In re L.G. , 2021 Ohio 1947 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as In re L.G., 
    2021-Ohio-1947
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    SCIOTO COUNTY
    IN THE MATTER OF:                             :
    L.G.,                                : CASE NO. 20CA3928
    Adjudicated Dependent
    Child.                                : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    _________________________________________________________________
    APPEARANCES:
    George L. Davis, IV, Portsmouth, Ohio for appellant.1
    David M. Huddleston, New Boston, Ohio, for appellee.
    CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
    DATE JOURNALIZED:6-4-21
    ABELE, J.
    {¶1}     This is an appeal of a Scioto County Common Pleas Court,
    Juvenile Division, judgment that granted Scioto County Children
    Services (SCCS), appellee herein, permanent custody of L.G., the
    biological child of mother A.G., appellant herein.
    Appellant assigns one error for review:
    “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PERMANENT
    CUSTODY BECAUSE SUCH WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
    1
    Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
    court proceedings.
    2
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
    {¶2}   Appellant is the natural mother of L.G., born August 7,
    2008.   On June 7, 2017, appellee filed a complaint and motion for
    temporary emergency custody.   The complaint alleged L.G., an eight-
    year-old boy with severe autism spectrum disorder, to be a
    dependent child.   In particular, the complaint averred that,
    because L.G. lacked adequate parental care due to his mother’s
    mental or physical condition, the child’s condition or environment
    warranted the agency to assume his guardianship.
    {¶3}   Apparently, a June 6, 2017 report and subsequent SCCS
    home visit revealed that dirty diapers, food products, pizza boxes,
    and trash littered appellant’s home.   The complaint alleged
    appellant to be disheveled, confused, and that she informed law
    enforcement that “someone had invaded the house and did all the
    damage, and that the NSA had bugged her house.”    Officials also
    found L.G., dressed in a diaper and food-covered t-shirt that he
    had been wearing for at least two days.
    {¶4}   Law enforcement transported appellant to a mental health
    facility for evaluation and involuntary hospitalization.     An
    investigation also revealed an extensive history with L.G. due to
    his mother’s mental health issues and the child’s autism spectrum
    3
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    disorder diagnosis.   The child’s biological father lived out of
    state, and L.G.’s maternal grandmother, who had cared for him in
    the past, could not do so now.
    {¶5}   On June 7, 2017, the trial court issued an emergency care
    order.   SCCS then developed a case plan that appellant would need
    to undertake to protect L.G: (1) complete a mental health
    evaluation; (2) take all prescribed medications; (3) refrain from
    self-adjusting her medications; (4) regularly meet with her medical
    team; (5) keep her home clean, vacuum when necessary, wash dishes
    daily and take out the garbage; and (6) send L.G. to school daily.
    {¶6}   Subsequently, appellee requested permanent custody of the
    child.   SCCS asserted that L.G. had been in its temporary custody
    for more than 12 months out of a consecutive 22-month period.
    Appellee further claimed that appellant has bi-polar disorder, a
    history of discontinuing her medication, and that she can become
    “paranoid and delusional.”   SCCS also noted that it took custody of
    the child by parental agreement three times, and on four other
    occasions removed the child from his mother’s care.   The motion
    also stated that appellant had been involuntarily hospitalized for
    several months, released in October 2017 to a group home, but
    relapsed and was again hospitalized.
    4
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    {¶7}   The permanent custody motion further alleged that, after
    appellant’s April 2018 release from the state hospital, she
    increased her visits with L.G.    After SCCS placed L.G. on an
    “extended home visit” on December 19, 2018, a caseworker visited
    appellant’s home on January 11, 2019 and observed a visibly
    agitated L.G., who had been sent home from school due to his
    disruptive behavior.   The caseworker further observed that home
    conditions “were becoming a concern.”
    {¶8}   On January 23, 2019, appellant called the caseworker to
    accuse her of stealing appellant’s purse.     After the caseworker
    visited appellant’s home and searched for her purse, they found the
    purse under a chair cushion.     However, appellant’s home was in
    “disarray, with dirty clothes piled up, dirty dishes all over, and
    a broken-down bed frame in the dining room.”     Appellant blamed L.G.
    for the mess and said that she heard the voice of a “creeper” who
    tells L.G. to tear up papers and throw them on the floor.
    Appellant also accused the caseworker of stealing her keys.
    {¶9}   Due to L.G.’s behavior, SCCS transferred him to a
    different school.   However, the new school reported that L.G.’s
    outbursts had become very aggressive and caused concern for staff
    safety.    Meanwhile, appellant called SCCS’s hotline to report about
    5
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    SCCS stalking her.
    {¶10} The permanent custody motion further alleged that a
    caseworker and supervisor visited appellant’s home on March 1, 2019
    and discovered deteriorated mental condition and home conditions,
    and that L.G. exhibited aggressive behavior.   Consequently, SCCS
    removed L.G. from appellant’s home and, because of no other
    available placement, returned him to a home that specializes in
    children with autism spectrum disorder.   The permanent custody
    motion also alleged appellant’s inability to remain stable, to
    provide specialized care that L.G. requires, the absence of any
    area relatives who could provide for L.G., and the disruptions
    caused by repeated removals.
    {¶11} On November 26, 2019, the trial court held a hearing to
    consider appellee’s request for permanent custody.   Because L.G.’s
    biological father (E.I.) appeared for only the second time during
    the proceedings, the trial court appointed counsel for E.I. and
    continued the hearing.
    {¶12} On January 28, 2020, SCCS, appellant, appellant’s
    counsel, E.I., E.I.’s counsel and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
    appeared at the permanent custody hearing. E.I. testified that he
    also has bi-polar disorder, a “lack of experience with autistic
    6
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    children,” and that he had not seen L.G. since he was four-years-
    old.    E.I. testified that “with her being bipolar that there are
    mood swings and even if I have custody of him, I don’t think I
    would be any better than her and I think that we’re detrimental to
    his autism getting better.    So I’d rather give him to somebody * *
    * that can take care of him the way he’s supposed to be.”        E.I.
    agreed to terminate his parental rights and further opined that
    L.G. should not be returned to appellant.    E.I. testified that
    L.G.’s placement [with the specialized foster home] means that he
    is “getting help on his autism and our intervening is going to hurt
    him.”
    {¶13} SCCS Caseworker Naomi Kinsel testified that SCCS has been
    involved with L.G. since 2010, when they first removed him from
    appellant’s care through parental agreement.    SCCS removed L.G.
    again in October 2011, and returned him to appellant in September
    2012.    SCCS removed L.G. once again by parental agreement in
    February 2013 and August 2014.    Kinsel, who became the caseworker
    in 2014, testified that because appellant was “not taking her
    medications as prescribed and so, he was removed from the home
    again so that she could get herself together again.    Get the home
    cleaned up, get back on her meds, get back on track.”
    {¶14} Caseworker Kinsel explained that in January 2015,
    7
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    appellant’s mother, V.G., assumed L.G.’s legal custody for
    approximately six months.    However, there “was an incident at the
    home. [V.G.] couldn’t manage [L.G.’s] behavior.     I believe that was
    the time that he had gotten out of the house.     He had run away
    toward a neighbor’s house.    There was a pool.   He was going
    straight for the pool and we removed him then. * * * [V.G.]
    reported that she could no longer manage [L.G.].”     Thus, SCCS
    removed L.G. from V.G.’s custody in July 2015.     In October 2015,
    SCCS returned L.G. to appellant.
    {¶15} Caseworker Kinsel further testified that the current case
    began in June 2017 when SCCS received a call regarding L.G.’s
    living conditions.    Initially, SCCS attempted to work with
    appellant to keep L.G. with her, but when appellant was
    hospitalized SCCS removed L.G.     Appellant had been hospitalized
    from June 2017 until her release to a group home in October 2017.
    However, within a month appellant returned to the state hospital
    and remained there until April 2018.
    {¶16} After appellant secured appropriate housing, SCCS
    permitted visits with L.G. and also administered a December 2018
    trial placement.     Approximately one month later, appellant’s mental
    condition and living conditions again began to deteriorate.
    Caseworker Kinsel testified that, after appellant accused her of
    8
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    stealing her purse, Kinsel visited appellant’s home to help her
    search for the purse and observed the deteriorating living
    conditions.    Kinsel also testified that L.G. began to have problems
    in school “acting out in the classroom,” and the agency transferred
    him to another school.    Kinsel again visited appellant’s home at
    the end of February and found it “in disarray.    There were dirty
    clothes piling up in the bathroom.    Dirty dishes all over, cups
    needed to be thrown away.    The bedframe had been moved to the
    dining room.    It had been broken down and there was a mattress that
    was also moved on there. [Appellant] also reported to me that day
    that her keys were missing and she knew that I had them.     And, I
    did not * * * have any of her keys.”    Apparently, appellant blamed
    L.G. for the condition of the home.    Further, appellant informed
    Kinsel that she had “a creeper in the house, either in the house or
    outside of the house, that was telling [L.G.] to do these things. *
    * * [S]he said that she heard the voices tell [L.G.] to tear up the
    paper in the house.”    On March 1, 2019, SCCS removed L.G. and
    returned him to the special needs home in which he had been placed
    in 2017.   Kinsel explained that L.G. does well at the special needs
    home and that L.G. is nonverbal.    “He can say some words
    sporadically,” and understands prompts but cannot have a
    conversation.    The foster family is “willing to keep him in their
    9
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    home.   I’m not sure if they would ever adopt him or not, but they
    certainly don’t want him placed anywhere else.   They want him to
    stay with them.”
    {¶17} Caseworker Kinsel further testified that, during
    appellant’s visit with her son at McDonald’s, appellant acted in a
    condescending manner and filed a complaint that alleged that Kinsel
    controlled L.G. via radio control.   Appellant also accused Kinsel
    of assaulting her and L.G. with a taser, and that SCCS used remote
    devices to control appellant and L.G.   Kinsel also recalled one
    visit when appellant told her that someone had broken into her
    home, manipulated her with medications and raped her.   Appellant
    also told Kinsel that neighbors sift through her trash and that
    SCCS stalks her.   Kinsel did acknowledge that appellant and L.G.
    have a strong parental bond, and that appellant is affectionate
    with L.G.
    {¶18} On April 7, 2020, the permanent custody hearing continued
    and GAL Robert Johnson testified.    Johnson stated that he met with
    L.G. at least once at his mother’s home, once at his foster
    family’s home and that he had met with appellant several times.
    Johnson had concerns about appellant’s “ability to distinguish
    reality from what I think are delusions, paranoid delusions.”
    Johnson testified about experiences with appellant in which she
    10
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    believes that others manipulate and control both her and L.G.
    {¶19} V.G., appellant’s mother, testified that, after she lived
    in North Carolina for two years, she returned to the area in
    September   2019.    She last observed L.G. at the visit with
    appellant at McDonald’s and he seemed subdued and “zombiish.”     V.G.
    testified that she returned to Scioto County because of North
    Carolina’s high cost of living and that she also knew that
    appellant did not have custody of L.G.: “if I came back and she
    [appellant] was overwhelmed because an autistic child is more
    difficult to handle than a normal child.     You have to have eyes on
    them continually and I thought I could help her out a little bit,
    give her a break now and then so she could rest or something.”
    V.G. stated that she believed L.G. could be placed with appellant
    and that she is “there for her to fall back on if she needs me.”
    {¶20} Dustin Kesler, Case Manager at Ascend Counseling and
    Recovery, served as L.G.’s personal aide from October 2014 to
    February 2016.      Kesler testified that L.G. is in a better mood when
    with his grandmother and appellant than when he is in foster care.
    {¶21} Appellant testified that she did her best to raise L.G.
    and to provide for his needs.      Since SCCS removed L.G., there “have
    been a lot of home invasions, um, and toxins and their air. . .”
    11
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    When asked if her house is in better condition, she replied, “I
    don’t think anything’s really changed.   We improved the heating
    units and there have been more violations to the home.”   On cross
    examination, appellant testified about Caseworker Kinsel coming
    into her first grade classroom and:
    there was a manipulation in the classroom and the
    nineteen eighties government had issued, um, radio remote
    controls for children that were malbehaved. * * * IT was
    a new thing being passed around to all the classrooms,
    um, the state government was experimenting, um,
    privately, and um, anyway, Naomi, or whatever her name
    is, had left one of those little radio remote controls in
    the classroom and, um, one of these social workers had
    re-entered our classroom at some point with the
    malbehaved substitute teacher, used the radio, um, and,
    uh, infected my ear. At that same time a couple of
    malbehaved, older brunettes screamed at a high-pitch and
    ruined by inner ears, um, and uh, my inner brain. Um,
    so, that affected my memory, my focus and attention while
    we’re eating, um, it affected my inner calculator. I
    couldn’t do math problems in my head. I had to use
    paper. Um, and it also got to be a disability where I
    couldn’t use inter-brain mental communication or praying.
    I had a hard time mentally focusing. Um, and so, at that
    point the government did recall all of those radio
    control gadgets. Um, they had them recalled. They were
    illegal that year and just within a few months of being
    issued.
    {¶22} Appellant went on to explain that during her pregnancy,
    she received an “iron bomb” that poisoned her three times with
    toxins “by Mr. Bowman or his associates.”   Appellant also outlined
    “home invasions” when “court-placed lawyers” “play dirty and they
    do invade homes.”   Further, appellant testified that when L.G.
    12
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    comes for an extended stay, a “listening device or microphone, um,
    to tell, the voice on there told [L.G.] to tear up some paper and
    [L.G.] continued to tear up paper. * * *    Someone was actually,
    destroying this (inaudible) baby and putting his mother through a
    lot of pain.”    Appellant also described her neighbors: “the next
    door neighbor is a cold blooded, thieving, uh, murderer.    Two doors
    down is a drug dealing murderer.    Three doors down is a cold
    blooded freak.   Across the way in the other, in the other is a coal
    black thug, criminal killer.    I mean, it’s a daily process.”
    Appellant also claimed that Naomi (a caseworker),
    has been breaking through that lock, those locks, and
    have introduced, um, her presence in my house and has
    caused a mass hysteria in the neighborhood, among other
    social workers have done the same thing. Um, many people
    have invaded my home. People want to harm lovely young
    women that have no male around. It’s common. * * * This
    is nothing new.
    {¶23} Appellant described a summer 2018 incident that occurred
    after the court discharged her from the state hospital.    Appellant
    stated that she observed an SCCS employee or foster parent strike
    her child, foster parent grab her phone and purse, verbally abuse
    appellant and her mother, but then state that “[i]t was all a
    cover-up.”   Appellant further alleged that during the McDonald’s
    visit, SCCS tasered her.    When L.G. visited appellant, she claimed
    that he “was sedated” and both manipulated and assaulted.
    13
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    Appellant did acknowledge, however, that she informed the foster
    mother that she did not administer L.G.’s medications as
    prescribed.   Appellant testified that the reason she wants custody
    is:
    Love, education is a big issue. I think CPS has failed
    his education beyond, beyond, beyond what I was working
    with him on. So has ODE. I’m not sure what all the
    coordinated activities of them between MH or ODE and CPS
    and DD and TCC and SOMC, and, * * * LEE, and, um, I’m not
    sure what all the coordination events have been against
    someone that’s non-crime when professionals have prison
    sentences but it has been going on.
    Also, appellant stated that the day before the hearing she heard
    “three or four different” voices in her home.
    {¶24} On April 27, 2020, the trial court (1) awarded SCCS
    permanent custody of L.G.; (2) found that L.G. cannot be placed
    with either parent, or should not be placed with either parent,
    within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) determined that placing
    L.G. in appellee’s permanent custody is in L.G.’s best interest.
    The court further determined that the relationship between L.G. and
    appellant is detrimental to the child, and that appellant’s mental
    health disorder and struggle to differentiate “between reality and
    delusion” prevents her from appropriately caring for her child.
    Also, the court found that L.G. has been in appellee’s temporary
    custody since June 7, 2017.   Thus, the trial court granted
    14
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    appellee’s request for L.G.’s permanent custody.   This appeal
    followed.
    I.
    {¶25} In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that
    the trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.    In particular, appellant argues
    that: (1) she had been stable for at least six months before she
    regained custody of L.G., (2) SCCS should have given her more time
    than one month with L.G., and (3) she, in essence, has completed
    the case plan requirements.
    Permanent Custody Principles
    {¶26} In general, a parent has a “fundamental liberty interest”
    in the care, custody, and management of his or her child and an
    “essential” and “basic civil right” to raise his or her children.
    Santosky v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 753, 
    102 S.Ct. 1388
    , 
    71 L.Ed.2d 599
     (1982).   A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute.   In re
    D.A., 
    113 Ohio St.3d 88
    , 
    2007-Ohio-1105
    , 
    862 N.E.2d 829
    , ¶ 11.
    Rather, “ ‘it is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * *
    are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is
    the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’ ” In re
    Cunningham, 
    59 Ohio St.2d 100
    , 106, 
    391 N.E.2d 1034
     (1979), quoting
    15
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    In re R.J.C., 
    300 So.2d 54
    , 58 (Fla.App. 1974); accord In re B.S.,
    4th Dist. Jackson No. 19CA6, 
    2019-Ohio-4143
    , ¶ 41.
    Standard of Review
    {¶27} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial
    court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.   In re R.M., 
    2013-Ohio-3588
    ,
    
    997 N.E.2d 169
    , ¶ 53 (4th Dist.); In re T.J., 4th Dist. Highland
    Nos. 15CA15 and 15CA16, 
    2016-Ohio-163
    , ¶ 25; In re I.W., 4th Dist.
    Pike No. 19CA902, 
    2020-Ohio-3112
    , ¶ 18.   When an appellate court
    reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ weighs
    the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
    credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving
    conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its
    way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
    [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ”   Eastley v.
    Volkman, 
    132 Ohio St.3d 328
    , 
    2012-Ohio-2179
    , 
    972 N.E.2d 517
    , ¶ 20,
    quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 
    141 Ohio App.3d 103
    , 115, 
    750 N.E.2d 176
    (9th Dist.2001), quoting State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    ,
    387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983).
    16
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    {¶28} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a
    reviewing court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings * * *
    were supported by clear and convincing evidence.”   In re K.H., 
    119 Ohio St.3d 538
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4825
    , 
    895 N.E.2d 809
    , ¶ 32.   In
    determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and
    convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to
    determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before
    it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.”   State v. Schiebel,
    
    55 Ohio St.3d 71
    , 74, 
    564 N.E.2d 54
     (1990).   “Thus, if the children
    services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon
    which the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief
    that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is
    not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”   R.M. at ¶ 55; In
    re K.M., 4th Dist. Highland No. 20CA4 & 20CA6, 
    2020-Ohio-4476
    , ¶
    38.
    {¶29} When reviewing evidence under this standard, appellate
    courts generally defer to a trial court’s determination of
    credibility matters, which are crucial in these cases when a
    written record may not adequately reflect a witness’s demeanor and
    attitude.   Eastley at ¶ 21; Davis v. Flickinger, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 415
    ,
    419, 
    674 N.E.2d 1159
     (1997).   A reviewing court should find a trial
    17
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    court’s permanent custody decision against the manifest weight of
    the evidence only in the “ ‘ exceptional case in which the evidence
    weighs heavily against the decision.’ ”   
    Id.,
     quoting Martin at
    175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    .
    Statutory Framework
    {¶30} A children services agency may obtain permanent custody
    of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect, or
    dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a motion
    under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody.    In this
    case, appellee sought permanent custody of the child under a R.C.
    2151.413 motion.   When an agency files a R.C. 2151.413 permanent
    custody motion, R.C. 2151.414 applies.    R.C. 2151.414(A).
    {¶31} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides that a trial court may grant
    a children services agency permanent custody of a child if the
    court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child’s
    best interest would be served by the award of permanent custody,
    and (2) any of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply.
    {¶32} In the case sub judice, the trial court found that L.G.
    has been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of
    a consecutive 22-month period.   Thus, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)
    18
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    applies. Because appellant does not challenge the trial court’s
    R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding, we do not address it.
    {¶33} The trial court also thoroughly addressed R.C.
    2151.414(D)’s best-interest framework.   To determine the best
    interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of
    this section of the Revised Code, R.C. 4151.414(D)(1) instructs
    courts to consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited
    to:
    (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child
    with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster
    caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other
    person who may significantly affect the child;
    (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the
    child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due
    regard for the maturity of the child;
    (c) Custodial history of the child, including whether the
    child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
    public children services agencies * * * for twelve or
    more months of a consecutive twenty-month period ending
    on or after March 18, 1999;
    (d) The child’s need for a legally secure placement and
    whether that type of placement can be achieved without a
    grant of permanent custody to the agency;
    (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to
    (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and
    child.
    {¶34} Consequently, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a court “to
    consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including five enumerated
    19
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    statutory factors * * * No one element is given greater weight or
    heightened significance.”   In re C.F., 
    113 Ohio St.3d 73
    , 2007-
    Ohio-1104, 
    862 N.E.2d 816
    , ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 
    111 Ohio St.3d 498
    , 
    2006-Ohio-5513
    , 
    857 N.E.2d 532
    , ¶ 6.
    {¶35} In applying the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, the trial
    court in the case at bar found that it is in the child’s best
    interests to terminate appellant’s parental rights for the
    following reasons:
    {¶36} As for the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) “the interaction and
    interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings,
    relatives, foster care givers and out-of-home providers, and any
    other person who may significantly affect the child,” the trial
    court determined that appellant’s relationship with L.G. is
    detrimental to the child.   While the court readily acknowledged
    appellant’s love for her son and her desire to love and care for
    him, the court questioned appellant’s ability to care for her
    child.   The court stated that (1) the “testimony presented is
    uncontroverted that [appellant] suffers from a mental health
    disorder,” (2) appellant acknowledged that she did not administer
    her son’s prescribed medications because she disagrees with them,
    and (3) appellant believes that she knows more about her mental
    health conditions than any of her physicians.     The court concluded
    20
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    that appellant’s bipolar disorder causes her to struggle “with
    differentiating between reality and delusion” and “these delusions
    will at times prevent [appellant] from appropriately caring for her
    child.”
    {¶37} The trial court also noted that L.G’s relationship with
    his father is non-existent, a word used by L.G.’s father who admits
    to not having seen L.G. since he was approximately four years old.
    The court indicated that L.G.’s father testified that he recognizes
    that he is not in a position to care for L.G. and that L.G. is
    better served in the permanent custody of SCCS.   Finally, the court
    recognized that L.G. appears to be well-cared for and content in
    his foster home, and although the foster family “may not wish to
    adopt [L.G.], they do wish to keep him in their home.”
    {¶38} As for the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) “wishes of the child,”
    the trial court indicated that it did not conduct an in-camera
    interview due to “the child’s diagnosis of autism and testimony
    from multiple witnesses that the child is non-verbal and severely
    limited in his ability to communicate.”   The court noted that
    appellant also agreed that such an interview would be futile.    The
    court did, however, receive input concerning the child’s wishes
    from the GAL report.
    21
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    {¶39} For the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) factor concerning the
    child’s “custodial history,” the court determined that:
    the child has been involved with or in the custody of CSB
    on multiple occasions since September 2010. He has been
    removed by parental agreement with CSB on multiple
    occasions; he has been placed in the temporary custody of
    the agency with legal custody ultimately being vested
    with his maternal grandmother; temporary custody has been
    awarded to CSB with custody of the child being returned
    to his mother; ultimately resulting in his removal in
    June 2017 and his temporary custody remaining with CSB.
    {¶40} As for the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) “need for a legally
    secure permanent placement” and the ability to achieve placement
    without a grant of permanent custody to the agency, the court
    found:
    [T]he Court has no doubt of the love of this mother for
    her child. However, it is abundantly clear that Ms.
    G[.....] cannot care for this child. It is clear from
    her own testimony that Ms. G[.....] suffers from frequent
    delusions. Ms. G[.....] has testified that she heard 3
    or 4 voices telling her things as recently as the day
    before the hearing. She has testified that she has heard
    voices telling her son to do things. She rationalized
    [L.G.]’s behavior based on hearing these voices. On the
    one hand she displays delusions of grandeur as
    illustrated by her comments that [L.G.] ‘has acquired
    much more academic skill from her than any other teacher’
    and that she ‘thinks she understands more about her
    mental health than any of her doctors can comprehend.’
    But on the other, she displays paranoid delusions as
    evidenced by her statements that the government has
    placed radio devices in classrooms to control students;
    that she has been drugged and raped; that others have
    broken into her home on multiple occasions; and her focus
    on Ms. Kinsel and accusing Ms. Kinsel of stealing from
    her and assaulting her. The Court is of the opinion that
    22
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    although Ms. G[.....] may not deliberately harm her
    child, it isn’t difficult to envision a time or occasion
    where her delusions cause her to act out toward her son.
    She has already withheld medication from him, because she
    did not think it necessary that he have it.
    {¶41} Finally, concerning R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) and whether
    any factor in divisions (E)(7) to (11) apply in relation to the
    parents and to the child, the trial court found that R.C.
    2151.414(E)(8) “may apply in that [appellant] has withheld medical
    treatment, in the form of medication, from the child and not for
    treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone or in accordance
    with the tenets of a recognized religious body.”   After a thorough
    review of the testimony, the trial court determined that the
    appellant’s parental rights termination is in the child’s best
    interest.
    {¶42} Appellant does not dispute L.G.’s temporary custody for
    12 of 22 months, so we do not address it.   However, appellant
    contends that (1) the trial court erred in finding that permanent
    custody is in the child’s best interest, (2) the trial court
    “simply blamed mother’s mental health” and granted the permanent
    custody motion without a meaningful analysis of the best interest
    of the child factors, and (3) the “real obstacle between Appellant
    and her son was Scioto County Children Services Board and an
    irritated caseworker.”   Further, appellant argues that although her
    23
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    initial hospitalization and deplorable home conditions formed the
    genesis of L.G.’s removal, at the time of the permanent custody
    hearing she “was no longer institutionalized, was maintaining a
    stable and cleaner home, and would have been able to care for her
    son again if given the chance.”
    {¶43} Our review of the record reveals the long-standing issues
    in this case and SCCS multiple attempts to reunite this family.        As
    appellee points out, the child has been in SCCS’s care on seven
    different occasions.   After appellant’s hospitalization, SCCS
    returned L.G. to appellant for an extended visit to determine
    whether appellant could safely care for the child.   However, the
    child’s condition, appellant’s mental condition, and their living
    conditions rapidly deteriorated.   Moreover, L.G.’s caseworker and
    the GAL testified about multiple instances of appellant’s inability
    to distinguish reality from delusion.   Finally, and sadly,
    appellant’s own testimony supported the trial court’s conclusion
    concerning appellant’s inability to distinguish reality from
    delusion and to properly care for her child.
    {¶44} Consequently, after our review, we agree with the trial
    court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the
    finding that the child should not be placed with appellant.      The
    conditions that led to the child’s removal included appellant’s
    24
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    serious mental health issues, appellant’s inability to maintain a
    safe, stable, and permanent home, and appellant’s bipolar disorder
    and hospitalization.   SCCS became involved when L.G.’s safety was
    in jeopardy and, although appellant’s condition improved
    sufficiently to be released from hospitalization, she believed that
    she knows more about her condition than her physicians, and that
    she continues to suffer from multiple paranoid delusions.   A
    reading of appellant’s testimony reveals rambling and stark
    examples of paranoia and delusions.   Appellant accused SCCS staff
    members, foster parents, and others of manipulating her, stealing
    from her, and harming her and her son.   See In re S.C., 9th Dist.
    Summit No. 27676, 
    2015-Ohio-2623
    , ¶ 41 (mother’s delusions and
    paranoia contributed to trial court granting permanent custody to
    agency); In re D.G., __ N.E.3d __, 
    2021-Ohio-429
     (1st Dist.), ¶ 19
    (given extensive evidence of mother’s delusional behavior and
    demonstrated impact on her ability to provide a stable and secure
    environment for child, trial court’s decision to award permanent
    custody affirmed).
    {¶45} As the trial court and appellee both candidly agree,
    appellant’s love for her son is unquestionable.   However, we agree
    with the trial court that clear and convincing evidence exists to
    support the view that appellant’s chronic mental illness and
    25
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    delusions render her unable to appropriately care for her son, and
    to provide an adequate permanent home.   Consequently, after our
    review in the case sub judice, we agree with the trial court’s
    conclusion that appellee adduced ample competent, credible clear
    and convincing evidence to support the determination that a
    permanent custody award is warranted and in the child’s best
    interest.
    {¶46} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
    overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    26
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed.   Appellee shall
    recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
    directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division,
    to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
    pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
    For the Court
    BY:_____________________________
    Peter B. Abele, Judge
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
    final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
    commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
    27
    SCIOTO, 20CA3928
    TOPICS & ISSUES
    Permanent custody–trial court’s decision to award children
    services agency permanent custody of child not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence when mother’s chronic mental illness and
    delusions render her unable to care for her son.