G-I Holdings, Inc. f/k/a GAF v. , 654 F. App'x 571 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                              NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 15-2164
    _____________
    In re: G-I HOLDINGS INC, f/k/a GAF Corporation, et al.,
    Debtors
    NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
    Appellant
    v.
    G-I HOLDINGS, INC.
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    District Court No. 2-14-cv-06103
    District Judge: The Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    July 14, 2016
    Before: SMITH, ROTH, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: July 18, 2016)
    _____________________
    OPINION
    _____________________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
    The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) has creatively tried to
    repackage its claim against G-I Holdings for property damage as a claim for
    injunctive relief in the hopes of getting a better outcome this time around.
    Specifically, NYCHA argues that its “new” claim is a non-dischargeable injunctive
    claim for pollution abatement brought by NYCHA in its capacity as a
    governmental entity. By turning its monetary claim for property damage into a
    “regulatory” action, NYCHA hoped to avoid the steep discounting, inherent in
    most bankruptcy proceedings, of its claim for monetary damages. We hold that
    NYCHA cannot so easily circumvent federal bankruptcy laws. We will therefore
    affirm the District Court’s judgment in all respects.
    I.
    NYCHA is a public corporation created under New York law to construct
    and maintain public housing for lower-income residents in New York City.
    Approximately 419,000 residents are currently housed in NYCHA’s 2,702
    residential properties. G-I Holdings is the corporate successor to a manufacturer of
    housing products that contained asbestos. Facing close to 500,000 asbestos-related
    lawsuits, G-I Holdings filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
    Bankruptcy Code in 2001. During the bankruptcy process, NYCHA submitted a
    Proof of Claim seeking roughly half a billion dollars for property damage to its
    not constitute binding precedent.
    2
    buildings. As a result of the well-documented carcinogenic effects of exposure to
    asbestos fibers, NYCHA claimed that it had to undertake extensive, and expensive,
    precautionary measures whenever it removed Asbestos Containing Material
    (ACM) from any of its buildings. The Proof of Claim filed by NYCHA did not
    mention injunctive relief or allege that its claim was non-dischargeable.
    On November 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court in conjunction with the District
    Court approved the Eighth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (Plan), which
    disposed of all covered claims against G-I Holdings and barred the holders of such
    claims from reasserting them against the reorganized G-I Holdings. NYCHA
    never appealed the Confirmation Order finalizing the Plan.
    However, three years later NYCHA filed a complaint against G-I Holdings
    in which it sought an injunction to compel G-I Holdings to remove ACM from
    hundreds of NYCHA’s buildings. In this complaint, NYCHA put forward two
    reasons why this claim was not barred by the now-finalized Plan. First, NYCHA
    argued that its request for an injunction was not a “claim” as defined by the Plan
    and thus was not barred by the res judicata effect of the District Court’s
    Confirmation Order. Second, NYCHA argued that as a governmental entity, it
    should be allowed to use its inherent regulatory power to force G-I Holdings to
    remediate the environmental damage caused by the ACM. The Bankruptcy and
    3
    District Courts rejected both of these arguments, and we do the same.1
    II.
    NYCHA’s request for an injunction is most certainly a claim as defined by
    the Plan. The Plan specifically states that a “claim” includes “any right to any
    equitable remedy.” JA 1202. Thus, to the extent NYCHA is acting as a creditor
    seeking to enforce a claim for injunctive relief, this claim is barred by the clear
    terms of the Plan.
    NYCHA, however, argues that it is not an ordinary creditor. Instead, it
    claims that it can exercise its inherent power as a governmental entity to compel G-
    I Holdings to remediate the ongoing environmental harm resulting from the ACM
    it produced. In support, NYCHA cites several cases which stand for the much
    narrower proposition that an entity cannot simply “discharge” future compliance
    with state and local environmental laws by entering into bankruptcy. See, e.g., In
    re Torwico Elec., Inc., 
    8 F.3d 146
     (3d Cir. 1993); In the Matter of Quanta
    Resources Corp., 
    739 F.2d 912
     (3d Cir. 1984).
    A brief explanation of our holding in Torwico will help clarify why
    1
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d)(1), the District Court had
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), and the Bankruptcy Court had
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(b). “We exercise de novo review over
    orders granting motions to dismiss.” In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 
    590 F.3d 252
    , 256
    (3d Cir. 2009).
    4
    NYCHA’s attempt to invoke this exception fails. In Torwico, the New Jersey
    Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (NJDEPE) issued an order
    requiring Torwico to submit a written plan explaining how it would close the
    seepage pit that was allegedly polluting local waterways.       
    8 F.3d at 147-48
    .
    Torwico argued that this was a “claim” under its bankruptcy reorganization plan
    and thus was discharged because the NJDEPE did not file a timely proof of claim.
    
    Id. at 148
    . We disagreed, explaining that the state was exercising its police powers
    to “enforce laws requiring Torwico to clean up the hazardous waste it is
    responsible for under state law.” 
    Id.
     We thus held that “a debtor cannot maintain
    an ongoing nuisance in direct violation of state environmental laws. The state can
    exercise its regulatory powers and force compliance with its laws, even if the
    debtor must expend money to comply.” 
    Id. at 150
    . Torwico – and the judicially
    created exception NYCHA is trying to invoke – is thus limited to situations in
    which a state is not attempting to enforce a “right to payment” but is instead
    invoking its “right to force the debtor to comply with applicable environmental
    laws by remedying an existing hazard.” 
    Id.
    This case is easily distinguishable from Torwico and the other similar cases
    NYCHA cites. First, NYCHA does not point to a single law which requires G-I
    Holdings to mitigate the property damage resulting from its products or which
    permits NYCHA to hold G-I Holdings liable for the environmental harm caused by
    5
    its products. Instead, the only laws mentioned impose a duty on NYCHA to
    provide safe housing for its residents. Second, NYCHA is a public corporation
    created for the specific purpose of providing housing to lower-income residents in
    New York City.       It has not been given authority to enforce New York’s
    environmental laws. Third, as NYCHA admits, the asbestos fibers in ACM only
    create a health hazard when ACM is removed or otherwise disturbed during
    apartment renovations. The state is thus not confronted with a polluter whose
    conduct necessitates injunctive relief to stop ongoing pollution. Instead, the injury
    here is the additional cost associated with renovating apartments that contain
    ACM. These additional costs are properly conceptualized as a form of property
    damage to NYCHA that occurred when the ACM material was installed. Thus,
    NYCHA’s claim for injunctive relief is merely an attempt to force G-I Holdings to
    foot the bill for remediation of a past harm. This type of claim was dealt with in
    G-I Holdings’ bankruptcy proceeding and cannot be relitigated now.
    NYCHA’s claim is thus properly characterized as a “repackaging of a
    forfeited claim for damages.” Torwico, 
    8 F.3d at 150
    . NYCHA is not a regulatory
    agency seeking to enforce a state or local law; it is simply a creditor seeking to
    circumvent the limitations on its recovery of monetary damages from G-I Holdings
    6
    under the Plan.2 We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s judgment in all
    respects.
    2
    The Bankruptcy Court therefore properly denied NYCHA’s request to amend its
    Proof of Claim to incorporate these “new” claims.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-2164

Citation Numbers: 654 F. App'x 571

Filed Date: 7/18/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023