United States v. Eric Walton , 587 F. App'x 83 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ERIC ARTHUR WALTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:94-cr-00021-FPS-JSK-1)
Submitted: November 26, 2014 Decided: December 16, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Eric Arthur Walton, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti,
Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Arthur Walton appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Walton’s
motion seeking relief from his criminal judgment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), or in the alternative, for a writ of
audita querela pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). He also
appeals the district court’s order denying his post-judgment
motion for correction of clerical error.
Having reviewed the record, we find no reversible
error in the portion of the court’s order denying a writ of
audita querela. See United States v. Gamboa, 608 F.3d 492, 495
(9th Cir. 2010); Massey v. United States, 581 F.3d 172, 174 (3d
Cir. 2009). Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion in the
denial of relief from the court’s judgment under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 36 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), as the purported clerical
errors identified by Walton have no substantive impact on the
court’s judgment and are therefore harmless. See Pfizer Inc. v.
Uprichard, 422 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating standard of
review). We therefore affirm the district court’s orders on
these issues.
The portion of the district court’s order dismissing
Walton’s motion in part as an unauthorized, successive § 2255
motion is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge
issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
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§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012); see Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683, 688
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that certificate of appealability is
required to appeal from dismissal of habeas petition as
unauthorized and successive). A certificate of appealability
will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the
district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies
this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would
find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38
(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural
grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive
procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a
debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack,
529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record
and conclude that Walton has not made the requisite showing. We
therefore deny Walton’s motion for a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal of this issue.
Finally, we construe Walton’s notice of appeal and
appellate pleadings as an application to file a second or
successive § 2255 motion. See United States v. Winestock, 340
F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization
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to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert
claims based on either:
(1) newly discovered evidence that . . . would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have
found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012). Walton’s claims do not satisfy
either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to
file a successive § 2255 motion.
We affirm the district court’s orders in part and
dismiss the appeal in part. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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