Devil's Advocate, LLC v. Grynberg Petroleum Company , 588 F. App'x 264 ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1561
    DEVIL’S ADVOCATE, LLC,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    GRYNBERG PETROLEUM COMPANY; JACK J. GRYNBERG,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    No. 14-1693
    DEVIL’S ADVOCATE, LLC,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    GRYNBERG PETROLEUM COMPANY; JACK J. GRYNBERG,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.    Claude M. Hilton, Senior
    District Judge. (1:13-cv-01454-CMH-IDD)
    Submitted:   November 25, 2014            Decided:   December 19, 2014
    Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    No. 14-1561 vacated and remanded;     No.   14-1693   dismissed   by
    unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John W. Toothman, DEVIL’S ADVOCATE, LLC, Great Falls, Virginia,
    for Appellant.   Brian V. Ebert, BRIAN V. EBERT, P.C., Fairfax,
    Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Devil’s   Advocate,     LLC,       appeals        the    district    court’s
    order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and denying as
    moot its motion for partial summary judgment, docketed as Case
    No. 14-1561, and the court’s denial of its motion for recovery
    of time, attorney’s fees, and expenses, docketed as Case No. 14-
    1693.   We vacate the district court’s order in Case No. 14-1561
    and remand for further proceedings, and dismiss the appeal in
    Case No. 14-1693 as premature.
    Devil’s    Advocate   contends           that      the    district    court
    erred   in   granting    Defendants’        motion        to    dismiss    under    Rule
    12(b)(3) because the District Court for the Eastern District of
    Virginia was a both a proper venue under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
     (2012)
    and a permissible venue under the forum selection clause in the
    contract between the parties.          We agree that the district court
    erred in dismissing the complaint for improper venue under Rule
    12(b)(3).       “Whether     venue     is       .     .   .      ‘improper’       depends
    exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought
    satisfies    the   requirements      of”    §       1391(b);     a    forum   selection
    clause has no effect on the inquiry.                 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v.
    U.S. Dist. Ct., 
    134 S. Ct. 568
    , 577 (2013).                      Thus, “a case filed
    in a district that falls within § 1391 may not be dismissed
    under . . . Rule 12(b)(3).”          Id.     A review of the record reveals
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    that,     under       § 1391(b),      venue      in       this   case       is    proper       in   the
    Eastern District of Virginia.
    Moreover, we conclude that the doctrine of forum non
    conveniens        does       not     provide          a    basis      for        dismissing         the
    complaint.        See Atl. Marine Constr., 
    134 S. Ct. at 580
     (“[T]he
    appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to
    a   state   .     .    .    forum     is    through        the    doctrine         of    forum       non
    conveniens.”).             The forum selection clause at issue permits the
    filing of a complaint in the Alexandria Division of the Eastern
    District     of       Virginia.           See   FindWhere        Holdings,         Inc.    v.       Sys.
    Env’t     Optimization,            LLC,    
    626 F.3d 752
    ,      755    (4th       Cir.    2010)
    (adopting rule that “forum selection clauses that use the term
    ‘in   [a    state]’         express       the    parties’        intent      as    a    matter       of
    geography, permitting jurisdiction in both the state and federal
    courts     of    the       named    state”).           Thus,     we   vacate       the     district
    court’s     dismissal         order       in    Case      No.    14-1561         and    remand       for
    further proceedings. *
    *
    We decline to address Devil’s Advocate’s contention that
    the district court erred in denying as moot its motion for
    partial summary judgment. We instead leave consideration of the
    propriety of summary judgment to the district court in the first
    instance on remand. See Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 
    181 F.3d 544
    , 555 n.9 (4th Cir. 1999) (“It is the general rule . . .
    that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not
    passed upon below.”) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 
    428 U.S. 106
    ,
    120 (1976)).
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    In light of our disposition in No. 14-1561, and in the
    interest   of    judicial     economy,   we     decline   to   address    Devil’s
    Advocate’s      appeal   of      the   district      court’s    order     denying
    attorney’s fees and expenses at this juncture.                    We therefore
    dismiss Devil’s Advocate’s appeal in No. 14-1693.                     We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately   presented      in   the   materials     before    this    court   and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    No. 14-1561 VACATED AND REMANDED
    No. 14-1693 DISMISSED
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