local 537.
    UWUA argues that nowhere in the Amended Complaint
    does Independent 537 say it is suing on behalf of anyone.
    Although Independent 537 pleaded in its Amended Complaint
    that it is the “successor” to Local 537, this claimed status is not
    dispositive of Independent 537’s standing. App. 83–84. We
    agree with the District Court that Independent 537 is not a legal
    successor-in-interest. See Utility Workers United Ass’n, Loc.
    537 v. Utility Workers’ Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 
    2022 WL 9
    254389, at *11–12 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2022). The NLRB has
    already determined that Independent 537 is a completely new
    labor organization. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 19-cv-00580-LPL, ECF
    No. 23-3, Ex. 3; see also Utility Workers United Ass’n, Loc.
    537 by Booth v. Pennsylvania Am. Water Co., 
    838 F. App’x 686
    , 688 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (affirming the same). And we agree
    that Independent 537 has no right to sue on its own behalf for
    the property of former Local 537. But this case is not about
    successorship status for collective bargaining agreements, and
    Independent 537 is not suing on its own behalf. Instead,
    Independent 537 pleaded that its members, all of whom are
    former members of Local 537, have third-party beneficiary
    rights under the UWUA constitution, and that Independent 537
    sued to enforce those rights on their behalf. See, e.g., App. 90
    (“the dues, property and assets are the property of the
    Association and its members. . . ) (emphasis added). Congress
    expressly authorized such a suit on behalf of third-party
    beneficiaries in the LMRA § 301(b). So Independent 537 has
    standing.
    For these reasons, we hold the District Court had subject
    matter jurisdiction under LMRA § 301 and Independent 537
    has standing to sue UWUA on behalf of the former members
    of Local 537.
    III
    We next consider the District Court’s order partially
    granting Independent 537’s motion for summary judgment and
    denying UWUA’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Our
    review is de novo. Tundo v. County of Passaic, 
    923 F.3d 283
    ,
    286 (3d Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is proper if the moving
    party shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
    10
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    UWUA asks us to reverse and vacate the summary
    judgment for Independent 537 based on its view that
    Independent 537’s consent to the preliminary injunction
    enforcing the trusteeship rendered the disaffiliation ineffective.
    UWUA claims that its revocation of Local 537’s charter was a
    valid exercise of its power under the UWUA constitution,
    giving UWUA a right to all the assets of the former Local 537.
    The District Court disagreed, holding that Independent 537 is
    entitled to summary judgment even if the forfeiture provisions
    in the constitution remained applicable. Utility Workers, 
    2022 WL 254389
    , at *9. We agree with the District Court.
    Independent 537 has a right to equitable distribution of
    Local 537’s assets because UWUA breached the fiduciary duty
    it owed to former members of Local 537 under LMRDA § 501.
    That section provides, in relevant part:
    The officers . . . of a labor organization occupy
    positions of trust in relation to such organization
    and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the
    duty of each such person, taking into account the
    special problems and functions of a labor
    organization, to hold its money and property
    solely for the benefit of the organization and its
    members. . ., [and] to refrain from dealing with
    such organization as an adverse party or in behalf
    of an adverse party in any matter connected with
    his duties and from holding or acquiring any
    pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts
    with the interests of such organization. . . .
    
    29 U.S.C. § 501
    (a).
    11
    Duffy and Langford were “officers” of Local 537. See
    LMRDA § 3(n), 
    29 U.S.C. § 402
    (n) (defining “Officer” to
    include “any person authorized to perform the functions of
    president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other
    executive functions of a labor organization”). Duffy, as
    Trustee, was authorized to “take full charge of the affairs” of
    Local 537, to remove and temporarily appoint officers, and to
    take such other action he deemed necessary to preserve Local
    537’s interest. App. 401 (UWUA const., art. IV, sec. 6-B (2)).
    Langford, as UWUA President, was authorized to supervise
    and control Duffy’s conduct as Trustee. 
    Id.
    Both Duffy and Langford owed fiduciary duties to
    Local 537 under LMRDA § 501. As such, they had to refrain
    from dealing adversely to Local 537 and “its members as a
    group,” including by avoiding any conflict of interest. See
    LMRDA § 501(a). Duffy and Langford breached that duty as
    a matter of law. Once Duffy was appointed as Trustee, his
    duties to UWUA in his role as its Vice President created a
    direct conflict of interest with his duties to Local 537 and its
    members as the Trustee of Local 537’s constructive trust.
    Similarly, Langford’s duties to UWUA as its President created
    a direct conflict of interest with his duties in supervising and
    controlling the conduct of Langford as Trustee. Duffy and
    Langford’s positions enabled their use of the trusteeship power
    to keep Local 537 affiliated and bound by the constitution
    while they proceeded to disband its membership and revoke its
    charter, triggering forfeiture of its assets to and for the benefit
    of UWUA. On UWUA’s view, Independent 537’s attempts to
    disaffiliate were “in opposition to the UWUA’s interests from
    the moment of its inception.” UWUA Br. 22. UWUA’s
    revocation of the charter and seizure of Local 537’s assets—
    only after the Local had no members left—was therefore self-
    12
    dealing.
    These breaches of fiduciary duty render unenforceable
    UWUA’s invocation of the forfeiture provision of its
    constitution. We will not reward UWUA for orchestrating a
    conflict of interest. The District Court was correct to find that
    Independent 537 is entitled to a share of the assets of the former
    Local 537 on behalf of Local 537’s former members.
    Independent 537 was thus entitled to summary judgment and
    equitable distribution of the assets.
    IV
    Both parties contend that the District Court erred in the
    amount of money it awarded Independent 537. As a threshold
    matter, the parties disagree about our standard of review.
    UWUA says abuse of discretion applies. Independent 537
    seeks plenary review. Neither party cites any caselaw. We
    agree with UWUA because we see no reason to deviate from
    the standard we generally apply to equitable decisions: abuse
    of discretion. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod.
    Liab. Litig., 
    246 F.3d 315
    , 320 (3d Cir. 2001).
    After thoroughly considering UWUA’s appeal and
    Independent 537’s cross-appeal, we perceive no abuse of
    discretion in the equitable distribution of the assets. The
    District Court awarded Independent 537 a sum of $632,667.01
    of the $951,466 in Local 537’s assets, along with certain books
    and records. The Court’s calculation was based on the parties’
    accountings and proposed allocations, including UWUA’s
    second allocation after it failed to comply with the first Court
    order for proposed allocation. The Court distributed the
    undifferentiated funds, earnings, and expenses “in proportion
    to the historical contributions to UWUA [ ]’s funding of the
    13
    bargaining units now represented by each union.” Utility
    Workers, 
    2022 WL 254389
    , at *15.
    UWUA argues that the District Court abused its
    discretion by not awarding it $193,486.01, the pro rata share of
    the dues paid to Local 537 during the time when the Local was
    in trusteeship. UWUA is right that it was legally obligated by
    the consent order to represent the members of Local 537 during
    the trusteeship. Consistent with that principle, the Court
    awarded UWUA legal and arbitration expenses, an equitable
    decision supported by Independent 537’s position on the
    allocation. See Utility Workers United Ass’n, Loc. 537 v. Utility
    Workers’ Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 
    2022 WL 2289832
    , at *1 &
    n.3, 3 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2022). But that doesn’t mean that the
    District Court abused its discretion in denying UWUA the rest
    of the dues unrelated to the legal fees. We are persuaded by
    caselaw establishing that contributions from individual union
    members are held in trust to benefit those members. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Goad, 
    490 F.2d 1158
    , 1162 (8th Cir. 1974);
    see also Boilermakers v. Loc. Lodge D129, 
    910 F.2d 1056
    ,
    1062 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a portion of defunct local
    union’s assets that did not belong to the International
    “should . . . be returned to the reconstituted local in whatever
    form it now exists”). So there was no abuse of discretion in
    awarding Independent 537 the dues paid during the
    trusteeship.1
    1
    UWUA is correct that Independent 537 made no arguments
    against UWUA’s claim to the $193,486.01. But UWUA itself
    failed to make a specific argument that this was a forfeiture.
    Therefore UWUA forfeited any forfeiture argument. See Altice
    USA, Inc. v. New Jersey Bd. of Pub. Utilities, 
    26 F.4th 571
    , 575
    14
    Independent 537 argues on cross-appeal that it should
    have received all of Local 537’s former assets.2 It cites Tile for
    the proposition that all assets move to a new union after
    disaffiliation. See Tile, Marble, Terrazzo, Finishers,
    Shopworkers and Granite Cutters Int’l Union AFL-CIO v. Tile,
    Marble, Terrazzo, Helpers and Finishers Loc. 32, 
    896 F.2d 1404
    , 1413 (3d Cir. 1990). But in Tile, “virtually the whole
    membership of TMT Local 32 resigned.” 
    Id.
     Here, not every
    member of Local 537 joined Independent 537. The District
    Court was correct that Independent 537 cites no caselaw
    holding that all assets of a prior union automatically pass to a
    new union. For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse
    its discretion in awarding Independent 537 $632,667.01 in
    equitable relief.
    V
    Finally, Independent 537 cross appeals the District
    Court’s order denying attorneys’ fees. We agree with the
    District Court that Independent 537 has no legal entitlement to
    attorneys’ fees. Nothing in the UWUA constitution authorizes
    an award of attorneys’ fees for its breach, and “no statute
    authorizes fee shifting in section 301 cases.” Ames v.
    Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
    864 F.2d 289
    , 293 (3d Cir. 1988).
    We therefore apply “the American rule that each party to a
    lawsuit pay its own attorneys’ fees.” 
    Id. n.2
     (3d Cir. 2022). We also review the District Court’s
    equitable division of the assets for abuse of discretion and
    discern none here.
    2
    “All” assets does not include per capita dues to UWUA,
    which would not be part of Local 537’s property.
    15
    Independent 537 nevertheless claims it is entitled to
    attorneys’ fees as a matter of equity because UWUA had no
    colorable basis to oppose the return of social funds. But even
    if we were to agree that equity could authorize an award of fees
    and the District Court had determined UWUA acted in bad
    faith in refusing to acknowledge that the disaffiliated members
    of Local 537 had a right to their social fees, Independent 537
    proposed no specific amount expended to recover those fees by
    litigation. Independent 537 instead claims the number is too
    hard to calculate and so it should be awarded all its attorneys’
    fees. Such a blanket award would not be equitable, so the
    District Court did not err in declining to grant attorneys’ fees
    to Independent 537.
    *      *       *
    Independent 537 properly brought this suit on behalf of
    its members who are former members of Local 537.
    Independent 537 was entitled to summary judgment and
    equitable distribution of the assets of the former Local 537. The
    District Court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the
    equitable award. Nor did the Court err in declining to award
    attorneys’ fees. We will therefore affirm the orders of the
    District Court in all respects.
    16