United States v. Tawayne Love ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-7547
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TAWAYNE DEVONE LOVE, a/k/a Terry Wayne Love, a/k/a T-Wayne,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:03-cr-00187-1)
Submitted: May 25, 2021 Decided: June 7, 2021
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tawayne Devone Love, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tawayne Devone Love appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his
motions filed pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
132 Stat. 5194. We vacate the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration in light
of United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021), and United States v.
Lancaster, F.3d , No. 20-6571, 2021 WL 1823287 (4th Cir. May 7, 2021).
We previously held in United States v. Chambers that, “when imposing a new
sentence” under the First Step Act, “a court does not simply adjust the statutory minimum;
it must also recalculate the [Sentencing] Guidelines range.” 956 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “any Guidelines error deemed
retroactive . . . must be corrected in a First Step Act resentencing.” Id. at 668. We also
held that “the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors apply in the § 404(b) resentencing
context,” and a court “may consider post-sentencing conduct” in determining whether to
exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence. Id. at 674. Additionally, “the First Step Act
does not constrain courts from recognizing Guidelines errors,” id. at 668, or “preclude the
court from applying intervening case law,” id. at 672, in making its discretionary
determination.
In a prior appeal, we instructed the district court to reconsider its earlier order
denying Love’s motion in light of Chambers. United States v. Love, 814 F. App’x 779,
781 (4th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-6431(L)). On remand, the district court concluded that Love’s
Guidelines range did not change because he remained a career offender; however, the court
did not address Love’s argument that he was no longer a career offender under current law.
2
Moreover, while the district court addressed the § 3553(a) factors, it only engaged with
Love’s arguments regarding his postsentencing rehabilitation in a footnote.
In Collington, we clarified three steps a district court must take when considering a
request for relief under Section 404: (1) “district courts must accurately recalculate the
Guidelines sentence range,” (2) “district courts must correct original Guidelines errors and
apply intervening case law made retroactive to the original sentence,” and (3) “the court
must consider the § 3553(a) factors to determine what sentence is appropriate.” 995 F.3d
at 355. We further explained that “when a court exercises discretion to reduce a sentence,
the imposition of the reduced sentence must be procedurally and substantively reasonable.”
Id. at 358. Thus, a district court must “consider a defendant’s arguments, give individual
consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors,
determine—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence remains
appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain that decision.” Id. at 360.
We provided further guidance to district courts in Lancaster. We explained that a
district “court must engage in a brief analysis that involves the recalculation of the
Sentencing Guidelines in light of intervening case law.” 2021 WL 1823287, at *3 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This requires a district court to correct Guidelines errors based
on non-retroactive changes in the law. Id. at *4. We cautioned, however, that this “analysis
is not intended to be a complete or new relitigation of Guidelines issues or the § 3553(a)
factors.” Id. at *3.
Because the district court did not have the benefit of our decisions in Collington and
Lancaster, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration. By this
3
disposition, we express no view on the ultimate merits of Love’s motion. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
4