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Joseph Cunningham v. JP Morgan Chase Bank , 537 F. App'x 44 ( 2013 )


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  •       ELD-043                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-3244
___________
JOSEPH CUNNINGHAM,
Appellant
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-00756)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 3, 2013
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 21, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Joseph Cunningham appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing
his amended complaint against JP Morgan Chase Bank (hereinafter, “the Bank”). There being
no substantial question presented, we grant the Bank’s motion to summarily affirm the District
Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
1
Cunningham’s complaint arises from a foreclosure action initiated by the Bank in the
Delaware Superior Court. At issue in that case is a mortgage executed by Joseph Cunningham,
Sr., Cunningham’s deceased father. Over five months after the Bank initiated the foreclosure
case, Cunningham filed a rambling complaint in the District Court. This complaint was a
combination of discovery requests and an allegation that the Bank has committed fraud by
concealing the satisfaction of the mortgage from the heirs of Cunningham’s father’s estate.
The District Court dismissed his complaint without prejudice and provided him time within
which to file an amended complaint.
Cunningham filed his amended complaint, again asserting various discovery requests
and his fraud allegation. His amended complaint appears to allege that the Bank’s fraudulent
actions interfered with his ability to defend against the foreclosure, and he asked the District
Court to enjoin the foreclosure action and award him $1 million in damages. The District
Court dismissed his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris,
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971).1 This
appeal followed.2
1
The Younger abstention doctrine “reflects a strong federal policy against federal-court
interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”
Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp.,
    970 F.2d 1195
    , 1200 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this doctrine, “federal courts must abstain in certain
circumstances from exercising jurisdiction over a claim where resolution of that claim would
interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Miller v. Mitchell,
    598 F.3d 139
    , 145 (3d Cir.
2010).
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over the
legal determinations of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been met and, if
so, we review the district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.” FOCUS v.
Allegheny Cnty. Court of Common Pleas,
    75 F.3d 834
    , 843 (3d Cir. 1996).
2
We agree with the District Court that Younger abstention was appropriate in
Cunningham’s case. Such abstention is appropriate “only when: (1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.”
Kendall v. Russell,
    572 F.3d 126
    , 131 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, the foreclosure action against
Cunningham is ongoing in the Delaware Superior Court, and this proceeding implicates
important state interests. Finally, Cunningham has adequate opportunities to raise his fraud
claim in state court. Furthermore, Cunningham has not demonstrated “bad faith, harassment or
some other extraordinary circumstance, which might make abstention inappropriate.” Anthony
v. Council,
    316 F.3d 412
    , 418 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by deciding to abstain. Therefore, we grant the Bank’s motion for summary action
and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
3